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INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation examines a paradox inherent in modern ideals of sovereign authority, 
and argues that several democratic paradoxes identified by contemporary theorists are instances 
of this more fundamental paradox of sovereignty.  By calling attention to the paradoxical nature 
of modern sovereignty, I aim to do for sovereignty what theorists like Bonnie Honig, Alan 
Keenan, Seyla Benhabib, and Carol Gould have done for democracy: To show that its 
importance and value lie, not in the way that it axiomatically frames or founds a particular 
people’s politics, but in the ways that it invites, sustains, and indeed requires ongoing political 
contest over the constitution and the identity of ‘the people’ itself.   
Sovereignty is a very powerful political norm that has been articulated, defined, and 
enacted in very diverse ways.1  I focus on a modern ideal of sovereignty that is frequently, 
although perhaps too simplistically, associated with the 1648 Treaties of Westphalia and the 
subsequent development of the modern interstate system.2  According to this ideal, sovereignty is 
internally supreme, externally independent, and bounded political authority.3  This basic 
                                                
    1 Several broad studies of sovereignty have been especially influential on my project: F. H. Hinsley, 
Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Steven Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999); Robert Jackson, Sovereignty (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2007); Jean Bethke 
Elshtain, Sovereignty: God, State and the Self (New York: Basic Books, 2008); Joanne Pemberton, Sovereignty: 
Interpretations (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).  
    2 Joseph Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).  
Recent studies have challenged the significance of the Treaties of Westphalia as a clear turning point in the 
development of modern sovereignty.  See John Gerard Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing 
Modernity in International Relations,” International Organization 47, no. 1 (1993): 139-174; Hendrick Spruyt, The 
Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Benno Teschke, The Myth of 
1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations (London: Verso, 2003); Hannes Lacher, 
Beyond Globalization: Capitalism, Territoriality and the International Relations of Modernity (London: Routledge, 
2006); Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006).   
    3 “Sovereignty requires independence from any outside power and final authority over men who live within 
certain boundaries.”  Strayer, Medieval Origins, 58.  This is obviously a simple and schematic conceptualization of a 
very fluid political ideal, and it will be significantly complicated and clarified in Chapter 2.  However, the four 
components of the general definition (internal supremacy, external independence, boundedness, and authority) 
comprise a relatively unchanging core that defines modern sovereignty through its various historical articulations.  
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conception of sovereignty is sometimes regarded as a classical or standard view of sovereignty; 
throughout this dissertation, I refer to it as the ‘general definition’ of sovereignty or, simply, ‘the 
modern ideal’ of sovereignty.  The modern ideal of sovereignty as supreme, independent, and 
bounded authority is inherently paradoxical, I argue, insofar as it presents sovereignty as a 
particular kind of authority that authoritatively constitutes the source of its own authorization.     
 Contemporary political theory has given much attention to the purportedly paradoxical 
nature of democracy, but not to this more foundational paradox of sovereignty.  Although there 
are several distinct and important versions of “the democratic paradox,” I focus on a paradox of 
democratic constitution, which expresses the logical and practical impossibility of constituting a 
democratic people—a demos—according to democratically legitimate means.4  A demos cannot 
be constituted democratically because any genuinely democratic (or democratically legitimated) 
procedure for constitution presupposes the very demos that it would engender.  Because the 
demos that could legitimate the act of constitution does not exist prior to that act, democratic 
                                                
For theoretical and historical studies that characterize modern sovereignty as supreme, independent, and bounded 
political authority, see: Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society (Boston: Allen and 
Unwin, 1986), 3, 5; Spruyt, The Sovereign State, 3, 36; Julie Bunck and Michael Fowler, Law, Power, and the 
Sovereign State: The Evolution and Application of the Concept of Sovereignty (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania 
State Press, 1995), 36-7; David Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1995), 
36; Krasner, Sovereignty, 3-4, 2-25; James Caporaso, “Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public 
Authority and Sovereignty,” International Studies Review 2:2 (2000): 2, 5, 10; Daniel Philpott, “Usurping the 
Sovereignty of Sovereignty?,” World Politics 53, no. 2 (2001): 316, and Revolutions in Sovereignty (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001) 16-9; Julie Mostov, Soft Borders: Rethinking Sovereignty and Democracy 
(London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004) 19-20; Charles Maier, “Transformations of Territoriality: 1600-2000” in 
Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien, G. Budde, G., et al, eds.  (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 2006), 35; Robert Jackson, Sovereignty, 6, 10-12. 
    4 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), 175-6; Robert Dahl, After the 
Revolution? Authority in a Good Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 46; Frederick Whelan, 
“Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem,” in Nomos 25: Liberal Democracy, J. Pennock and J. 
Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University Press, 1983), 13-47; William Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 139; Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: 
Verso, 2000); Benhabib, Rights of Others, 455, 206, and Another Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 33-5, 167; Carol Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 39-41, 174-5; Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker, eds. The Paradox of Constitutionalism: 
Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Sofia Nasström, “The 
Legitimacy of the People,” Political Theory 35, no. 5 (2007): 624-658; Arash Abizadeh, “Democratic Theory and 
Border Coercion,” Political Theory 36, no. 1 (2008): 37-65, Bonnie Honig, Emergency Politics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2009), 12-39. 
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self-constitution always outpaces, or exceeds, democratic legitimacy.  This paradox is 
philosophically and politically significant because it marks at the level of theory an inherent limit 
to what can be done, at the level of practice, in the name of one of our highest political norms.  
The paradox of sovereignty is similar to the paradox of democratic constitution.  As I will 
argue, the modern ideal of sovereignty indicates a particular kind of political authority that, in 
order to be internally supreme and externally independent, must constitute its own collective 
subject—‘the people’—over which it is exercised.  At the same time however, sovereignty, like 
all forms of political authority, cannot function without the authorization of its subject.  Whereas 
authority in general depends upon authorization by the individual subjects that it commands, 
sovereignty in particular depends upon authorization by the collective subject that it commands 
and constitutes.  Every sovereign—whether it is a single monarch or an entire people, and 
regardless of whether its authority is exercised through unitary or divided institutions—is 
ultimately indebted, for its sovereign authority, to the constituted people over which that 
authority is exercised.  According to the modern ideal of sovereignty, then, the exercise of 
sovereign authority constitutes its own collective subject but, paradoxically, cannot be exercised 
without authorization from the very collective subject that it constitutes.  Sovereignty authority, 
in other words, engenders the people from which it emanates.  That is the paradox of 
sovereignty.  Whereas the paradox of democratic constitution indicates a limit to what can be 
accomplished by democratic decision-making procedures, the paradox of sovereignty indicates a 
limit to the ways that supreme and independent authority can be exercised over (and potentially 
by) a people. 
Democratic theorists note that the paradox of democratic constitution does not only 
appear in mythical moments of political founding.  Nor is it limited to exceptional moments of 
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reconstitution, as when a revolutionary assembly convenes to constitute a new body politic, or 
suffragists extend the demos to include the previously disenfranchised.  Rather, the clear 
appearance of the paradox in these exceptional moments tells us something about the normal 
functioning of democracy.  Democracies are continually reconstituting themselves through the 
myriad and mundane acts of inclusion, exclusion, enfranchisement, naturalization, entitlement, 
and subjection by which the boundaries of the demos are established, policed, and maintained by 
its agents.5  Beyond this, the demos continually reconstitutes itself through the self-government 
that is characteristic of democracy: “Every act of self-legislation is also an act of self-
constitution.  ‘We, the people’ who agree to bind ourselves by these laws, are also defining 
ourselves as a “we” in the very act of self-legislation.”6  Because the everyday activity of 
democratic politics involves the reconstitution of the democratic body politic, democratic politics 
invokes the paradox of democracy every day. 
The paradox of sovereignty is similarly persistent.  Sovereign authority is exercised both 
within and over the boundaries that are essential to it.  By continually establishing, maintaining, 
regulating, and policing the spatial, civic, and ideological boundaries of its jurisdiction, a 
sovereign continually constitutes the collective subject that is circumscribed by those boundaries.  
In order for this continual process of constitution to be authoritative, however, it must be 
continually authorized by the constituted collective subject itself.  Thus, the paradox of 
sovereignty arises in all of the acts of bounding and bordering by which a sovereign determines 
who is, and who is not, a member of the people that is its collective subject.  The sovereign’s 
continual constitution of the people always outpaces, or exceeds, its sovereign authority.  
                                                
    5 Honig, Emergency Politics, 15. 
    6 Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism, 33.  
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This does not, however, entail the finality or incontestability of sovereign acts of 
constitution.  Just the opposite.  The paradox of sovereignty expresses a circular interdependence 
of constitution and authorization that cannot be broken by any invocation of God, nature, nation, 
territory, tradition, or raison d’état, or any arbitrary political act, as a pre-political and 
incontestable source of either the sovereign’s authority or the people’s constitution.  This is what 
an analysis of the paradox of democratic constitution reveals concerning the more fundamental 
paradox of sovereignty: Because every sovereign constitutes the basis of its own authority—its 
collective subject—the constitutive authority of any sovereign, and the constitution of its subject, 
always remain politically contestable, indeterminate, and incomplete.   
Insofar as modern sovereignty is idealized as unambiguous internal supremacy and 
inviolable external independence, ‘sovereignty’ would appear to name a particular end of, rather 
than an occasion for, political contestation.  Nevertheless, although sovereign authority is 
exercised through acts of self-bounding and bordering that are indeed acts of political closure, 
the paradoxically interrelated preconditions and effects of this closure—the authority of the 
sovereign and the constitution of the people—themselves remain open sites for critical political 
engagement.  Like the paradox of democracy, then, the paradox of sovereignty is politically 
productive rather than obstructive.  It is because a demos cannot legitimately constitute itself 
once and for all that democracy is a dynamic, creative, and potentially just mode of political 
contest.  Similarly, it is because a sovereign cannot authoritatively constitute its subject once and 
for all that sovereignty is, and should be recognized as, a dynamic, creative, and thoroughly 
contestable mode of political organization. 
These claims will be substantiated over the course of four chapters and a brief interlude 
between Chapters 2 and 3.  In Chapter 1, I develop an account of political authority that will be 
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used, in later chapters, to analyze the modern ideal of sovereignty.  Although I draw upon 
normative theories of authority and political obligation, my account is descriptive rather than 
normative.  I do not deny that authority is a normative concept, but I follow Max Weber and 
Hannah Arendt in focusing on questions of what authority is, how it is exercised, and how it can 
be resisted or forfeited, rather than on questions concerning whether or not authority relations 
involve moral obligations or duties to obey certain commands.  In doing so, I substantiate a claim 
about authority that underlies the modern ideal of sovereignty, namely that political authority 
must be authorized by the subjects over which it is exercised.  Every authority depends, for its 
authority, upon its subjects.  
In Chapter 2, I examine the three other components of the modern ideal of sovereignty: 
internal supremacy, external independence, and boundedness.  In order to be supreme and 
independent in the relevant senses, sovereign authority must be not merely bounded, but self-
bounding.  By determining the limits of its own authority, I argue, a sovereign circumscribes its 
subjects within its jurisdiction and constitutes them, by virtue of their shared subjection, as a 
collective subject.  Sovereign authority, in other words, is constitutive authority.  Sovereigns 
constitute, at least in a ‘thin’ sense, the collective subjects over which they rule.  This important 
aspect of internal (or domestic) sovereignty is conceptually and politically inseparable from more 
commonly studied aspects of external (or international) sovereignty. 
In the interlude between Chapters 2 and 3, I combine the arguments of the previous 
chapters in order to clarify the paradox of sovereignty.  Sovereignty is, according to its modern 
idealization, a kind of authority that authoritatively constitutes the source of its authorization.  I 
illustrate the paradox with a brief discussion of Hegel and Marx, who, when read together, 
illuminate a political ambiguity at the core of the modern ideal of sovereignty.  I then preview 
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my argument that the paradox of democratic constitution is a species of the more fundamental 
paradox of sovereignty. 
In Chapter 3, I identify different expressions of the paradox of sovereignty in the political 
philosophy of Niccolò Machiavelli, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Emmanuel Sieyès, each of 
whom directly engage the circular relation of authorization and constitution that is essential to 
modern sovereignty.  Over the course of the chapter, I show that the paradox of sovereignty is 
not exclusive to either absolutist or popular sovereignty, and that it in fact marks a continuity 
between these forms of political organization.  I end the chapter with a discussion of Sieyès’s 
failure to ground the paradox of sovereignty in a purportedly pre-political (and so unauthorized 
and unconstituted) source of political authority and constitution.  By arguing that the bases of 
political authority and constitution are always themselves political, I begin to connect the 
paradox of sovereignty to the paradoxes of democratic constitution. 
In Chapter 4, I examine different but related articulations of the paradox of democratic 
constitution in the work of Frederick Whelan, Seyla Benhabib, and Carol Gould.  I then argue 
that these particularly democratic paradoxes are instances of the more fundamental paradox of 
sovereignty.  Once this is understood, the paradoxes of democratic constitution can be made to 
shed light on the paradox of sovereignty.  In particular, they affirm what is suggested by the 
discussion of Sieyès in the previous chapter: that the depoliticization of either the authority of the 
sovereign, or the constitution of the people, is itself a politically contestable act that cannot 
effectively dissolve the paradox of sovereignty.  Exactly this kind of depoliticization, I argue, has 
been facilitated by the persistent modern connection between sovereignty and territoriality, 
which presents the composition of the sovereign’s collective subject as a fact of geography rather 
than an effect of a particular (and paradoxical) political relation.  As alternatives to this 
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inadequate way of negotiating the paradox, I critically examine Benhabib’s and Gould’s 
proposals for responding to the paradoxes of democracy with political contest rather than 
political closure.  The paradox of sovereignty, I conclude, demands continual political contest 
over the acts of political constitution that are both the expressions and sources of sovereign 
authority.
 1 
CHAPTER I 
 
AUTHORITY 
 
It is widely agreed that sovereignty is a kind of political authority.7  However, the concept 
of authority itself is often unexplored by contemporary theorists of sovereignty, and occasionally 
an author will simply refer to a prevalent account of authority as if it can be imported, without 
modification, into an account of sovereignty.8  Rather than make the same assumption, in this 
chapter I outline what I will call a political account of political authority.  I will both retain and 
complicate this account in the following chapters, where I argue that sovereignty is a unique—
and uniquely paradoxical—form of political authority. 
By emphasizing that mine is a political account of political authority, I mean to distance 
myself from important debates concerning the moral justification of authority.  I turn to those 
normative debates—and the thought of Robert Paul Wolff and Joseph Raz in particular—in order 
to borrow what I take to be compelling descriptions of political authority, its functions, and its 
stakes.  However, I do not take up their central questions concerning whether or why authority is 
morally justified.  This is not because such questions are insignificant, but because my larger 
project—an investigation of sovereign authority—does not make claims about the morality of 
sovereignty.  Consequently, I do not intend my own descriptive account of authority to directly 
                                                
7 Allen Buchanan’s Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) is an 
instructive exception.  Buchanan links sovereignty to political legitimacy, but sharply distinguishes the latter from 
political authority.  He does so in order to avoid serious objections to normative theories that attempt to ground 
political authority in moral obligation.  On Buchanan’s view, sovereignty need not, and does not, make reference to 
any obligation to obey (187, 234-249).  I engage Buchanan’s work more directly in Chapter 2.  Here I simply note 
my agreement that a theory of sovereignty does not require an account of moral obligation.  While I theorize 
sovereignty as a kind of political authority, I do not understand authority in terms of moral obligation, so my work 
does not depend upon the kinds of arguments and concepts that Buchanan rightly rejects. 
8 See, for instance, Matthew Noah Smith, “Rethinking Sovereignty, Rethinking Revolution,” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 36 no. 4 (2008): 421. 
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compete with Wolff’s and Raz’s normative arguments concerning the moral justification of 
authority.  Nonetheless, I charitably reconstruct and then criticize their portrayals of authority 
just enough, I hope, to clear space for my own. 
What ultimately distances my account of political authority from these familiar debates is 
my focus on the political contestability and negotiability, rather than the moral propriety, of 
political authority.  Drawing upon Max Weber and Hannah Arendt, as well as some key insights 
of Wolff and Raz, I outline a descriptive account of authority that acknowledges the moral 
arbitrariness at the heart of many actual authority relations.  Political authority is primarily a 
political concept, and politics, far from being a branch of applied ethics, involves the contest and 
negotiation of social relations that, regardless of their ultimate moral justification, deeply 
structure our actions and lives.9  ‘Authority’ is the name of one such relation, and its grip on us 
does not depend exclusively on its moral status.10   
Authority relations are political relations insofar as the impositions of authority express 
an agency that is alien to, and potentially in conflict with, the agency of the subject over which 
authority is exercised.  In this chapter, I am particularly interested in the ways that authorities 
and subjects negotiate this potential conflict of agency, and the ways that their interactions 
constrain or broaden, and foreclose or open, the avenues of practical action available to each 
other.  Despite the significant merits of Wolff’s and Raz’s views regarding the moral justification 
of political authority, I argue below that neither Wolff nor Raz focuses on the potentially 
                                                
9 My formulation of this point is influenced by Raymond Guess’s Philosophy and Real Politics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2008), 1-18.  
10 This is not to deny that authority is a normative concept.  Even merely de facto authorities rely upon the 
inherent normativity of the concept when they claim authority.  See below, page 10-15, 38-40.  In my descriptive 
account of this normative concept, I attempt to explain how this normativity is articulated, attributed, and appealed 
to in negotiations between authorities and subjects.  I do not take up the important task of asking whether authority 
is itself moral or legitimate, but I do describe the various aspects of authority relations that, in specific cases, can be 
normatively evaluated.  Ultimately, I do not need an account of the moral justification of authority (or of political 
obligation) because I am attempting a philosophical interpretation of, rather than argument for, the modern ideal 
sovereignty.  
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conflictual interaction of agencies that defines authority as a political relation.  I signal this now, 
not to raise a premature objection to Wolff’s and Raz’s accounts, which have influenced my 
own, but to indicate a line of inquiry that differs from the important moral inquiries that 
dominate contemporary philosophical debates on authority.11  
By theorizing political authority in terms of contestable social relations, rather than moral 
duties, I am not claiming that authority is identical to, or reducible to, blunt power.  Despite their 
very different presuppositions and conclusions, Weber, Wolff, Raz, and Arendt all agree that the 
compelling force of authority involves a claim to rightfulness that distinguishes it from coercive 
power.  Following Weber and Arendt, I argue that the importance of this claim is not its moral 
legitimacy (the claim to rightfulness may be wrong or invalid, and authority may be morally 
unjustified), but the fact that the claim must be acknowledged, accepted, or recognized by the 
subject over whom authority is exercised.  Authority makes an appeal to the independent 
judgment of its subject, and the subject has an active role to play in authorizing the authority that 
commands her.  In other words, while power can be exercised over persons as if they were mere 
objects, authority depends upon the autonomous agency of the subject over whom it is exercised.  
This claim, which will be the conclusion of the present chapter, is essential to understanding the 
paradoxical nature of sovereign authority. 
In part I of this chapter, I examine the influential theories of authority developed by 
Weber, Wolff, Raz, and Arendt in order to lay a foundation for my own brief account of political 
authority.  In clarifying the shared commitments and disagreements that connect these thinkers, I 
                                                
11 By sketching a political account of political authority, and distinguishing this account from moral accounts, I 
do not mean to imply that authority relations do not pose crucial moral questions, or that authority is an amoral 
phenomenon.  Regarding the moral justification of authority, I am somewhat sympathetic to the philosophical 
anarchist positions of Wolff and especially A. John Simmons.  If authority is as Wolff or Simmons describes it, then 
a heavy burden falls upon those who would offer moral justifications of authority relations.  Below, however, I note 
my reservations concerning Wolff’s description of subjection to authority; some of these reservations would apply to 
Simmons as well.  See A. John Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), especially chapters 3, 4, 6, and 7. 
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make no attempt to summarize every aspect of their thought.  Nor do I pretend that these four 
thinkers represent every important descriptive or normative position concerning political 
authority.  My aim is simply to develop an informed and productive working account of 
authority based on the shared commitments of these very different thinkers.  Despite highlighting 
their methodological and substantive differences, I emphasize a common thread that runs 
throughout Weber’s, Wolff’s, Raz’s, and Arendt’s accounts of authority.  For all of these 
thinkers, authority cannot be exercised without the active participation of its subjects in their 
own subjection. 
 Clarifying this common commitment will open a space for the political account of 
authority that I develop in part II of this chapter.  There, I emphasize the contestability and 
durability of political authority, as well as the ways that authority makes claims upon, but 
ultimately preserves, the autonomy of its subject.  I conclude the chapter by defending the claim 
that all authorities continually depend, for their authority, upon their subjects.  This is a claim 
about the political relations, rather than moral justifications, that are required for the effective 
exercise of political authority.  I will return to this claim and complicate it in Chapters 2 and 3, 
where I examine modern and contemporary theories of sovereign authority. 
 
Part I: Descriptive and Normative Theories of Authority 
 
Weber on authority 
In his very influential conceptualization of authority, Max Weber does not fundamentally 
separate authority (Herrschaft) from power (Macht).12  Whereas power is “the probability that 
                                                
12 For discussions of the terms and translations that have influenced this section, see Max Weber, Economy and 
Society, 2 vols., ed. by Guenther Roth and Clause Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 62 fn. 
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one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite 
resistance,” authority is a particular kind of power, namely the “assured power to issue 
commands.”13  Authority overcomes resistance in a particular way, namely by soliciting 
obedience, which is a form of compliance wherein “the action of the person obeying follows in 
essentials such a course that the content of the command may be taken to have become the basis 
of action for its own sake.”14  Elaborating on the “the authoritarian power of command,” Weber 
writes: 
The manifested will (command) of the ruler or rulers is meant to influence the 
conduct of one or more others (the ruled) and actually does influence it in such a 
way that their conduct… occurs as if the ruled had made the content of the 
command the maxim of their conduct for its very own sake.  Looked on from the 
other end, this situation will be called obedience.15 
 
In his notes on this passage, Weber emphasizes his “as if” formulation.16  On his view, it is 
crucial that the authoritative command “is accepted as a ‘valid’ norm,” or “may be taken” as 
such, regardless of whether it is actually valid according to any external criteria.17  The difference 
between authority and power, then, is not that the former is legitimated by its moral propriety, 
but that it is accepted as legitimate by the subjects over whom it is exercised.18   
Authority, in other words, involves a correlation between the recognized “power to 
command and duty to obey,” which is based on a judgment or belief about the legitimacy of what 
                                                
31; Peter Blau, “Critical Remarks on Weber’s Theory of Authority,” American Political Science Review 57:2 
(1963): 306; Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1971), 156. 
13 Weber, Economy and Society, 1:52-3, 215.  Whereas Arendt strictly separates power and authority, Weber 
notes that power may enable, complement, or transform into authority, and vice versa.  See Ibid., 1:53-4, 2: 943-8. 
14 Ibid., 1:215. 
15 Ibid., 2:946. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid, 1:215. 
18 Throughout this discussion, I have abstracted the two roles of “authority” and “subject” from the three 
positions that Weber identifies in different systems of authority: the leader (or chief or ruler), the administrative staff 
and the subjects (or the ruled).  For Weber, when all three of these positions are present in a single system, they 
resolve into a network or series of binary authority-subject relations.   
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is commanded.19  Even more than coordinated interest, affective bonds, or force, a belief in 
legitimacy provides a “sufficiently reliable basis” for the correlation of command and obedience 
that is essential to authority.20  Weber writes: 
So far as it is not derived merely from fear or from motives of expediency, a 
willingness to submit to an order imposed by one man or a small group, always in 
some sense implies a belief in the legitimate authority of the source imposing it…  
The basis of every authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to 
obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent 
prestige.21 
 
Weber identifies legitimacy with “the prestige of being considered binding;” a legitimate 
command is one that is understood to make a valid claim to obedience.22  Because legitimacy 
correlates command with obedience, every system of authority “attempts to establish and 
cultivate the belief in its legitimacy.”23  Weber’s famous ideal types of authority—legal, 
traditional, and charismatic—correspond to different ways that legitimacy is claimed by, 
attributed to, and made effective within different systems of authority.24  
Legal authority, which is the most rationalized and modern of Weber’s types, rests on a 
claim to the legitimacy of an impersonal and hierarchical social order that structures command 
and obligation.  Legitimacy is attributed to the order insofar as it codifies and enforces norms in 
                                                
19 Ibid., 2:943; cf. Ibid., 1:37, 53-4, 213, 2:954.  Here I am breaking from the tendency of commentators to track 
Weber’s distinction of authority and power primarily in terms of legitimacy (for example, as legitimate Herrschaft 
vs Herrshaft simpliciter).  It is true that, for Weber, all authority involves a belief in the legitimacy of the command 
on the part of the person subject to that command.  However, the concept of authority refers primarily to the 
correlation between command and obedience, and only secondarily and derivatively to a belief in legitimacy, which 
facilitates this correlativity.  Weber writes, “The sociological concept of domination [Herrschaft] must hence be 
more precise and can only mean the probability that a command will be obeyed…  As far as sociology is concerned, 
power of command does not exist unless the authority which is claimed by somebody is actually heeded to a socially 
relevant degree” (Ibid., 1:53, 2:948).  The belief in legitimacy enables the obedience required for authority, but 
authority cannot be reduced to legitimacy by itself.  
20 Ibid., 1:213. 
21 Ibid., 1:37, 263. 
22 Ibid., 1:31. 
23 Ibid., 1:213. 
24 Ibid.  Weber is clear that actual systems of authority rarely, if ever, fully or purely instantiate the three ideal 
types (Ibid., 1:20, 263). 
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a rational, consistent, and reliable way.25  Whereas systems of legal authority derive legitimacy 
from the official and transparent codification of norms, statuses and obligations, systems of 
traditional authority derive their legitimacy from the opacity of authority’s origins.  In such 
systems, authoritative commands are accepted as valid and binding because they have always 
been obeyed—or, at least, have been obeyed for so long that present social structures would 
otherwise be unimaginable.  Although here again individual authority is derived from the social 
order as a whole, it is now personally appropriated by individuals: “Obedience is owed not to 
enacted rules but to the person who occupies a position of authority by tradition.”26  Unlike legal 
and traditional systems of authority, both of which tend to perpetuate existing social conventions, 
charismatic authority, Weber’s third ideal type, specifically opposes established social orders.27  
The basis of its perceived legitimacy is personal charisma, “a certain quality of an individual 
personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with 
supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.”28  Subjects 
obey the charismatic leader because they accept her personal extraordinariness as a valid basis 
for guiding their actions.29 
Inasmuch as each of these ideal types of authority corresponds to a different way of 
believing in legitimacy, each can be understood as illuminating a different way that the subjects 
of authority accept, and ultimately enable, their own subjection.  Weber identifies the belief in 
legitimacy with “a willingness to submit to an order” or a “willingness to obey” that “confirms 
                                                
25 Ibid., 1:36, 217-220.   
26 Ibid., 1:227, italics added.  Talcott Parsons’s translation is more explicit: “The object of obedience is the 
personal authority of the individual which he enjoys by virtue of his traditional status.”  Weber, The Theory of Social 
and Economic Organization, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1964), 341. 
27 Weber, Economy and Society, 1:244. 
28 Ibid., 1:241-2. 
29 Ibid., 1:242. 
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the position of the persons claiming authority” in relation to the obedient subjects.30  He notes 
that every authority relation involves “a minimum of voluntary compliance, that is, an interest 
(based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in obedience.”31  This suggests that the belief 
in legitimacy is somehow up to the subjects of authority.  They submit themselves to authority, 
although usually not directly.  Rather, the three ideal types of authority correspond to three 
systems of mediation through which the subjects of authority actively participate in their own 
subjection.  In each, it is ultimately the subject’s self-subjection that correlates command with 
obedience and distinguishes authority from other forms of power.32  
When subjects attribute legitimacy to an authority, and thereby submit themselves to its 
commands, they actively authorize that authority and subject themselves.  However, they do not 
grant the authority full license to do just anything.  Weber is clear that inasmuch as authority 
requires “a minimum of voluntary compliance,” it also depends upon this voluntary compliance, 
and this dependence constrains authority.  For each of his three ideal types, Weber discusses 
ways in which authorities are constrained by the need to maintain the belief in legitimacy.   
Regarding legal authority, Weber notes that authorities are themselves subject to the 
norms and procedures of the existing legal order, insofar as their ability to solicit obedience is a 
function of their office within a system that is perceived to be legitimate.33  Traditional 
authorities are similarly constrained, even though they are better able to exercise their “free 
personal decision” than legal authorities.34  If traditional authorities demand too much or stray 
                                                
30 Ibid., 1:37, 263, 214. 
31 Ibid., 1:212.  Parsons substitutes ‘submission’ for ‘compliance’ in Weber, Theory of Organization, 324. 
32 Weber, Economy and Society, 1:212-215.   
33 Ibid., 1:217-8.   
34 Weber, Theory of Organization, 341.  Although Weber claims that “traditional prerogative rests primarily on 
the fact that the obligations of personal obedience tend to be essentially unlimited,” I agree with Parson that Weber’s 
phrasing is “a very unhappy formulation of the essential point.”  See Economy and Society, 1:227; Theory of 
Organization, 341, fn. 24.  Weber is clear that “there is a double sphere” of traditional legitimacy, essentially a 
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too far from entrenched norms, their subjects appeal to tradition in order to negotiate the limits of 
authority: 
The exercise of [“authority”] is oriented toward the consideration of how far the 
master and staff can go in view of the subjects’ traditional compliance without 
arousing their resistance.  When resistance occurs, it is directed against the master 
or his servant personally, the accusation being that he failed to observe the 
traditional limits of his power.  Opposition is not directed against the system as 
such.35   
 
Finally, charismatic authority is constrained by the authority’s need to be continually recognized 
as exceptional.  Charisma effectively solicits obedience “so long as it is proved; that is, as long 
as it receives recognition…  If proof and success elude the leader for long… above all, if his 
leadership fails to benefit his followers, it is likely that his charismatic authority will 
disappear.”36  Because personal exceptionality is difficult to institutionalize, maintain, or 
delegate, charismatic authority tends to be more fragile than the other types.37   
 In short, authority requires a “willingness to submit” on the part of its subjects.  The 
subjects’ belief in the legitimacy of authority, and consequently their willingness to obey 
authoritative commands, makes authority effective qua authority.  This does not mean, however, 
that authority involves permanent, invariable, or total dominance over obedient subjects.  Just the 
opposite.  The “assured power of command” requires maintaining a belief in legitimacy, and this 
belief becomes a site of negotiation and contest between authorities and their subjects.  Subjects 
                                                
range of personal freedom within wider traditional constraints (Economy and Society, 1:227).  The range of personal 
prerogative is vague, and is constrained—partly in the name of tradition—by the subjects themselves. 
35 Weber, Economy and Society, 1:227.  The Clause and Wittich edition of Economy and Society, which is the 
source of this quote, has “power” in place of “authority”.  I have substituted in “authority” from the Parsons’s 
edition, which is a better translation of “die tatsächliche Art der Herrschaftsausübung.”  Otherwise, the quoted 
translation is superior.  See Weber, Theory of Organization, 342; Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriß der 
verstehenden Soziologie (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1972), 130-1.  
36 Weber, Economy and Society, 1:244, 242.  Rousseau says almost exactly the same thing regarding the 
“Lawgiver” in On the Social Contract (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 68-72.  Authority that 
comes ‘from on high’ does not compel obedience unless it is recognized as authority by those over whom it would 
be exercised.  In Chapter 3, I return to this thought by reading Rousseau through the work of Bonnie Honig. 
37 The longevity of charismatic authority often depends on its transformation into legal or traditional authority 
(Weber, Economy and Society, 1:246-9). 
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resist authority when they no longer believe that it is legitimate and no longer submit to its 
commands.  Nonetheless, they cannot simply shirk off their subjection, however, insofar as 
systems of authority and individual authorities themselves tend to encourage, solicit, or 
perpetuate the voluntary submission of their subjects.  They do so through positive means, such 
as education, reward, induction into social statuses, coordination of interests, and imposition.  
Authority and subjection are also maintained through negative means, as when authorities 
conform to existing norms of legitimation and refrain from behavior that would risk their legal, 
traditional, or charismatic authority.38  
 The active role played by authorities in securing the self-submission of their subjects 
suggests the importance of this submission.  Although the systems of mediation through which 
submission is volunteered often involve “a large measure of imposition,” authority ultimately 
depends upon the “voluntary compliance” of its subjects.39  This dependence, even where it is 
minimal, entails that authority remains a negotiable and contestable relation.  Unlike other forms 
of power, authority does not treat those over whom it is exercised as passive objects.  Rather, 
authority cannot function unless its subjects are also active agents in their own subjection.  
Because of this, there is always the potential for them to resist, challenge, or subvert the 
authority that commands them. 
 Weber does not attempt to justify political authority.40  On his view, authority is a 
correlation between command and obedience that is predicated on a belief in legitimacy; it need 
                                                
38 Weber, Economy and Society, 1:217-220, 225-8, 242-4.   
39 Ibid., 1:51, 212. 
40 I emphasize this point in order to distance Weber, and ultimately myself, from critiques of “attitudinal” 
accounts of morally legitimate authority.  For example, in Justification and Legitimacy, A. John Simmons argues 
that “No plausible theory of state legitimacy could maintain that a state has the rights in which its legitimacy 
consists—rights to exclusively impose and coercively enforce binding duties on its subjects—simply in virtue of its 
subjects’ feelings of loyalty or its own capacities to generate such feelings” (134).  Simmons’s line of criticism fails 
because it does not track the kind of “theory of state legitimacy” that Weber attempts.  Weber does not try to explain 
the state’s right to do anything (i.e., coerce, impose duties, etc), where ‘right’ signifies a morally justified ability or 
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not be legitimate according to any external moral perspective.  This is a descriptive account of 
authority, but it does not merely report the way things are with regard to authorities and subjects.  
Rather, Weber’s account serves a critical purpose precisely by refusing to ground authority in an 
objective, universal, or final basis of legitimacy.  He presents political authority as a relation that, 
because it is morally arbitrary, is also variable, negotiable, and contestable.  Most importantly, he 
reveals the way that authority—regardless of whether it is entrenched in legal or traditional 
norms, or appears as a unique exception to those norms—always makes a claim upon, and so 
depends upon, the autonomous beliefs and actions of its subjects.   
This last thought will gain significance throughout this chapter, culminating with the 
political claim that authorities always depend, for their authority, upon their subjects.  Authority 
is first and foremost an ability to compel obedience, but it is also a kind of indebtedness to the 
subjects who, by acknowledging or accepting claims to legitimacy, authorize authorities and 
subject themselves.  To substantiate this claim, I must first clarify the ways that, by authorizing 
authority, subjects subject themselves.  To begin to do so, I turn to Wolff’s critique of authority, 
which contains a very strong reading of the self-subjection that makes authority possible. 
 
Wolff on authority 
In his classic essay, In Defense of Anarchism, Robert Paul Wolff argues that political 
authority imposes obligations that necessarily conflict with the moral autonomy of individuals.  
                                                
prerogative.  Rather, Weber attempts to explain how authority functions.  This requires explaining what is accepted 
as right (i.e., what is juridically, traditionally, or charismatically validated—even if not morally valid).  By 
conceptualizing the legitimacy that underwrites authority as a belief in the normative validity of command, Weber 
remains agnostic regarding what it would take for commands to be actually normatively valid and binding in a way 
that would satisfy philosophers interested in moral accounts of political authority.  Importantly, Weber’s theory of 
authority could contain a moral account of political authority.  One can easily imagine a fourth ideal type of 
authority in which the belief in legitimacy (and so the practical correlation of command and obedience) rests on 
whether commands satisfy, for example, the criteria of Raz’s service conception of authority.  However, it is hard to 
imagine such an ideal type ever corresponding to actual social and political relations. 
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Because the “primary obligation” of every individual is autonomy, he argues, authority can never 
be morally legitimate; the concept of de jure legitimate authority is thus “vacuous.”41  In making 
this argument, however, Wolff goes a long way in theorizing the concept he regards as vacuous.  
He does so, not only in order to ultimately reject it, but also to explain instances of de facto 
authority, such as that exercised by existing states over their subjects.  Because actual authorities 
can never be de jure legitimate, their compelling and obligating force must lie in something other 
than moral duty itself.   
For Wolff, the compelling force of de facto authority depends upon a mistake.  Actual 
authorities are able to obligate their subjects because the latter incorrectly “believe in the 
existence of legitimate authority,” which they mistakenly attribute to de facto authorities.42  In 
other words, the ability of de facto authority to compel action depends upon a misapplication of 
the concept of de jure authority.  For this reason, a quick sketch of de jure authority is necessary 
to explain the practical compulsion inherent in actual authority relations, whether or not such 
compulsion is truly legitimate and thereby worthy, from the perspective of the moral 
philosopher, of the name ‘authority’.      
According to Wolff, de jure authority involves a correlation between command and 
obedience.43  He writes, “Authority is the right to command, and correlatively, the right to be 
obeyed.”44   Accordingly, de jure authorities are persons who have a “right to command,” while 
de jure subjects are persons who have a “correlative obligation to obey the person who issues the 
                                                
41 Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper, 1970), 18-19. 
42 Wolff writes, “What can be inferred from the existence of de facto states is that men believe in the existence of 
legitimate authority, for of course a de facto state is simply a state whose subjects believe it to be legitimate (i.e., 
really to have the authority it claims for itself).  They may be wrong.  Indeed, all beliefs in authority may be 
wrong…  But so long as men believe in the authority of states, we can conclude that they posses the concept of de 
jure authority” (Ibid., 10-11). 
43 Ibid., 4-5, 9. 
44 Ibid., 4. 
 13 
command.”45  The roles of authority and subject are defined in relation to one another by the 
deontological correlation of command and obedience. 
Importantly, this correlation depends, not on the content of authoritative commands, but 
on their source.  Wolff writes:   
Authority resides in persons; they possess it—if indeed they do at all—by virtue 
of who they are and not by virtue of what they command.  My duty to obey is a 
duty owed to them, not to the moral law or to the beneficiaries of the actions I 
may be commanded to perform…  Obedience is not a matter of doing what 
someone tells you to do.  It is a matter of doing what he tells you to do because he 
tells you to do it.46 
 
In other words, authority and the correlative form of obedience are “content independent.”47  The 
content-independent right to command is not merely a mark of authority; rather, it is authority.  
Similarly, the correlative obligation to obey does not merely indicate subjection; it is subjection.   
According to Wolff, de jure and de facto authority alike involve claims to rightful 
command and the correlative obligatory obedience.  These claims distinguish authority from 
power, which involves the threat or use of force to coerce compliance; unlike power, de jure and 
de facto authority make appeals to their own legitimacy.48  Wolff argues that these appeals are 
always invalid, because content-independent command and obedience conflict with the moral 
standing of individuals as rationally autonomous and self-determining agents.49  He writes, “The 
autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous, is not subject to the will of another.  He may do 
what another tells him to do, but not because he has been told to do it.”50  Because autonomy is 
“the primary obligation” of all rational persons, such persons cannot be morally obligated to 
                                                
45 Ibid., 9. 
46 Ibid., 6, 9. 
47 H. L. A Hart, “Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons,” 101-2.  Cf. Scott Shapiro, “Authority,” in The 
Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), 389-90. 
48 Wolff, Defense of Anarchism, 4-5, 9.  
49 Ibid., 18-19.  
50 Wolff, Defense of Anarchism, 14. 
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obey the commands of authority.51  Thus, there can be no morally legitimate, or de jure, 
authority.52 
This means that all actual instances of authority are merely de facto; they are believed to 
be legitimate when, in fact, they are not.53  Like the concept of de jure authority, upon which they 
depend, instances of de facto authority are characterized by an essential correlativity; here again, 
the correlation of command and obedience explains the ability of an authority to compel action.  
However, the de facto correlation of command and obedience is predicated upon practical 
dispositions rather than duty.  For Wolff as for Weber, it is the subject’s beliefs and actions, 
rather than moral duty itself, that enable the practically compelling—if not morally legitimate—
force of de facto authority. 
More specifically, de facto authority depends exclusively upon an act of 
acknowledgement, acceptance, or accession by the subject over whom it is exercised.  According 
to Wolff, authority is established when an actor claims or asserts the right to command and, 
regardless of the illegitimacy of this claim, it is “acknowledged and accepted by those at whom it 
is directed.”54  By accepting a claim of rightful command, or by otherwise acknowledging or 
acceding to the right of a particular actor to issue commands, a subject attributes de jure 
authority to the actor, and simultaneously obligates herself to obey the actor’s commands.55  In 
other words, she authorizes the other actor and subjects herself.  This act of authorization and 
subjection is crucial to the politics of political authority, and it is what Wolff means when he 
                                                
51 Ibid., 18. 
52 Ibid., 18-9.  Wolff does not necessarily advocate non-compliance.  The content-independent nature of 
authority and obligation conflicts with autonomy, but autonomous reasoning may independently confirm the content 
of authoritative commands. 
53 Ibid., 10-11. 
54 Ibid., 5. 
55 Ibid., 5-8. 
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claims that subjects believe in the legitimacy of the authority that commands them.56  Whether or 
not the claimed right and correlative obligation are in fact morally valid, the subject’s act of 
acknowledgement, acceptance, or accession expresses a belief in legitimacy that, even in the 
absence of an actual moral duty, practically correlates command and obedience. 
Wolff is careful to distinguish the subjects acknowledgement, acceptance, or accession 
from deliberate consent.  He writes: 
Most commonly today... authority is granted to those who occupy official 
positions...  We become conditioned to respond to the visible signs of officiality, 
such as printed uniforms and badges.  Sometimes we may have clearly in mind 
the justification for a legalistic claim to authority, as when we comply with a 
command because its author is an elected official.  More often the mere sight of a 
uniform is enough to make us feel that the man inside it has the right to be 
obeyed.57 
 
On Wolff’s account, de facto authority does not depend upon a conscious or purposeful act of 
consent.  It does, however, ultimately depend upon the autonomous agency of the subject over 
whom it is exercised, insofar as it is the subject’s act of acknowledgement, acceptance, or 
accession that practically correlates command and obedience.58  The subject of de facto authority 
is, in this sense, an agent of her own subjection.   
This account of authority is persuasive, up to a point.  By emphasizing the subject’s role 
in authorizing de facto authority, Wolff captures something essential about authority, namely that 
it involves “a minimum of voluntary compliance, that is, an interest… in obedience,” as Weber 
puts it.59  However, in order to facilitate his criticism of de jure authority, Wolff overemphasizes 
the subject’s self-subjection.  On his account, obedience requires forgoing practical deliberation 
                                                
56 Ibid., 10-11. 
57 Ibid., 7.  Here, Wolff explicitly draws upon Weber’s ideal-type of legal authority; in the surrounding passages, 
he implicitly draws upon the ideal-types of traditional and charismatic authority (Ibid., 6-7, 16-18).  See Weber, 
Economy and Society, 1:215-245. 
58 Wolff, Defense of Anarchism, 5-8. 
59 Weber, Economy and Society, 1:212.  This is not to deny that authority also involves “a large measure of 
imposition” (Ibid., 51). 
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regarding the content of authoritative commands.  Once a subject acknowledges or accepts a 
claim to rightful command, she is obligated to “obey the commands of [the authority] without 
making any attempt to decide for [her]self whether what is commanded is good or wise.”60  In 
other words, authority and obedience are not only content-independent; they also preempt a 
subject’s decision-making process. 61  Because the subject surrenders her independent judgment 
to the commands of authority, Wolff claims that the acceptance of authority is itself tantamount 
to a “forfeiture of autonomy.”62  On his view, every investiture of de facto authority is a 
divestiture of autonomous judgment and agency.63   
The idiom of forfeiture appears continually throughout Wolff’s argument, repeatedly 
signaling an opposition between authority and autonomy.64  However, both the idiom and the 
opposition rely upon an exaggerated account of the subject’s self-subjection.65  Wolff is correct 
that authority involves a measure of heteronomy; in acknowledging the authority of another 
agent, a subject does indeed open herself to imposition.  However, the impositions of authority 
do not completely trump or preempt the subject’s own practical deliberation.  The subject does 
not totally “forfeit” her autonomy.   
If the subject of authority did forfeit her autonomy, resistance to authority would be 
conceptually nonsensical and practically impossible.  However, subjects do sometimes resist the 
                                                
60 Wolff, Defense of Anarchism, 14. 
61 Ibid., 6, 9, 14-17.  Shapiro helpfully imports the language of preemption from Raz’s work to Wolff’s 
argument.  See Shapiro, “Authority,” 389-90. 
62 Wolff, Defense of Anarchism, 15.   
63 “When I place myself in the hands of another, and permit him to determine the principles by which I shall 
guide my behavior, I repudiate the freedom and reason which give me dignity” (Ibid., 72).  Wolff clarifies that 
autonomy may be forfeited in degrees, but he insists that subjecting oneself to authority is an act of unspecified and 
unrestricted forfeiture (Ibid., 14-18). 
64 Ibid., 14-16, 41, 43, 47-48, 70, 72.  The idiom is so crucial that “Autonomy, forfeiture of” is listed in the 
index. 
65 The overstatement becomes evident when it is noted that, on Wolff’s view, the obligation to honor promises 
involves a similar forfeiture of autonomy.  Rather than bite this bullet, Wolff concedes that “contractual democracy 
is legitimate… for it is founded on the citizens’ promise to obey its commands” (Ibid., 69).  As Simmons points out, 
this contradicts Wolff’s main argument that “the concept of a de jure legitimate state would appear to be vacuous” 
(Ibid., 19).  See Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy, 111, fn. 15. 
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authority to which they are subject.  They can do so precisely because they retain a degree of 
autonomy, which—pace Wolff—they exercise by evaluating for themselves the source of 
authoritative commands.  When resistant subjects disobey, they turn their unforfeited autonomy 
against the authority that commands them, but this does not amount to a denial or dissolution of 
de facto authority.  Rather, both autonomy and authority are present at the scene of resistance, 
and neither of them fully dominates the authority relation.  The subjects may deny the de jure 
legitimacy of the authority that they oppose, but generally there is no question that the authority 
exercises de facto authority, as this is what the resistant subjects resist and, only in some cases, 
attempt to abolish.  In other words, resistance to authority—from acts of civil disobedience to 
simple instances of talking back—express the autonomy of the resistant subject in the face of 
authority.66  Such instances make clear that a degree of autonomy persists through and during 
subjection to authority.  The subjects of authority retain some of their autonomous judgment and 
agency, which they may exercise through continuing to acknowledge, or potentially resisting, 
claims to authority.  Authority makes demands upon, but does not negate or appropriate, the 
autonomy of its subject. 
In short, Wolff overstates the subject’s self-subjection.  At the same time, he understates 
the authority’s dependence upon this self-subjection.  By theorizing the acknowledgement of 
authority as an assumption of obligation, Wolff correctly recognizes that de facto authority 
                                                
66 Despite Wolff’s anarchism (or maybe because it is “philosophical anarchism”), he does not discuss the 
possibility of resisting, disrupting, abolishing, or even transforming or negotiating authority.  In fact, he declines to 
consider these topics.  See Wolff, Defense of Anarchism, 19.  Simmons describes Wolff’s position, and his own, as 
such: “Philosophical anarchists do not take the illegitimacy of the state to entail a strong moral imperative to oppose 
or eliminate states; rather they typically take state illegitimacy simply to remove any strong moral presumption in 
favor of obedience to, compliance with, or support for our own or other existing states.” Simmons, Justification and 
Legitimacy, 104.  For related reasons, David Miller has described the philosophical anarchist as “a rather bloodless 
member of the [anarchist] species.” Miller, Anarchism, (London: J. M. Dent, 1984), 15.  Carol Pateman makes the 
point more seriously: “Wolff offers an abstract ‘solution’ to a ‘problem’ generated by his own philosophical 
apparatus.  No political ruler need quake at the implications of Wolff’s ‘anarchism’… it is an extension of a purely 
philosophical skepticism…  Wolff’s ‘denial’ of the authority of the state is of exactly the same character and status 
as the philosopher’s ‘denial’ that there are other minds, or material objects—or that promises oblige.” Carol 
Pateman, Problem of Political Obligation (Berkley: University of California Press, 1985), 137. 
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depends upon the autonomy of the subject over whom it is exercised.  However, by theorizing 
the subject’s assumption of content-independent obligation as an autonomous forfeiture of 
autonomy, Wolff construes authority’s dependence as momentary, such that it is satisfied by a 
single, irreversible act of authorization and self-subjection.  In doing so, he fails to recognize that 
authority continually depends upon the subject over whom it is exercised.  Authority is 
continually in need of authorization by its subject; without this authorization, authority would 
become mere power, and its compulsion would become mere coercion.  Consequently, the 
subject must retain her independent agency in order to continually authorize the authority.  Put 
more strongly, authority is incompatible with a total forfeiture of the subject’s autonomy, 
because, in order to maintain itself, authority continually depends upon, and makes demands 
upon, that autonomy.  
Because every de facto authority continually depends upon the autonomy of its subject, 
there is always the potential for the subject to disrupt, resist, or subvert de facto authority.67  This 
does not mean, however, that authority is necessarily fragile, or that subjects can simply and 
easily rescind their acknowledgement and undo the authority relation.  Rather, authority relations 
are frequently durable and stable, due to persistent and continual—rather than complete or 
final—acts of authorization and subjection.68  Authority tends to beget further authorization.  
Ironically, by considering the autonomous agency of the subject to be strictly incompatible with 
subjection to authority, Wolff cannot theorize what might be, to the philosophical anarchist, the 
                                                
67 Weber and Arendt argue that because authority is made possible by the agency of subjects, this agency 
constitutes an ultimate limit to the impositions of authority.  Moreover, both thinkers understand losses of authority 
in terms of an interaction between authorities and their subjects; subjects do not simply undo authority relations at 
will.  See Weber, Economy and Society, 1:217-8, 227, 242, 244; Arendt, On Violence, 45, and Between Past and 
Future, 92-3, 102-3, 107, 132-3. 
68 If the philosophical anarchist is right to be concerned about authority, it is not because authority abolishes the 
subject’s autonomy, but because authority exploits that autonomy by diffusing, co-opting, or redirecting it in ways 
that potentially perpetuate subjection. 
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most insidious characteristic of authority: that it preserves and directs the autonomy of its 
subjects in ways that make possible—and perhaps demand—continual acts of self-subjection. 
 
Raz on authority 
 Joseph Raz’s “service conception” of legitimate authority is intended, in part, to meet the 
challenges raised by Wolff’s argument.69  Raz preserves the basic command and obedience 
structure emphasized by Wolff, and he agrees that authorities claim “a right to rule those subject 
to their power.”70  This claim to rightful rule is, with regard to the potential subjects of an 
authority, “an appeal to compliance… an invocation of the duty to obey.”71  Thus, for Raz as for 
Wolff, an authority’s commands are correlative to a subject’s obligation.  However, Raz rejects 
Wolff’s claim that de jure authority is a vacuous concept.  On Raz’s view, authority is de jure 
legitimate when it serves its subject in a particular way.  
Raz’s service conception is based on three theses or conditions that connect the service 
performed by authority, its claim to legitimacy, and the obligation of its subject.  According to 
the first two theses, authority is legitimate—and obedience to it is obligatory—when (1) by 
following the directives of the authority, a subject “would better conform to reasons that apply to 
him [or her] anyway (that is, to reasons other than the directives of the authority)” than by not 
                                                
69 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986), 55-69.  Raz has developed the 
service conception over the last two decades, but its basic commitments remain largely the same.  I will focus 
mainly on Raz’s recent reformulation of the service conception in Between Authority and Interpretation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009).  Importantly, the service conception is an account of de jure authority; it clarifies 
what is necessary for authority to be legitimate.  Consequently, the following discussion may at first appear to be 
tangential to the previous section’s focus on de facto authority.  It is not.  For both Wolff and Raz, the concept of de 
jure authority is necessary to understand instances of de facto authority.  See Wolff, Defense of Anarchism, 10-11; 
Raz, Authority and Interpretation, 129, 132-3.   
70 Raz, Authority and Interpretation, 128. 
71 Raz, Morality of Freedom, 26.   See also Raz, Authority and Interpretation, 135: “Directives issued by 
authority aim to constitute reasons for their subjects and are binding on their subjects because they are meant to be 
so binding. If we recognize a duty to obey them we recognize that they have a right to command us, not only to 
affect the circumstances that shape our opportunities and the obstacles on our path.”  Here again, the claim to 
legitimate rule and obligatory obedience is supposed to distinguish authority from other forms of power, which 
make no such appeal (Ibid., 128-9).  
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following and (2) the matters in question are “such that with respect to them it is better to 
conform to reason than to decide for oneself.”72  These two theses describe the service that 
authority provides the subject: it helps her to act rationally by complying with the reasons that 
apply to her.  The third thesis gives content to the subject’s obligation.  Since the directives of a 
legitimate authority already take into account all of the relevant reasons that apply to the subject 
(from thesis 1), (3) every legitimately authoritative directive “preempts” relevant reasons against 
the required conduct by excluding and replacing them.73  Although preempted reasons cannot be 
used to deny the force of the authoritative directive, this does not mean that authority is 
ultimately incontestable.  Although “we are bound to obey it, and are not allowed to question its 
force” regarding specific directives, we are still “allowed to question its wisdom and advocate its 
reform” in general.74  Nonetheless, as the third thesis makes clear, “authority involves accepting 
the directives of another,” even when these directives conflict with a subject’s own judgment.75 
In short, authority’s service lies in the way that it improves the subject’s conformity with 
reason without her having to consider all relevant reasons regarding certain matters (theses 1 and 
2).  Its obligatory force lies in the way that it prohibits her from acting upon some of these 
reasons (thesis 3).  If the conditions specified by all three theses are met, “authoritative 
directives, just like promises, are binding because, and where, they improve our powers by 
                                                
72 Ibid., 136-41.  Raz calls these two conditions the “normal justification thesis” and the “independence” 
condition.  The former condition is consistent with Raz’s earlier formulations in The Morality of Freedom, while the 
latter is a new formulation.  It appears to do some of the work of the “dependence thesis” that appeared in the earlier 
works.  See Raz, Morality of Freedom, 46-8, 52-3.   
73 This is a paraphrase of Raz’s remarks on preemption in Authority and Interpretation, 140-1, 143-5.  That 
discussion retains some of the content of the “dependence thesis” that appears in earlier formulations of the service 
conception.  See Raz, Morality of Freedom, 46-8.  There, Raz’s discussion of preemption is generally clearer: “The 
fact that an authority requires performance of an action is a reason for its performance which is not to be added to 
all other relevant reasons when assessing what to do, but should exclude and take the place of some of them…  To 
the extent that legitimate authorities have power over us, the preemption thesis governs our right attitude toward 
them” (Ibid, 46, 47). 
74 Raz, Authority and Interpretation, 140-1.  In other words, authority constrains action rather than judgment.  
See Raz, Morality of Freedom, 38-42.  This view is close to that of Kant in “An Answer to the Question: ‘What is 
Enlightenment?’.”  See Kant, Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 54-60. 
75 Raz, Morality of Freedom, 48.  See also Raz, Authority and Interpretation, 142-3, 151. 
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enabling us to conform to reason better than we could without them.”76  It is this service that 
grounds the legitimacy of authority and establishes a correlative duty of obedience. 
Like Wolff, Raz emphasizes the subject’s active participation in the authority relation.  
Although Raz’s account is not primarily a recognitive theory, the subject’s recognition of 
authority is essential to the correlation of authoritative commands and the subject’s obligation to 
obey.  Raz writes, “It is one’s own judgment which directs one to recognize the authority of 
another…  The only reliable way of conforming to authority is through having a reliable belief 
that it is an authority, and therefore should be obeyed.”77  Although an authority must be 
recognized as such in order for its commands to legitimately obligate obedience, the subject’s act 
of recognition need not involve explicit consent.78  Nonetheless, as on Wolff’s account of de 
facto authority, the subject’s participation in the authority relation is a necessary condition of 
authority; the subject’s recognition makes authority possible.79  Here again, authority depends 
upon the autonomous judgment and action of the subject over whom it is exercised.  
Unlike Wolff, however, Raz does not believe that subjection to authority requires a 
forfeiture of autonomy.  Although he rarely discusses autonomy per se, Raz claims that 
legitimate authority—i.e., that which simultaneously serves and obligates subjects—actually 
preserves and enhances the “rational capacity” and “ultimate self-reliance” of a subject by 
helping her to comply with relevant reasons for right action.80  On his account, authority is an 
instrument, “simply one device, one method, through the use of which people can achieve the 
                                                
76 Raz, Authority and Interpretation, 142. 
77 Ibid., 140, 147.  See also Raz, Morality of Freedom, 65: “In most cases the normal justification [of legitimate 
authority] cannot be established unless the putative authority enjoys some measure of recognition and exercises 
power over its subjects.” 
78 Raz, Morality of Freedom 48, 92-94; Authority and Interpretation, 147, 159-65. 
79 For Raz, this is true of both de jure and de facto authority, inasmuch as the latter implies a concept of, and a 
claim to, the latter.  See Raz, Authority and Interpretation, 129, 132-3.  Importantly, although Raz does not consider 
the concept of legitimate authority to be vacuous, he is explicit that many de facto authorities fail to meet the 
conditions of the service conception (Ibid., 131). 
80 Raz, Morality of Freedom, 48; Raz, Authority and Interpretation, 139, 140.  
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goal (telos) of their capacity for rational action, albeit not through its direct use.”81  In other 
words, the subject’s subjection to authority facilitates, rather than erodes, her autonomy.  Raz 
writes: 
This way of understanding matters is reinforced by the fact that in following 
authority… one’s ultimate self-reliance is preserved, for it is one’s own judgment 
which directs one to recognize the authority of another, just as it directs one to 
keep promises, follow advice, use technical devices and the like.82 
 
For Raz, the autonomous judgment and agency of the subject is expressed in, and preserved by, 
the act of recognition that authorizes the authority and simultaneously subjects the subject.  This 
commitment is the core of Raz’s disagreement with Wolff. 
Above, I criticized Wolf for overstating the conflict between authority and autonomy and 
consequently understating authority’s dependence upon the autonomy of its subjects.  Because 
Raz emphasizes the compatibility of authority and autonomy, his view initially appears to 
remedy these defects.  Nonetheless, his particular form of instrumentalism inadequately captures 
two important aspects of authority.  First, by theorizing authority and obligation in terms of 
particular instances of command, decision, and compliance, the service conception does not 
acknowledge the continuity of authority and obligation between and beyond these instances.  
Second, by reducing authority to an instrument for subjects, the service conception exaggerates 
the autonomy of subjects while underestimating the agency of authorities.  I will pursue these 
two lines of criticism in turn.  My aim is not to definitively refute Raz.  Rather, I hope to begin 
clarifying ways that a political account of political authority—that is, an account of authority’s 
contestability, rather than its justification or propriety—will differ from even a successful moral 
account of political authority. 
                                                
81 Ibid., 140. 
82 Ibid.  See also Raz, Morality of Freedom, 48. 
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As discussed, the service conception considers commands to be legitimately authoritative 
(and thus obligatory) when obeying them would help subjects conform to reason in matters 
where conformity to reason is more important than deciding for oneself (theses 1 and 2 above).  
In such cases, subjects are meant to regard authoritative commands as preemptive reasons that 
trump reasons for acting otherwise (thesis 3 above).  On this account, authority and the 
correlative form of obligation affect the practical reasoning of subjects only when and where 
authoritative directives (those satisfying the conditions in theses 1 and 2) are issued.  In other 
words, authority and subjection are limited to particular instances of command, decision, and 
compliance.83  The “right to rule” and the “duty to obey” are thus analyzed episodically, as 
motivating factors in particular instances of practical reasoning about particular matters in 
particular circumstances, rather than as a durable prerogative and obligation, or as aspects of an 
ongoing relationship between an authority and subject.84  In short, Raz’s account of authority 
denies the continuity of authority and subjection between and beyond particular instances of 
command and compliance. 
Raz’s emphasis on instances or episodes of decision-making may be appropriate to a 
theory of theoretical authority (the kind of authority that, for example, a well-regarded scholar 
has in her particular area of study), because theoretical authorities provide reasons for belief 
                                                
83 Raz, Morality of Freedom, 59, 61-2, 68-9; Raz, Authority and Interpretation, 136-7, 142-3, 149-150. 
84 In his critique of the service conception and other “decision models” of authority, Scott Shapiro emphasizes 
the episodic nature of Raz’s account.  See Shapiro, “Authority,” 415-417.  According to Shapiro, accounts like the 
service conception make three questionable and interrelated assumptions.  First, they assume that obligation to 
authority is the outcome of a decision-making process that occurs whenever a potentially authoritative directive is 
issued.  Thus, the correlation of command and obedience is relevant only to particular commands about particular 
matters in particular circumstances (Ibid., 415).  Second, accounts like Raz’s assume that the subjects of authority 
decide to obey each time an authoritative directive is issued; as Shapiro puts it, “Each act of compliance involves a 
choice to comply” (Ibid., 417).  Third, such accounts assume that authoritative directives affect a subject’s practical 
reasoning at the level of preferences or reasons for action (or beliefs about preferences or reasons); obedient subjects 
choose to obey particular commands because they prefer to conform (Ibid.)  Cf. Raz, Authority and Interpretation, 
136-9. 
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when consulted, and these reasons are not generally obligatory.85  However, political authority 
(both de jure and de facto) guides, permits, and prohibits action even when it is not consulted—
i.e., between and beyond those instances in which subjects actively invite the dictates of 
authority into their practical reasoning.86  This is not to say that political authority exists when it 
does not compel subjects; that is a view that Raz rightly rejects.87  Rather, political authority 
exists, and compels subjects, even beyond those moments when subjects decide upon 
authoritative directives.  The compelling effects of political authority, in other words, are not 
contained within instances of reason-giving, and obligation to authority is not limited to 
particular instances of decision-making and compliance.  By reducing authority and subjection to 
episodes of command, decision, and compliance, the service conception excludes too much.  
Authority—both de jure and de facto—involves more than the service conception theorizes.   
A second line of criticism operates similarly, by questioning Raz’s reduction of authority 
to instrumentality.  This reduction also misses something important about authority, namely the 
persistence of the authority’s autonomy in and through authority relations.  Because of this, the 
service conception underestimates the ways that authority imposes upon subjects, and it 
misconstrues the potential for subjects to resist authority’s impositions through disobedience.  
For Raz, de jure authority serves its subject, and all it does is serve its subject.  He 
frequently describes “the whole point and purpose of authorities,” “the point of having 
authorities,” and “the function of authorities” entirely in terms of the service that authorities 
provide to obedient subjects.88  He even goes so far as to suggest that subjects would not subject 
themselves to authority if it did not serve them: “The point of being under an authority is that it 
                                                
85 Raz, Authority and Interpretation, 155-7. 
86 This seems to be Shapiro’s thought when he theorizes the self-subjection of the subject as an act that 
constrains her “future self to act on the demands of the authority, whatever they may be” (Ibid., 415).   
87 Raz, Authority and Interpretation, 158. 
88 Raz, Morality of Freedom, 47-8, 67; Raz, Authority and Interpretation, 141. 
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opens a way of improving one’s conformity with reason.  One achieves that by conforming to the 
authority’s directives.”89  To employ this service, a subject simply uses an authority’s directives 
to preempt her other reasons for action, just as she would consult “professional advice” as a way 
of “reducing the burdens of decision and inquiry.”90   
This reduction of authority to instrumentality requires the subordination of the authority’s 
autonomous agency to that of the subject.  Raz makes this clear when he compares obedience to 
authority with “making vows, taking advice, binding oneself to others long before the time for 
action with a promise to act in certain ways, or relying on technical devices to ‘take decisions for 
us,’ as when setting alarm clocks, speed limiters, etc.”91  Only one of these examples—taking 
advice—admits the agency of anyone other than the self-subjecting subject; a subject can make 
vows, bind herself, and promise without actually interacting with another agent.  The last two 
examples—relying on alarm clocks and speed limiters—explicitly involve mechanical tools 
rather than a second agent.  Although Raz later notes that obedience to authority is unlike setting 
an alarm clock because the former “involves subjecting our will to that of another,” his 
instrumentalist account consistently denies this will any agential role other than serving the 
subject.92  
Even this way of putting it, however, attributes more autonomy to the authority than is 
actually at work in Raz’s account.  According to the service conception, the commands of an 
authority are merely reasons to be included in a subject’s decision procedures.  If they have any 
compelling force at all (which they must, if they are authoritative), this is only because the 
                                                
89 Raz, Authority and Interpretation, 147. 
90 Ibid., 149-50.  See also 160-2. 
91 Ibid., 140. 
92 Ibid., 161.  
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subject herself treats them, individually, as preemptive reasons.93  Raz writes, “To the extent that 
legitimate authorities have power over us, the preemption thesis governs our right attitude toward 
them.”94  For its part, the authority functions like a passive supply of reasons, from which the 
subject draws in order to act rightly, just as she might consult a doctor for “professional advice” 
to trump her own self-diagnosis.95  It is up to the subject to choose to comply with the reasons (or 
advice) that she receives; thus, it is the subject’s autonomous agency alone—in particular, her 
practical rationality—that compels her to act in accordance with authoritative directives.96  On 
this view, the subject, and not the authority, is the sole agent of her own obligation.  
Although subjects do indeed play an important agential role in authorizing authority and 
subjecting themselves, Raz exaggerates this role by completely evacuating the autonomous 
agency of the authority from his account.  In this regard, his account is similar to Wolff’s, only 
now it is the subject that enjoys a monopoly of the autonomy within the authority relation.  Raz’s 
account of authority recovers the autonomy that Wolff believes is forfeited by the subject, but it 
only does so by reducing authority to a non-agential tool or a “device,” a passive multiplier of 
the subject’s autonomy.97 
This reduction goes too far.  Authority relations are never purely instrumental, because 
neither party fully appropriates or subordinates the autonomy of the other.  Rather, authority is 
an interactive relation between two autonomous agents, in which both parties negotiate a 
correlation of command and obedience.  Through this negotiation, each agent expresses her 
                                                
93 In obeying authority, “we follow reason, and thus exercise our judgment—though…we do it at one remove—
by accepting, through our judgment, the binding force of… directives… that preempt our freedom to act for some of 
the background reasons” (Ibid., 142).   
94 Raz, Morality of Freedom, 67.  
95 Raz, Authority and Interpretation, 149. 
96 Raz writes, “In following authority… one’s ultimate self-reliance is preserved, for it is one’s own judgment 
which directs one to recognize the authority of another, just as it directs one to keep promises, follow advice, use 
technical devices and the like” (Ibid., 140).  See also Ibid., 139, 142-3; Raz, Morality of Freedom, 48. 
97 Raz, Authority and Interpretation, 140. 
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autonomy in relation to the other.  It is true that the subject must authorize the authority and 
subject herself, but the authority will actively solicit authorization, both at the inception of the 
authority relation and throughout its duration.  Likewise, the authority may actively forfeit or 
squander this authorization; authorities are at risk of losing authority precisely because they are 
agents.  In short, authority relations come into being, are maintained, and are dissolved through 
the interacting agencies of authorities and subjects.  The autonomy of each may be constrained 
by this interaction, but it is not forfeited.  Neither agent is a passive object for the other. 
Within the interactive authority relation, authorities may exercise their agency in ways 
that involve “a large measure of imposition,” as Weber puts it.98  Raz attempts to allow for this 
by noting that authority is responsive to the relevant reasons that apply to a subject, rather than to 
the subject’s own perceived interests.99  However, because he understands subjection in terms of 
the subject’s “right attitude” toward authoritative reasons, expressed through her choice to 
comply with those reasons, Raz cannot account for the ways that authority sometimes functions 
through, and is experienced as, imposition.100  Pace Raz, authority operates through imposition 
precisely because subjects obey authoritative directives without appropriating them as their own 
reasons for action.  In fact, when authority serves its subject, it is the impositional nature of 
authority—its unappropriated, unchosen intrusion into the subject’s practical options—that 
benefits the subject by compelling right action.101  Authority functions this way because the 
subject can authorize an authority without deciding on particular directives.  As discussed, 
                                                
98 Weber, Economy and Society, 1:51. 
99 Raz, Morality of Freedom, 48.   
100 “To the extent that legitimate authorities have power over us, the preemption thesis governs our right attitude 
toward them” (Ibid., 67). 
101 This is why it makes sense to speak of resistance to authority.  If authority were simply an instrument for its 
subject, then disobedience would be a matter of the subject’s failure to responsibly or successfully use this 
instrument; resistant non-compliance would amount to the subject’s failure to constrain herself.  This misses 
something important about resistant disobedience, namely that it, just like obedience, involves an interaction 
between two agents. 
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subjects authorize authorities to intervene in their lives between and beyond particular instances 
of deliberation.  This, in turn, depends upon the autonomous agency of the authorities, which are 
not simply reservoirs of reasons for subjects to decide upon. 
In sum, Raz’s service conception goes a long way in clarifying what is required for 
authority to be justifiable.  His focus on the autonomous agency of the subject is especially 
notable, insofar as the subject’s autonomy is necessary for the acts of recognition that establish 
and maintain authority.102  However, by theorizing authority in terms of particular episodes of 
reason-giving and deliberation, his view underestimates the ways that authority structures the 
lives and roles of agents between and beyond actual instances of command.  Moreover, by 
reducing authority to an instrument for subjects, the service conception understates the agential 
role that authorities play in every authority relation.  Regardless of the service they may provide 
their subjects, the impositions of authority express an autonomous agency that is alien to, and 
potentially in conflict with, the subject’s own.  This crucially political aspect of authority 
warrants examination that the service conception does not provide. 
 
Toward a political account of political authority 
Despite their differences, the theories of authority developed by Wolff and Raz both miss 
something essential to political authority, namely that authority is established and maintained 
through continual interactions between authorities and their subjects, both of whom exercise 
degrees of autonomy in these interactions.  Political authority is political precisely because, 
through their acts of subjection and authorization, authorities and subjects continually and 
necessarily constrain or broaden, and foreclose or open, the avenues of practical action available 
to each other.  These interactions cannot eliminate the autonomous agency of either party; 
                                                
102 Raz, Authority and Interpretation, 140. 
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otherwise, the compelling force of authority gives way to coercive power, or becomes a mere 
tool for decision making.  Both parties, then, are agents of the authority relation that binds them.  
Each exercises a degree of autonomy within the authority relation, but nonetheless neither enjoys 
unlimited freedom with regard to the other.   
By theorizing the subject’s acknowledgement of authority as a forfeiture of autonomy, or 
by reducing the agency of the authority to a mere instrument of the subject over whom it is 
exercised, both Wolff and Raz (respectively) mischaracterize the interactive relation specific to 
political authority.  Their divergent mischaracterizations stem from their shared presuppositions 
regarding the subject of authority.  Both thinkers implicitly assume this subject to exercise 
autonomous judgment and agency separate from and prior to her subjection to political 
authority.  That is, were it not for authority, the autonomy of the subject would not be in doubt.  
Moreover, it is only because subjection is implicitly opposed to autonomy that political authority 
is presented as a moral problem in the first place.  Given the autonomy of the unsubjected agent, 
Wolff and Raz ask, can subjection to political authority be morally legitimate?103  The morality of 
authority is thus made to hang on whether the subjected agent retains the autonomy she 
presumably would have had, had she never acknowledged, recognized, or acceded to authority. 
However, it is not at all clear that subjection should be so strictly opposed to autonomy in 
the framing of an account of authority.  By assuming that an individual’s autonomous agency is 
separate from her subjection, and by construing the normativity of authority in terms of the fate 
of this autonomy once the individual is subjected, both Wolff and Raz ignore important ways 
that autonomy is not separate from or prior to authority relations.  Pace Wolff and Raz, 
subjection to authority can be compatible with the autonomous agency of the subject, even while 
an authority makes demands upon that autonomy.  Moreover, subjection to authority may be 
                                                
103 Wolff, Defense of Anarchism, 18-9; Raz, Authority and Interpretation, 126, 134-5. 
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conducive to the development of autonomy; autonomous judgment and agency may even require 
cultivation within authority relations.104  For example, the authority relations that structure 
families, communities, educational and religious institutions, and symbolic networks are not 
antithetical to rational and moral autonomy; they are, rather, sites of its development.  Such 
relations can be conducive to autonomy even when they include the kinds of impositions that 
would vindicate Wolff’s concerns about de facto authority and violate Raz’s instrumentalist 
account of de jure authority.   
More to the point, relations of political authority can also be conducive to independent 
rational and moral agency.  Autonomy may develop through, and not merely despite, political 
heteronomy.  This is Kant’s central thought in the famous essay, “An Answer to the Question: 
‘What is Enlightenment?’.”  There, Kant argues that the political authority of Frederick the 
Great, together with the correlative form of obedience, may actively enable the rational 
autonomy of the Prussian public.  According to this argument, authority is not merely compatible 
with autonomy.  Rather, subjection to political authority may be a necessary condition of the 
subjects’ autonomy.105  
A Kantian concern for autonomy underlies Wolff and Raz’s common line of moral 
inquiry, and both contemporary thinkers presuppose a Kantian ideal of the rational and moral 
individual.  However, Wolff and Raz ignore Kant’s commitment to the development of 
autonomy through heteronomy, insofar as their arguments presuppose an unsubjected and 
autonomous agent whose autonomy can only be fully negated or fully preserved—but never 
                                                
104 In recent decades, this thought has been pursued by so-called ‘post-modern’ theorists, such as Michel 
Foucault, Judith Butler, and Pierre Bourdieu.  However, it is also fully elaborated in the work of decidedly modern 
thinkers, such as G. W. F. Hegel, Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, Emile Durkheim, Sigmund Freud, and Max 
Weber.  
105 Kant, “What is Enlightenment?,” 54-60.  Shapiro notes that Kant treats autonomy and authority as 
compatible, but he does not acknowledge Kant’s commitment to the development of autonomy through subjection to 
authority.  See Shapiro, “Authority,” 388. 
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cultivated, nor merely infringed upon—through subjection.  Thus, their major disagreement is 
whether this agent does a disservice (Wolff) or service (Raz) to her preexisting rational and 
moral autonomy by acceding to the claims of authority.106  Consequently, neither of their theories 
acknowledges the possibility that the subject’s autonomy may be, not merely forfeited or 
preserved, but also shaped by, her subjection.  Moreover, neither theory acknowledges that it is 
the non-instrumental, impositional character of authority that enables it to shape—and potentially 
cultivate—the autonomy of the subject.  Perhaps most importantly, neither theory appreciates the 
ways that the non-instrumental aspects of authority are themselves continually enabled by the 
autonomy of the subjects upon whom they impose.  As a result, neither theory considers what 
may be the most difficult moral and political problem of authority, namely that subjects might 
continually and persistently exercise their autonomy by acknowledging as rightful or 
legitimate—and thereby authorizing, and subjecting themselves to—commands that do a 
disservice, or even violence, to the subjects themselves.107   
In short, neither Wolff nor Raz appreciates authority as a mutually interactive and 
potentially conflictual negotiation between agents, in which the stakes of authorization and 
subjection are various degrees of autonomy and heteronomy, freedom and constraint, prerogative 
and imposition.  Their common focus on the all-or-nothing status of the autonomous individual 
is an artifact of a presupposed opposition between autonomy and subjection.  This presupposition 
                                                
106 Carol Pateman charges Wolff with presupposing “radically abstract individualism,” and the same charge can 
be leveled against Raz.  See Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation, 134.  This individualism prevents both 
thinkers from understanding authority as an interactive relation.  Pateman writes, “Philosophical anarchists... like all 
consistently radical individualists, fail to deal coherently with the mutuality and reciprocity of social relationships.  
‘Authority,’ for example, is treated not as a relationship but as a property of individuals (although… this view of 
authority is not confined to philosophical anarchists)” (Ibid., 135). 
107 Weber, of course, does entertain this idea; authority’s dependence upon voluntary submission can limit, but 
never rule out, authorized but non-instrumental and potentially abusive uses of authority.  See Economy and Society, 
1:225-8, 242-244.  This idea is also central to Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power, which attempts to 
understand the “complicity, based on misrecognition, which is the basis of all authority,” including authority which 
does violence to the authorizing subject.  See Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 113; cf. 114-6, 170, 209-
212. 
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is suited to their moral inquiries, which focus on whether or not authority can be morally 
justified.  However, a political account of political authority would not presuppose this 
opposition, because such an account would focus on the ways that authority is established and 
variably maintained, contested, obeyed, negotiated, and resisted through interactions that express 
various degrees and forms of autonomy, and which affect the lives—the practical options, 
interests, and avenues of agency—of authorities and subjects alike.  The limits of Wolff’s and 
Raz’s views of authority, in other words, are the limits of non-political conceptions of authority. 
 
Arendt on authority 
Hannah Arendt’s account of authority is a political account, insofar as it understands 
authority as a dynamic relation of interdependence that serves and constrains both authorities and 
subjects, albeit in different ways.  More than Wolff or Raz, Arendt recognizes that authorities 
and subjects continually negotiate authority relations by negotiating the prerogatives and 
obligations stipulated by those relations.  Because she theorizes authorization and subjection as 
up for grabs within an interactive relation, Arendt is not tempted to theorize the moral status of 
authority in general. 
Like Weber, Wolff, and Raz, Arendt theorizes authority in terms of a particular 
correlation between command and obedience.  She writes: 
Authority precludes the use of external means of coercion; where force is used, 
authority itself has failed…  The authoritarian relation between the one who 
commands and the one who obeys rests neither on common reason nor on the 
power of the one who commands: what they have in common is the hierarchy 
itself, whose rightness and legitimacy both recognize and where both have their 
predetermined stable place.108 
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On this account, command and obligation are correlated by the recognition that a hierarchical 
relation between authority and subject is legitimate.  According to Arendt, “the compelling 
element lies in the relationship itself and is prior to the actual issuance of commands;” this is 
why authorities need not resort to forceful coercion, violence, or persuasion to compel 
obedience.109 
Arendt specifies that the “hallmark” of authority is “unquestioning recognition by those 
who are asked to obey.”110  Here again, the subject actively participates in the authority relation 
by acknowledging and acceding to authority, thereby acting as an agent of her own subjection.  
Nonetheless, the subject does not forfeit her independent agency by recognizing a particular 
hierarchical authority relation as legitimate; as Arendt emphasizes, “authority implies an 
obedience in which men retain their freedom.”111  This freedom is not the “uncompromising self-
sufficiency and mastership” that is sometimes associated with individual autonomy, but the 
freedom to act, to make new beginnings.  For Arendt, freedom is expressed only in action, which 
always occurs in relation to others.112  This freedom is compatible with subjection to authority, 
which may even facilitate the freedom of its subjects.113 
Because subjects do not forfeit their freedom, their obedience is never guaranteed, and 
authorities must continually solicit recognition that the authority relation is legitimate.  In other 
                                                
109 Ibid., 106.  Force, violence and persuasion may even work against authority, inasmuch as they are instruments 
suited for compelling one’s equals—or one’s superiors—to comply.  As such, their employment by an authority 
calls into question the hierarchy that is essential to authority. See Ibid., 92-3, 102-3, 107, 132-3, and Arendt, On 
Violence (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1970), 40-54. 
110 Arendt, On Violence, 45.  Neither violence nor persuasion can compel obedience that is simultaneously free 
and unquestioning. 
111 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 106. 
112 Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998), 234.  For Arendt, “Men are free… 
as long as they act, neither before or after; for to be free and to act are the same” (Between Past and Future, 153).  
Action, unlike behavior or fabrication, is a kind of spontaneous, public virtuosity that is always open to, and shaped 
by, unpredictable effects and the actions and reactions of others.  See Between Past and Future 148, 153-4, 162-7; 
Human Condition 178-84, 188-190, 220, 233-4, 245; On Violence, 4. 
113 Whereas totalitarianism attempts to script the behavior of subjects in ways that erode their freedom, 
relationships of authority compel subjects to act in ways that are guided, but not fully legislated, by authority.  
Authorities compel action structured by commands, while tyrants coerce conformity to commands. 
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words, authority must always present its subjects with reasons for obedience, and this means that 
it must be responsive to the interests and judgments of its subjects, even as it guides them.  
Following Kant, Arendt believes that this aspect of authority tends toward the preservation of 
political spheres of publicity and freedom.114  Thus, there is an instrumental aspect to authority, 
both in terms of subjects’ particular interests and the wider political context in which these 
interests are formed and negotiated.  However, authority is not reducible to instrumentality 
insofar as the authority retains its autonomous agency and the expression of this agency does not 
always or by definition serve its subjects.  An authority’s responsiveness to its subjects is a 
consequence of its dependence upon their agency, but authority is more than this dependence.  
On Arendt’s view, then, authority is a dynamic and alterable relationship that can be 
maintained, challenged, or lost depending on whether the authority relation is recognized as a 
legitimate hierarchy by those at its bottom.  This does not mean that recalcitrant subjects can 
simply excuse themselves from an authority’s demands and thereby bring down an existing 
authority relation.  Arendt acknowledges that authority relations are powerfully self-
perpetuating, and she understands the ability of authorities to solicit recognition and thereby 
continually compel obedience.  However, she is also aware that the continual need to solicit 
recognition and obedience practically constrains authorities.  In order to command obedience, 
authorities must avoid treating their subjects as equals, using violence against them, or inviting 
disdain or ridicule.  Arendt writes, “To remain in authority requires respect for the person or the 
office.  The greatest enemy of authority, therefore, is contempt, and the surest way to undermine 
it is laughter.”115  Although she never rules out the ability of subjects to challenge authority, 
                                                
114 Arendt, Human Condition 180-3, 200, Between Past and Future 95, 148-9, 153-4, 189-90.  
115 On Violence, 45.  Arendt also notes that “a father can lose his authority either by beating his child or by 
starting to argue with him, that is, either by behaving to him like a tyrant or by treating him as an equal” (Ibid).  See 
also Between Past and Future 92-3, 102-3, 107, 132-3. 
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Arendt realizes that such challenges are usually prompted by the authorities themselves when 
they squander, forfeit, or fail to secure the recognition and obedience of their subjects. 
 In other words, authority may be self-perpetuating, but it is always precarious.116  An 
authority continually depends upon its subjects for the recognition that authorizes it.  Because the 
compelling force of authority is internal to the hierarchical authority relation, and because 
external coercion works against this internal compulsion, the authority has no way to make 
subjects recognize the legitimacy of the relation if they do not.  It may solicit or encourage 
recognition by acting in ways ‘proper to’ authority, but any lapse in authority erodes its ability to 
do this effectively.   
Moreover—and more importantly for Arendt’s political theory—every political authority 
is continually dependent upon its subjects for their power.  On Arendt’s view, power 
“corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert.”117  Whereas free action 
may be performed by individual agents—but always in relation to others—power is always 
exercised by groups.  Power sometimes appears as authority, but authority is not a type of 
power.118  Arendt writes, “The most conspicuous characteristic of those in authority is that they 
do not have power.”119  Elsewhere, she claims that “the true seat of authority” is characterized by 
an explicit “lack of power.”120  Authority may command and coordinate power, but power is 
exercised collectively by the subjects of authority.  As with freedom, subjects do not forfeit or 
alienate this power when they authorize an authority; rather, authority depends upon the 
                                                
116 Indeed, Arendt is concerned with the absence of genuine authority in the contemporary world.  See Between 
Past and Future, 91-2. 
117 Arendt, On Violence, 44. 
118 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 93, 96, On Violence, 45-7.  
119 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 122.  Following Cicero, she continues, “Cum potestas in populo auctoritas 
in senatu sit, ‘while power resides in the people, authority rests with the Senate’” (Ibid).  This separation is not 
exclusive to the Roman context; Arendt argues in various texts that contemporary authoritarian and democratic 
governments are also founded on a separation of authority and power. See Between Past and Future, 98, On 
Violence, 44-7, and Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin Books, 2006),148, 191-3. 
120 Arendt, On Revolution, 192. 
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persistent power of the subjects inasmuch as authoritative demands solicit collective action from 
them.121  Political authority consists precisely in an authority’s ability—made possible by a 
recognized relationship of inequality—to make demands on the power of collective subjects in 
order to accomplish what the authority itself cannot.122 
 By theorizing authority as a relation in which subjects retain both their freedom of action 
and their power, and by acknowledging that authorities perpetually solicit the obedience of their 
subjects in order to remain in authority, Arendt refuses to identify authority in general with either 
domination or instrumental value.  Although she maintains that authority is a relation of 
hierarchy, she is clear that subjects are not finally and fully controlled by authorities; at the same 
time, she is clear that authorities are constrained by their dependence on the recognition, 
obedience, and power of their subjects.  Neither party, then, exercises unconstrained autonomy, 
but neither totally forfeits autonomy, either.  Moreover, both parties benefit from the authority 
relation.  The authority benefits from its access to power through the obedient subjects, while the 
subjects benefit from the authoritative coordination that augments their power.  Nonetheless, 
authority cannot be understood as a purely instrumental relation, because authority serves no 
consistent or necessary purpose (such as helping subjects act according to right reasons).  For 
Arendt, the ends of authority are just as variable, negotiable, and contestable as its means. 
By refusing the positions staked out by Wolff and Raz, Arendt is freer to develop a theme 
that is latent in all of the accounts of authority reviewed in this chapter.  I have shown that, for 
Weber, Wolff, and Raz, authority does not compel unless its subjects authorize an authority 
through an act of acknowledgement, accession, or recognition.  The correlation of command and 
                                                
121 For this reason, authority may exploit, but can never disempower, its subjects.   
122 Arendt does not deny that governments employ power or violence—which she also sharply distinguishes 
from authority—but she thinks that these forms of coercion tend to undermine authority.  For this reason, she is 
impressed by regimes that institutionalize, rather than ignore, the distinction between power and authority.  Arendt, 
On Violence, 44-49, Between Past and Future, 98-100, On Revolution, 148, 191-3. 
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obedience, in other words, is established by the subjects of authority, and this means that 
authorities are dependent upon their subjects for their authority.  Whereas Weber, Wolff, and 
Raz are all committed to this claim as regards the initial moment of authorization and subjection, 
Arendt understands authorities to be constantly dependent upon their subjects.  She makes this 
dependence central to her account of authority and her political thought more generally.  On her 
view, authority is a negotiable relation of hierarchy in which the authorities on top are ultimately 
indebted to the subjects on the bottom.  
In the next part of this chapter, I develop an account of authority that takes seriously this 
political insight, even as it leaves out some of Arendt’s core commitments.  Mine is not an 
Arendtian account of authority, but it draws heavily upon the thought of Arendt and Weber in 
order to sketch the ways that authority is established and maintained, the claims it makes upon its 
subjects, and the ways that it can be negotiated, reinforced, and resisted.  Rather than evaluating 
the moral status of authority, I aim to clarify its political conditions of possibility, and so also its 
limits.  This will enable me to develop a political theory of sovereignty in the following chapters.  
 
Part II: A Political Account of Political Authority 
 
Despite their important differences, a common commitment links the theories of authority 
articulated by Weber, Wolff, Raz, and Arendt.  For each of these thinkers, authority compels 
action because the subjects over whom it is exercised submit to it.  It is the subject’s submission 
that distinguishes obedience to authority from mere compliance with simple power.  By 
accepting, acknowledging, believing, or recognizing that another actor legitimately or rightfully 
commands her, the subject actively participates in her own subjection to authority.  
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This basic thought plays different roles in the work of Weber, Wolff, Raz, and Arendt, 
who use it to pose different questions and reach different conclusions.  In particular, Wolff and 
Raz direct it toward normative moral inquiries focused on whether the ability to command 
obedience can be morally justified.  Although their projects are philosophically and politically 
important, I will not pursue the moral questions they pose.  Rather, I aim to give a descriptive 
account of authority as a political relation.  This means that although I continue to rely upon 
some of their most important insights, which I highlighted in previous sections, I will not use the 
term ‘authority’ in exactly the same ways they do.  In particular, I do not follow Raz in defining 
‘authority’ as a “right to rule” or using the term ‘authority’ to refer to “legitimate authority.”123  
Nor do I define authority as a form of command that creates new moral obligations.  Rather, I 
follow Weber and Arendt—as well as others, such as H. L. A. Hart—in distinguishing the 
concept of political authority from normative questions concerning its moral legitimacy.124  On 
my descriptive view, authority can be legitimate, but it need not be legitimate in order to be 
authority; it can create moral obligations, but this is not a necessary condition of authority.125  
Authority relations pose, rather than answer, normative questions about the moral legitimacy of 
command and obedience. 
Nonetheless, a descriptive theory is not limited to describing merely de facto authority.  
What connects the descriptive theories of Weber and Arendt with the normative theories of 
                                                
123 Raz, Authority and Interpretation, 134, 129. 
124 See Hart, Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 151-207.  Importantly, Hart is clear that 
legal obligations, which are based on authority, have normative grip even though their grip is not the force of moral 
normativity.  Early on, he writes, “The most prominent feature of law… is that its existence means that certain kinds 
of human conduct are no longer optional, but in some sense obligatory…  [T]heories that make [a] close assimilation 
of law to morality seem, in the end, often to confuse one kind of obligatory conduct with another, and to leave 
insufficient room for differences in kind between legal and moral rules and for divergences in their requirements” 
(7-8).  
125 Nonetheless, I agree with Raz that “the concept of legitimate authority has explanatory priority over that of a 
mere de facto authority.  The latter presupposes the former but not the other way around” (Authority and 
Interpretation, 128, italics added).  I would not agree, however, that the concept of legitimate authority has 
explanatory priority over that of authority simpliciter.  The latter is the object of my inquiry.  
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Wolff and Raz is the common thought that authority, in order to be politically effective, must be 
recognized as legitimate by the subjects over which it is exercised.  The subjects may be correct; 
the authority relation may indeed be actually morally legitimate.  For this reason, it would be 
misleading to say that a descriptive theory of authority focuses on merely de facto authority.  
Rather, a descriptive theory of authority describes the conditions of possibility of authority and 
the correlative form of obedience while remaining agnostic about the moral legitimacy of 
authority tout court.  Nonetheless, this agnosticism does not prevent a descriptive theory from 
applying the term ‘authority’ to relations of command and obedience that meet its criteria. 
Descriptive theory may be unsatisfying to those seeking a justification of political 
authority, but description can still be critical.  Raz is entirely correct when he writes: 
What makes mere de facto authorities different from people or groups who exert 
naked power… is that mere de facto authorities claim, and those who have naked 
power do not, to have a right to rule those subject to their power.  They claim 
legitimacy.  They act, as I say, under the guise of legitimacy.126 
  
Moral accounts of political authority, like Raz’s, ignore the guise of legitimacy and focus on 
whether authority is, or can be, morally legitimate.  A political account of political authority, on 
the other hand, will take seriously the guise of legitimacy by trying to explain its conditions of 
possibility, its significance, and its stakes.   
In what follows, I motivate key insights from the first half of this chapter toward a 
political account of political authority.  I will provide a conceptual sketch, rather than full-
fledged account, of political authority.  Nonetheless, I intend this sketch to be robust enough to 
argue from a conceptual claim, namely that authority requires the participation of subjects in 
their own subjection, to a political claim, namely that all authorities are ultimately indebted, for 
                                                
126 Raz, Authority and Interpretation, 128. 
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their authority, to their subjects.  In later chapters, I will argue that this indebtedness is an 
essential aspect of modern sovereignty and the sovereign state. 
 
Authority, subjection, and recognition 
Political authority and subjection are correlated relational concepts.  They are correlated 
insofar as they are defined in relation to one another.  They are relational insofar as each 
characterizes the way that a particular agent (or agents) relates to another agent (or agents).  A 
drill sergeant, for example, exercises authority over new recruits, who are subject to the drill 
sergeant.  The authority of the sergeant correlates to the subjection of the recruits.  There are no 
political authorities without subjects, and there are no subjects—in the relevant sense—without 
political authorities.   
The correlation of authority and subjection takes the form of a relation between two 
autonomous agents.  I have shown above that Wolff and Raz misconstrue the interactive nature 
of this relation in ways that underemphasize the political aspects of political authority.  
Following Weber and Arendt, I understand authority and subjection to refer to an interactive 
relation in which agents negotiate their autonomous agency vis-à-vis one another.  Within an 
authority relation, authorities command and subjects obey, and while the correlation of command 
and obedience may constrain the autonomy of each agent, it does not fully eliminate it.   
What correlates command and obedience, and distinguishes an authority relation from the 
exercise of coercive power, is the subject’s acceptance, acknowledgement, or affirmation that the 
authority’s command is a legitimate or rightful basis for action.  A subject obeys, not because she 
affirms the content of a command, but because she accepts the right of another agent to 
command her, and/or she accepts that she has a legitimate obligation to obey the authority’s 
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commands.127  Through her acts of acceptance, acknowledgment, and affirmation, the subject 
expresses the “willingness to submit” that Weber identifies as a necessary condition of 
authority.128 
In this regard, my account differs slightly from Weber’s, which locates the subject’s 
submission in a belief in legitimacy.  Here I have been influenced by Hart, who stresses that it is 
the subject’s “voluntary co-operation,” manifested in various acts of acknowledgement and 
acceptance, that is essential to authority.129  Loosely following Raz and Arendt—as well as Pierre 
Bourdieu’s important work in social theory—I will use the broad term ‘recognition’ to refer to 
the subject’s acceptance, acknowledgement, or affirmation of the legitimacy of authority and 
subjection.130  It is the subject’s recognition of legitimacy that distinguishes an authority’s 
commands from mere coercion and a subject’s obedience from mere compliance.131  Put 
differently, it is by recognizing an agent as legitimately or rightfully able to command her that a 
subject authorizes that agent.  In so doing, she also subjects herself, due to the correlativity of 
authority and subjection.  In this way, the subject actively participates in her own subjection to 
authority. 
                                                
127 On content-independence, see pages 5 and 13, above.  The right to command and duty to obey are correlative, 
as Wolff stresses.  It is because they are correlative, however, that the belief in either is sufficient for obedience.  
Subjects may obey because they recognize an authority’s right to command without ever recognizing the corollary 
duty to obey; they simply obey “because he tells you to do it,” as Wolff puts it (Defense of Anarchism, 9). 
128 Weber, Economy and Society, 1:37. 
129 Hart, Concept of Law, 196.  See also pages 59-60, 198-9.  Hart is interested in the authority of law, but the 
same voluntary co-operation is necessary for authority more generally (19-20).   
130 Raz, Morality of Freedom, 65, Authority and Interpretation, 140, 147; Arendt, On Violence, 45, Between Past 
and Future, 92-3; Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 72-3, 
111-5. 
131 I have chosen the term ‘recognition’ in order to capture both reactive and proactive ways that subjects may 
relate to authority.  Since authority is frequently understood as an advantageous ability exercised over another agent, 
it is often theorized in terms of an authority’s claim to authority and the subject’s accession to this claim.  While this 
correctly highlights the necessary participation of the subject in the authority relation, it construes the subject’s 
agency as merely reactive.  In point of fact, subjects proactively bestow authority just as much as they accede to it.  
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The recognition of an agent as a legitimate source of command is a necessary condition 
for authorization and subjection.  Authority depends upon recognition.132  This means that there 
are no political authorities that are not recognized as legitimately or rightfully able to issue 
commands and guide the actions of the subjects they command.133  While there are obviously 
leaders and despots and experts and fathers that are not recognized in this way, they are not 
political authorities.  However, the recognition of legitimacy does not entail actual legitimacy.134  
It is not the case that every recognized authority has an actual right to command, or that every 
subject of such an authority has an actual moral obligation to obey.  
 Regardless of whether the recognition of legitimacy corresponds to actual legitimacy, 
there is a diversity of reasons why subjects may recognize an agent as a legitimate source of 
command.  Weber’s account of authority highlights many potential bases of recognition, 
including status, office, position in a traditional hierarchy, conformity to traditional rules, 
exceptional deeds, and reputation.  To some extent, Wolff and Arendt echo Weber in their own 
accounts.135  More recently, Bourdieu has extended and enriched Weber’s analyses with the 
concept of symbolic capital, which encapsulates an even wider variety of bases of recognition.136   
                                                
132 The subject’s recognition is not a sufficient condition of authority, insofar as the recognized agent must also 
actually issue commands.  In Authority and Interpretation, Raz correctly notes that authority does not exist separate 
from its exercise (158). 
133 This does not mean that a subject can simply refuse to recognize an authority and thereby de-authorize the 
authority.  Nor does it mean that every authority must be recognized at all times by every person subject to its 
command.  Political authority is frequently discussed as if it is a one-to-one relation between two agents.  Usually, 
however, it is a much wider social relation and, when it is, some important qualifications apply.  See below, pages 
47-8, 51.  
134 My account is descriptive, not normative.  It explains what authority is and how it functions, not what justifies 
it.  For this reason, Simmons’s objection to “attitudinal” justifications of authority does not apply to my own view.  
See Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy, 134.  
135 Wolff, Defense of Anarchism, 6-7, 16-18; Arendt, Between Past and Future, 92-3. 
136 According to Bourdieu, subjects recognize an agent’s symbolic capital (i.e., the various symbols of status that 
are favored within a particular social, economic, linguistic or political context) and thereby invest that agent with 
symbolic power.  Its name notwithstanding, symbolic power functions much like authority, and Bourdieu’s theories 
have been influential on my sketch of political authority.  See Language and Symbolic Power, especially pages 72-5, 
106, 113, 164, 170, 239 and Practical Reason (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 47. 
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In addition to these broadly social bases of recognition, there are also specifically 
political bases, as when citizens recognize the legitimate authority of an individual on the basis 
of her victory in an election, or on the basis of some other accepted procedure.  There are also 
situational bases of recognition.  For example, the passengers from a crashed plane may 
recognize a flight attendant as a legitimate authority on the basis that, given her training, she is 
most likely to lead them to safety.137  Additionally, there are moral bases for recognizing an agent 
as a legitimate source of command.  Raz’s service conception, for instance, may indicate one 
such basis for recognition.138  When an authority relation is founded on moral bases, recognized 
legitimacy may correspond to the actual legitimacy sought by some normative theorists, such 
that the recognized authority actually has a right to command and the recognizing subjects 
actually have a moral obligation to obey.139  In such cases, it may be morally wrong not to 
recognize the legitimacy of an authority.140   
This survey of the bases of authority is by no means exhaustive.  It is only meant to show 
that subjects may authorize an authority, and subject themselves, for a variety of reasons.  My 
descriptive sketch of authority is not meant to adjudicate between such reasons, even though 
identifying them may be crucial to evaluating the legitimacy of particular authority relations.  In 
fact, one virtue of descriptive accounts is that they emphasize the moral arbitrariness of 
                                                
137 This example occurs in David Estlund’s Democratic Authority (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 
124.  Through a detailed examination of this example, Robert Talisse and Michael Harbour effectively challenge the 
core of Estlund’s normative theory of authority.  See Talisse and Harbour, “Questions about Normative Consent” 
(unpublished paper on file). 
138 I.e., if certain commands help obedient subjects act in accordance with reason, and acting according to reason 
is better than deciding for oneself, then there may be a moral basis for recognizing as a legitimate authority an agent 
who issues such commands. 
139 However, this is not necessarily the case.  For instance, the doctrine that ‘might makes right’ may be 
considered a moral basis for authorizing an authority, but many normative conceptions of authority would not count 
the ensuing authority relation as actually legitimate. 
140 This thought is inspired by David Estlund’s theory of normative consent, which claims that there are 
situations in which it is immoral to refrain from consenting to authority.  See Estlund, Democratic Authority, 
Chapter 7.  Recognition and consent are sufficiently different that I am not committed to Estlund’s conclusions.  On 
the difference between recognition and consent, see below, pages 45-49.  
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authority relations, and of the underlying bases of recognition.  A descriptive account of 
authority does not affirm such arbitrariness, but presents it as one feature of authority that 
requires normative evaluation and enables political contestation.141   
This emphasis on moral arbitrariness notwithstanding, my account denies that forceful 
coercion can be a basis of the recognition that authorizes an authority.  The same goes for any 
other denial or negation of the recognizing subject’s basic autonomy.  But these restrictions are 
themselves descriptive, rather than normative.  Part of what defines authority is its crucial 
difference from blunt power: the subject of authority is a participating agent, and not merely a 
passive object, of her subjection. As Raz succinctly puts it, “One’s ultimate self-reliance is 
preserved, for it is one’s own judgment which directs one to recognize the authority of 
another.”142  The subject participates in her subjection by recognizing—for whatever reason—the 
legitimacy of the authority exercised over her, and this act of recognition expresses the 
autonomous agency and judgment that she retains even through her subjection.143  
 
Recognition, not consent 
At first glance, my account of authority may appear similar to consent theories of 
authority, in which the legitimacy or moral justification of authority is founded, either directly or 
indirectly, upon the consent of the subjects over whom authority is exercised.  My account does 
share a central feature with consent theory, namely that authority depends upon authorization by 
its subjects.  However, my account differs from consent theories in two significant ways.  First, 
                                                
141 Descriptive accounts can pose questions regarding the morality of actual authority relations without denying, 
as some normative accounts do, that authority can be morally arbitrary.  That is, they can pose the question, “Is this 
particular authority relation moral?” instead of simply, “Is this particular relation really authority?”  See Raz, 
Authority and Interpretation, 128-9. 
142 Raz, Authority and Interpretation, 140. 
143 For this reason, authority is a normative concept—it advocates for certain relationships.  The normative 
function of the concept can be described, however, without an account of moral obligation.  A descriptive account of 
a normative concept can be useful for understanding its function and the stakes of the normativity it articulates. 
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mine is not an account of legitimate or justified authority; it is not a normative account.  
Recognition, then, is not simply another idiom for consent, insofar as it plays a different role in 
my account (i.e., a necessary condition of authority) than consent does in consent theories of 
authority (i.e., a necessary condition of legitimate authority).   
Second, my account says nothing about the intention of subjects to authorize an authority.  
Consent theories, on the other hand, ultimately depend upon the intention of subjects to authorize 
authorities and subject themselves, although this intention may not be expressed directly.  
According to theories of express consent, the consenting subject voluntarily and intentionally 
agrees to precisely what the theories attempt to explain, namely the legitimacy of an authority.  
According to theories of tacit consent, consent is implied in, or expressed by, certain everyday 
practices of subjects, such as enjoying the protection of a government.  The strength of tacit 
consent theories depends upon the links they draw between the actual acts of subjects and the 
voluntaristic intentionality that is purported to be a necessary condition of legitimate authority.144  
Finally, hypothetical consent theories claim that a certain authority relation is legitimate because, 
under certain ideal conditions, subjects would have consented to it.145 
At the core of consent theory is a notion of consent as a voluntary and intentional act of 
authorization and subjection, and this causes problems for all forms of consent theory.  Theories 
of express consent are problematic because subjects rarely, if ever, expressly and intentionally 
consent to the authorities that subject them; there are few, if any, authorities that satisfy the 
conditions of express consent theory.  Theories of tacit consent are problematic because it is 
                                                
144 On express and tacit consent theories, see A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 57-95 and Justification and Legitimacy, 158-78.  Simmons 
emphasizes the intentionality that is necessary to both express and tacit consent on pages 177-8 of Justification and 
Legitimacy.  See also John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
145See, for instance, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Cynthia 
Stark, “Hypothetical Consent and Justification,” Journal of Philosophy 97, no. 6 (2000): 313-334; Estlund, 
Democratic Authority, 117-135.   
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difficult to convincingly identify, within everyday practices, the intentional and voluntary 
submission that is characteristic of consent.  This is especially true given that the practices that 
are said to imply consent—such as living under the protection of a particular government— are 
themselves not usually the result of intentional or voluntary choices.146  A similar line of 
argument can be applied to hypothetical consent theories, insofar as it is unclear how non-actual 
consent captures the voluntary and intentional self-subjection needed to do the normative work 
of consent theory.147  
My own account of authority does not compete with consent theory, insofar as I am not 
offering a justification of political authority.  Nonetheless, it is illustrative to note that the 
problems just mentioned do not affect my account.  Although recognition and consent are both 
ways that subjects participate as agents in their own subjection, only consent involves an 
(express, tacit, or hypothetical) intention to authorize an authority or submit to its command.  On 
my account, recognition correlates command with obedience and authorization with subjection, 
but a subject may recognize an authority’s prerogative to command without intending to 
authorize the authority and subject herself.  She may do so for a variety of reasons and on a 
variety of bases, none of which need involve any awareness that her act of recognition actually 
authorizes that authority.  A similar lack of awareness might well undermine the authorizing 
power of consent (we might consider the subject to be cheated, for example, if she does not 
know how her consent operates).  However, the authorizing power of recognition is not similarly 
undermined.  While consent and recognition both express a crucial moment of autonomous 
agency in the establishment of an authority relation, they differ insofar as recognition does not 
                                                
146 Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy, 77, 137-9, 177-8.  
147 Ronald Dworkin, “The Original Position,” in Reading Rawls, (New York: Basic, 1975), 17-21.  In 
“Hypothetical Consent,” Stark rescues hypothetical consent theories by abandoning any link to the voluntarism and 
intentionality that are crucial to theories of express consent (232-334).  My own descriptive account of authority is 
influenced by this move. 
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require the subject to (expressly, tacitly, or hypothetically) intend to authorize the authority or 
subject herself to the authority.  By recognizing an authority on the basis of status, office, or 
charisma (etc), subjects may authorize authorities without knowing it.  
My account can dispense with the intent to authorize, and thereby avoid the problems of 
consent theory, because it is not a normative account; the bar is lower, so I do not need 
voluntarism and intentionality to do any normative work for me.  This does not mean, of course, 
that I can dispense with the subject’s role in authorizing the authority or the uncoerced nature of 
her act of recognition.  However, once the subject’s act of recognition is separated from the 
intent to authorize, it is no longer difficult to discover acts of authorization in everyday practices.  
Subjects authorize authorities and subject themselves all the time by recognizing, for whatever 
reason and on whatever bases, the right of other agents to command them.  As Wolff notes, 
authorization often occurs through reflex or habit rather than intentional expressions of 
consent.148  Moreover, authorization and subjection may occur through acts of recognition that 
are embedded in long-term practices or ways of life.  By accepting or regularly obeying laws, 
fulfilling the duties of citizens and otherwise living as subjects of a particular government, 
subjects do recognize, if only tacitly, the right of that government to command them.149  Through 
                                                
148 Wolf, Defense of Anarchism, 7. 
149 Within a society-wide network of authority relations, there will be many different ways of recognizing the 
authority that structures society.  In The Concept of Law, Hart makes a point that is relevant here, despite the 
differences in our accounts of authority.  He writes: “The officials of the system may be said to acknowledge 
explicitly such fundamental rules conferring authority: the legislators do this when they make laws in accordance 
with the rules which empower them to do so: the courts when they identify, as laws to be applied by them, the laws 
made by those thus qualified, and the experts when they guide the ordinary citizens by reference to the laws so 
made.  The ordinary citizen manifests his acceptance largely by acquiescence in the results of these operations.  He 
keeps the law which is made and identified in this way, and also makes claims and exercises powers conferred by it” 
(59-60).  Hart notes that a “sufficient number” of persons in a society must accept a rule as authoritative in order for 
it to be so (196).  The same is true on my account of authority.  In a society-wide network of authority relations, 
there is no need for all subjects to recognize the authority that structures society.  A number of subjects may not 
recognize the legitimacy of a president or a court, for example, without threatening their authority.  In such cases, 
the president and the court will still exercise authority over the non-recognizing members of society.  I will not 
speculate as to the proportion of non-recognizers it takes to alter or dissolve a society-wide authority relation.  
Authority relations are variable, negotiable, and contingent, and political authority is not absolute.  This is why there 
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this kind of recognition, they may continually invest in their government an authority that, unless 
challenged, indefinitely structures their practical options.  The tacit nature of this recognition is 
not a problem for my account, because in it there is no need to connect everyday acts of 
recognition to the intentionality that is crucial to consent. 
Because my account stresses that subjects authorize authorities without necessarily 
intending to do so, it can affirm insights from branches of critical theory and social theory that 
are often ignored by moral theories of political authority.  Rather than review these here, I will 
simply note that thinkers like Marx, Weber, Freud, Lukács, Adorno, Bourdieu, and Butler take 
seriously what Raz calls “the guise of legitimacy,” as well as the ways that subjects reinforce it 
through their own acts of authorization.150  There is a critically democratic impulse to this line of 
thought, insofar as it emphasizes authority’s dependence upon the subjects over whom it is 
exercised.  However, from Marx onward, critical and social theorists have known that agents 
cannot always recognize their own agency when it is at work in the forces that compel or coerce 
them.  Authority does not usually advertise the fact that it depends upon the autonomy of those 
over whom it is exercised.  Moreover, as Bourdieu emphasizes, subjects may “misrecognize” 
their own acts of recognition, mistaking the bases of their recognition for the bases of authority 
itself.151  When this happens, authority appears to be a consequence of social facts, rather than the 
                                                
is a politics of political authority.  However, I will suggest that it is harder to deauthorize authority than it would at 
first appear, especially within a society-wide network of authority relations.  One reason is that acts of authorization 
and subjection may be indirect and transitive, such that one recognized authority (i.e., a mayor) may authorize an 
intermediate authority (i.e., a police officer), thereby subjecting her own subjects to the new authority.  In this case, 
to challenge the authority of the police officer may be to challenge the authority of the mayor, as well as other 
authorities within the network.  This makes it difficult for particular subjects to simply ‘opt out’ of a particular 
authority relation.  On the other hand, if a large majority of subjects refuse to recognize the authority of a 
sufficiently important authority, such as a president, then the authority of the president’s delegates may also be 
challenged.  Another reason that it is difficult to simply deauthorize a particular authority is that subjects may not be 
aware that they play any role in authorizing the authority in the first place; authority may appear to them as an 
independent social fact.  A final difficulty consists in the ways that authorities use their authority to continually 
solicit recognition.  See below, pages 50-53. 
150 Raz, Authority and Interpretation, 128. 
151 Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 139-140, 142-3, 169-70, 209-210, 214-6 and passim. 
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effect of social acts.152  Misrecognition thus conceals the role that subjects play in authorizing 
(and so potentially transforming or abolishing) the authority to which they are subject.  This 
phenomenon is crucial to the politics of political authority, and it complicates the voluntarism 
that underlies some moral accounts of political authority. 
Although my account dispenses with the voluntarist core of consent theories, it captures 
what may be their most attractive aspect, namely the way that they construe subjects as agents of 
the authority that compels them.  Raz suggests that consent theories are appealing because they 
attempt to make subjects the authors or owners of the limits that authority imposes on their 
freedom.153  My account attempts something similar, but more modest.  On my view, subjects do 
not author or appropriate authoritative commands as their own, but they do authorize the 
authorities that can issue such commands.  This is a necessary condition of authority; authority 
depends upon authorization by the subjects over which it is exercised.  This means that although 
the subjects are not the sole authors or owners of authoritative commands, neither are the 
authorities.  Although subjects do not voluntaristically and intentionally will authority into 
existence, their autonomous agency makes authority possible, and authorities, if they are to 
remain in authority, cannot ignore this.154 
 
 
                                                
152 For instance, citizens in a democracy may recognize the authority of a president on the basis of her victory in 
a fair electoral process, and then attribute her authority to the process itself, rather than to their own acts of 
authorization.  The election itself does not make the president an authority; rather, she is an authority because the 
election is taken as a legitimate basis of authority by the subjects whose acts of recognition authorize her.  
Misrecognition hides the fact that the president’s authority depends upon the citizens’ agency and acts. 
153 Raz, Authority and Interpretation, 162. 
154 In Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), David 
Estlund develops an innovative version of hypothetical consent that “retains the idiom of consent” but motivates it 
toward a surprising conclusion: “Authority can simply befall us, whether we have consented to it or not” (130, 117).  
Although Estlund’s arguments raise challenges for the view I am developing here, a full engagement with them is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation.  I hope to consider Estlund’s normative consent view more fully in a later 
work. 
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The politics of political authority 
I have claimed throughout this chapter that subjects participate as agents in their own 
subjection to authority.  This claim may seem hyperbolic, bringing to mind early modern debates 
about the ability to sell oneself into total and perpetual slavery.  However, as I argued in 
responses to Wolff and Raz, authority relations are not founded on a forfeiture of autonomous 
agency, nor is authority immutably established by a single act of consent.  Rather, an authority 
relation is an ongoing and variable interaction between two agents, one of whom commands the 
other and one of whom recognizes the legitimacy of the other to command her.  The acts of 
commanding and recognizing express the autonomous agency of the authority and subject alike, 
and their agency is negotiated through the interactive authority relation.155  Because the subject’s 
autonomy is constrained but never fully alienated, the potential for resistance, subversion, and 
transformation is always present in every authority relation.  When this potential is absent, as in 
the hypothetical case of total and perpetual slavery, the relation is one of domination by power, 
rather than subjection by authority. 
This last claim, however, may also seem hyperbolic, this time erring toward the opposite 
extreme by implying that subjects can easily avoid, subvert, or shrug off authority relations.  
Such an implication would fail to appreciate the durability and elasticity of authority’s 
compulsion.  Authority can be effectively challenged; authority relations are sometimes changed 
by the resistance or recalcitrance of subjects.  However, the autonomy of subjects can be, and 
often is, realized in the affirmation of existing authority relations.  Subjects actively participate in 
their own subjection and, insofar as their autonomy is not eliminated by authority, they may 
                                                
155 The agencies of the authority and subject are not exercised in identical ways, and it would be a mistake to 
think that their mutual necessity to the authority relation entails their equality in terms of ability or possibility.  
However, it would also be a mistake to think, as Wolff and Raz seem to, that the inequalities present within the 
authority relation guarantee one agent a monopoly of agency over the other. 
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always continue to authorize it.  Moreover, because authority relations are often embedded in a 
society-wide network of authority and subjection, subjects cannot very simply ‘opt out’ of 
particular authority relations.156  Most importantly, authorities do not simply wilt in the face of 
potential resistance.  Rather, they use their authority to solicit further recognition, and they 
continually manufacture, reestablish, remotivate, and reconfigure the bases of that recognition, 
thereby continually providing their subjects with reasons to recognize them as legitimate.  Thus, 
while the autonomy of subjects persists through their subjection, this does not mean that the 
existence of the authority relation is solely up to them.  Autonomy does not entail absolute 
agency, and authority relations—like all social relations—are sites where autonomy is expressed 
and realized in negotiation with the autonomy of others.   
Consequently, neither authorities nor subjects exercise total control over the authority 
relations that bind them.  Authority is a variable and negotiable relation between two agents, and 
it is responsive to the agency and actions of authorities and subjects alike.  Throughout the life of 
an authority relation, authority and subjection will wax, wane, and change in quality according to 
ongoing interactions of command, recognition, and obedience.  These interactions do not simply 
initiate authority relations.  They also perpetuate authority relations, as subjects continually 
authorize authorities, and subject themselves, through new acts of recognition.  These acts must 
be uncoerced, and they must express the autonomous agency of the subjects who perform them; 
otherwise, authority degrades into coercive power.  Thus, the characteristic that ultimately 
distinguishes authority from power, namely the uncoerced participation of the subject in her own 
                                                
156 For instance, the authority that a police officer exercises over me may be underwritten by my recognition of 
other authorities within a network of authority relations, such as the state officials who delegate authority to the 
police officer.  In that case, my refusal to recognize the authority of the officer depends upon my refusal to 
recognize the authority of the state officials; if I continue to recognize the authority of the officials, I transitively 
recognize the authority of the police officer.  If I refuse to recognize the authority of the whole network (i.e., the 
state), it may indeed be the case that police officer exercises coercive power, rather than authority, over me.  
However, unrecognizing and deauthorizing authority may be difficult for additional reasons.  See above, pages 47-8, 
note 149. 
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subjection, also denies the possibility of final authorization and total subjection.  Final 
authorization and total subjection would negate authority, rather than perfect it. 
In short, the autonomy of a subject is not merely compatible with her subjection to 
authority, but is a necessary condition of her subjection.  Insofar as the authority cannot be 
authorized, and the subject cannot be subjected, without the subject’s independent and uncoerced 
recognition that the authority legitimately commands her obedience, authority depends upon the 
autonomy of the subjects over whom it is exercised.  This dependency is not satisfied by a single 
act of recognition that establishes the authority relation once and for all.  Rather, authority 
continually depends, for as long as it is exercised, upon the autonomy of its subjects. 
This conceptual sketch points to a political claim that will be elaborated throughout the 
rest of this dissertation.  If authority continually depends upon the autonomy of the subjects over 
whom it is exercised, then authorities themselves—the persons who exercise authority—
constantly depend, for their authority, upon their subjects.  Every authority must be authorized, 
and the source of authorization must ultimately be—even in cases of tacit or indirect 
authorization—the subjects who recognize an obligation to obey authoritative commands.  When 
authorities are no longer recognized as authorities, their prerogative to command becomes 
ineffective because it is no longer correlated with a recognized obligation to obey; the authority 
is no longer an authority.  This means that every authority is ultimately indebted, for its 
authority, to the subjects whom it commands.  The exercise of authority requires the continual 
negotiation of this debt.   
Of the thinkers reviewed in part I, Weber and Arendt are most concerned with the 
political institutionalization of authority.  It is not surprising, then, that these two thinkers 
theorize the indebtedness of authorities most explicitly.  In each of his three ideal types, Weber 
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claims that the exercise of authority is contingent upon the subjects’ recognition of legitimacy, 
and he emphasizes that authorities must always be responsive to—and are ultimately constrained 
by—what their subjects consider legitimate or excessive exercises of authority.157  If an 
authority’s commands conflict with the bases of the subjects’ recognition, then the subjects will 
resist.158  Arendt makes similar claims, noting that authorities must act in ways appropriate to 
their position if their authority is not to be compromised in the eyes of their subjects.159  For 
Arendt, the dependence of an authority upon its subjects becomes especially evident in instances 
where its commands are viewed as laughable or abusive, or the authority itself appears 
incompetent, unfit to rule, or unworthy of respect.  In such instances, the authority cannot depend 
upon the participation of its subjects in their own subjection, and the authority relation is 
jeopardized.   
There is thus a politics, and not simply a moral normativity, to political authority.  
Authorities impose upon their subjects, but this imposition is constrained by the indebtedness of 
every authority to its subjects.  This indebtedness is both an effect of, and testament to, the 
autonomy of the subjects, which is exercised through acts of authorization or resistance.  The 
dependence of authorities upon their subjects may even grant subjects a degree of agency over 
their authorities; authorities may be subject to their subjects.  In light of this, as Arendt and 
Weber both note, authorities adopt strategies for securing and resecuring the recognition upon 
which their authority depends.  Even when such strategies are successful, however, they affirm 
rather than eliminate the authority’s dependence upon its subjects.  Unlike the coercive force of 
power, which can be exercised over persons as if they were passive objects, the compelling force 
of authority is purchased at the price of indebtedness to the agents over whom it is exercised. 
                                                
157 Weber, Economy and Society, 1:217-8, 227, 242-4. 
158 Ibid., 1:227. 
159 On Violence, 45; Between Past and Future, 92-3, 102-3, 107, 132-3. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
SOVEREIGNTY 
 
According to the general definition established in Chapter 1, sovereignty is supreme and 
independent political authority within boundaries.  This definition refers to a modern ideal of 
political organization, rather than a characteristic of actual political communities.  This ideal is 
rarely, if ever, perfectly realized; few sovereigns, if any, exercise totally independent or 
unquestionably supreme authority.160  Nonetheless, the ideality of modern sovereignty does not 
disqualify its real importance.  Just the opposite; aspirations to sovereignty have crucially shaped 
post-medieval political life at every level, from local power struggles to international and global 
affairs.  The continual effort to achieve and maintain sovereignty is the sine qua non of the 
international state system, the basic structure within which, and against which, contemporary 
political struggle occurs.  
Although the modern ideal of sovereignty is frequently associated with the 1648 Treaties 
of Westphalia, in truth a long and uneven transition was required for it to become a dominant 
norm of political organization.161  Nonetheless, the Treaties of Westphalia provide a convenient 
                                                
160 On sovereignty as a political ideal, see Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995; Alexander Murphy, “The Sovereign State System as a Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical 
and Contemporary Considerations” in State Sovereignty as a Social Construct, T. Biersterker and C . Weber, eds. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999). 
161 For a classic, Westphalia-centered historical overview, see Joseph Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the 
Modern State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Hendrick Spruyt’s The Sovereign State and Its 
Competitors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) is less Westphalia-centered.  Recent work in historical 
international relations theory, political economy, sociology, and political theory challenges the significance of the 
Treaties of Westphalia as the central turning point in the development of modern sovereignty.  See John Gerard 
Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,” International 
Organization 47:1 (1993): 139-174; Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of 
Modern International Relations (London: Verso, 2003); Hannes Lacher, Beyond Globalization: Capitalism, 
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marker for this long history because they formalize the crucial innovation of the modern ideal of 
sovereignty: the reconciliation of classical and medieval aspirations to imperium and dominum 
with the modern acknowledgement of multiple, locally supreme political authorities.  Whereas 
medieval systems of political authority were characterized by tangled networks of feudal 
obligation and overlapping spheres of imperial and ecclesiastical rule, modern sovereignty 
depends upon discrete and exclusive spheres of authority and subjection.162  By extending the 
thirteenth century principle that a ruler is supreme within its own realm (Rex est imperator in 
regno suo) to multiple, earthly polities, the modern ideal of sovereignty makes sense of an “anti-
medieval” world of multiple sovereigns.163  It is this ideal that underlies the (post-)Westphalian 
interstate system, in which the local supremacy of one sovereign is compatible with the 
supremacy of others, while the independence of each is achieved in relation to the independence 
of all. 
 Today, the modern ideal of sovereignty remains essential to the material and ideological 
structures, motivations, and epistemological frameworks that are characteristic of contemporary 
states.  Correlatively, the same ideal also underlies the norms and laws of contemporary 
international relations.  This does not mean that the modern ideal of sovereignty has persisted 
unchanged since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; rather, it has been articulated and 
approximated in diverse forms throughout its history.164  Nonetheless, as evidenced by twentieth 
                                                
Territoriality and the International Relations of Modernity (London: Routledge, 2006); Saskia Sassen, Territory, 
Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
162 Strayer, Medieval Origins; Bartelson, Genealogy of Soveriegnty, Chapters 4-6; Spruyt, Sovereign State, 
Chaptes 3 and 5; Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights, 32-73.  
163 Robert Jackson, Sovereignty (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2007), 6.  See also F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 88-9; Jean Bethke Elshtain, Sovereignty: God, State and the Self 
(New York: Basic Books, 2008, 57-75; Joanne Pemberton, Sovereignty: Interpretations (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009), 54-9. 
164 Bartelson, Genealogy of Sovereignty; James Caporaso, “Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public 
Authority and Sovereignty,” International Studies Review 2, no. 2 (2000): 1-28; Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in 
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century struggles for decolonization and succession, as well as twenty-first century concerns 
about state autonomy in a globalizing world, the ideal of sovereignty as supreme, independent, 
and bounded authority remains fundamental to contemporary politics.   
 Its primacy notwithstanding, this ideal is characterized by an irreducible internal tension 
that is generally unacknowledged by actors and institutions aspiring to sovereignty.  In fact, it 
could be argued that the most significant ideological function of the modern state is the 
disavowal of the self-contradictory nature of modern sovereignty.165  On one hand, sovereignty is 
idealized as a kind of constitutive authority, which not only commands, but also continually 
constitutes, its own collective subject.  In other words, the sovereign defines ‘the people’ over 
which it rules, either by founding a political community or by regulating its borders and 
differentiating its members from non-members.  On the other hand, sovereignty is idealized as a 
kind of authority that must be authorized by the very ‘people’ that it constitutes.  Because of its 
supremacy and independence, sovereign authority cannot be bestowed from ‘on high’; rather, it 
necessarily “flows upwards” from the collective subject over which it is exercised.166  The 
tension internal to the modern ideal of sovereignty is thus a tension between the sovereign’s 
constitutive authority and its dependence, for that authority, upon the collective subject that it 
constitutes.  
 This tension underlies several core problems of modern and contemporary political 
philosophy.  Most importantly, it underlies what I will call the paradox of sovereignty, whereby 
the authority necessary to constitute a sovereign polity is consequent upon, or immanent to, the 
                                                
Sovereignty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Georg Sorensen, Changes in Statehood: The 
Transformation of International Relations (New York, Pagrave MacMillan, 2001), 145-161. 
165 The present chapter lays a foundation for this claim, which will be elaborated further in Chapter 4. 
166 Pemberton, Sovereignty: Interpretations, 19.  This commitment to the popular authorization of the sovereign 
is, of course, central to ideals of popular sovereignty.  However, it is also latent in absolutist theories of sovereignty, 
as I will show here and in Chapter 3. 
 57 
act of constitution itself.  According to the modern ideal of sovereignty, the sovereign is not self-
authorizing; its authority comes from the constituted people.  The people, however, is not self-
constituting; its constitution comes from the authorized sovereign.167  A problematic circularity 
thus links the sovereign and the people in their capacities as, respectively, constitutive authority 
and constituted subject.  The sovereign is both the creator and the creature of the constituted 
people, and the constituted people is both the precondition for and result of sovereign authority.   
Although this paradox of sovereign constitution may at first appear as a purely abstract 
philosopher’s problem, it has concrete consequences for modern and contemporary politics.  As I 
will argue in later chapters, the territorial frameworks that have fundamentally structured modern 
politics are themselves symptoms of the paradox of sovereign constitution.  If these frameworks 
are currently becoming less and less important to contemporary political life, then it is necessary 
to understand the paradox of sovereignty in order to imagine alternative, non-territorial 
frameworks of authority and constitution.168  
In the present chapter, I work toward these later arguments by theorizing sovereignty as a 
type of constitutive authority.  In part I, I focus on the supremacy, independence, and 
boundedness conditions of sovereign authority.  To be supreme and independent in the relevant 
senses, I argue, an authority must determine the limits of its own jurisdiction.  Sovereign 
authority, then, must be not merely bounded, but self-bounding.  By giving itself boundaries, 
sovereign authority inscribes certain political agents within its jurisdiction, thereby determining 
who is, and who is not, subject to its command.  In short, sovereignty is an ideal of political 
authority that determines its own limits and identifies its own subjects.  
                                                
167 As I will show in the Chapter 4, this holds true even when the people is the sovereign.  Rather than solve the 
paradox, the identification of the people and the sovereign merely tightens it. 
168 See below, pages 163-5, 192-205, 224-8. 
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In part II, I argue that sovereign authority not only identifies its own subjects, but also 
constitutes these subjects as a coherent collective subject.  The sovereign’s constitution of its 
collective subject is equally essential to ideals of absolute and popular sovereignty; regardless of 
whether the sovereign is a single monarch, or the people itself, it is sovereign authority that 
ultimately engenders ‘the people’.  Turning to Hegel, whose political philosophy epitomizes the 
modern ideal of sovereignty, I argue that in a system or society of sovereign states, it is the 
supreme constitutive authority of each state that must be independent from the authority of other 
states.  Constitutive authority, in other words, is the core of modern sovereignty, which 
supremacy and independence qualify. 
Constitutive authority is frequently underemphasized by contemporary accounts of 
sovereignty.  In international relations theory and international law especially, sovereignty is 
identified with external independence, while the internal aspects of sovereignty are either 
ignored or understood as a derivative effect of a sovereign’s external relations.  In part III, I take 
issue with such views by briefly referring to the political transformations that would seem to be 
prima facie evidence for the primacy of external independence, namely the successful 
decolonization struggles of the 20th century.  Decolonization does indeed demonstrate the 
importance of external independence, but it also demonstrates the importance of internally 
exercised constitutive authority.  Moreover, the experiences of post-colonial states that have 
achieved external independence without supreme internal authority make clear that sovereignty’s 
internal aspect is not secondary to its external aspect.  Sovereignty cannot be reduced to external 
independence; external independence and internally supreme authority are both necessary 
conditions of modern sovereignty.  According to its modern idealization, sovereignty is self-
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bounding and constitutive authority that is supreme with regard to the collective subject that it 
constitutes, and independent with regard to all other political actors.  
 
Part I: Boundedness, Supremacy, and Independence 
 
The major innovation of the modern ideal of sovereignty is the situation of supreme and 
independent authority within a bounded sphere of jurisdiction.  The boundaries of this sphere are 
the limits of sovereign authority, within which a sovereign’s command is the highest political 
command.  In what follows, I analyze the ideal of modern sovereignty in terms of its 
boundedness, supremacy and independence and argue that, in order to be sovereign, a political 
authority must satisfy all three of these conditions together.  I then argue that this entails that 
sovereign authority must be self-bounding.   
Modern sovereignty is necessarily bounded.  Its boundaries may be de jure or de facto, 
material or notional, and marked or unmarked.169  What is essential is that they facilitate an 
inside-outside dichotomy and inscribe a jurisdiction wherein the recognized rightfulness of a 
sovereign’s commands correlates to the obedience of those who are commanded.170  As seen in 
the previous chapter, this correlation is accomplished through the interactive relation of an 
authority—in this case the sovereign—and its subjects.  For this reason, it is appropriate to think 
of jurisdiction as a sphere of relationality wherein a sovereign and one or more subjects are 
constituted, as sovereign and subjects, by their relation to each other.  Within this sphere, the 
                                                
169 “Boundaries are central to the discourse of sovereignty.  It is not merely a case of physical boundaries which 
separate one sovereign state from another, but of cultural boundaries which separate the ‘same’ from the ‘other’ and 
of conceptual boundaries which distinguish the domestic from the international, community from anarchy, the 
universal from the particular.”  Joseph Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty?: The Politics of a Shrinking 
and Fragmenting World (London: Edward Egar, 1992), 236. 
170 I do not intend the concepts of authority and obedience to signal moral obligations.  See Chapter 1 for a 
descriptive account of authority and subjection. 
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sovereign and subjects are bound together in such a way that it makes sense to talk about the 
sovereign and its subjects or the subjects and their sovereign.  For the rest of this dissertation, I 
will refer to such spheres as 'spheres of sovereignty'.  Sovereign command and the correlative 
form of subjection are inscribed within bounded spheres of sovereignty. 
Most definitions of sovereignty are committed to one or more specifications of the sphere 
of sovereignty.  Very frequently, sovereignty is conceptualized in spatial terms, as supreme and 
independent political authority within a territory.  According to this definition, the reach of 
sovereign authority corresponds to the boundaries of political-geographic space.  This 
understanding of sovereignty has been prevalent for roughly five hundred years, during which 
time the modern state and the international state system have served as predominant frameworks 
for the organization of political authority.  This does not mean, however, that the limits of 
territorial integrity have any necessary connection to the limits of command and obedience or to 
the supremacy and independence that define sovereignty.171  Authority always has a determinate 
reach, and the supremacy and independence of authority do require boundaries, but there is no 
reason that these boundaries must map onto territorial borders.172   
                                                
171 Although modern political sovereignty has generally functioned according to a secular “territorial ideal,” the 
essential elements of the modern ideal sovereignty— boundedness, supremacy and independence—can be divorced 
from territoriality.  Murphy, “Soveriegn State System,” 42.  In the present chapter, I attempt to make the idea of 
non-territorial sovereignty initially compelling by presenting the modern ideal of sovereignty without relying on the 
concept of territoriality.  The arguments here do not ignore notions of territorial sovereignty, but they mark the 
possibility of other criteria of boundedness.  This will allow me, in Chapter 4, to consider territoriality functionally, 
as being in the service of and subordinate to the modern ideal, and project, of political sovereignty. 
172 “What seems epistemically irreducible in the sovereignty claim is only the general proposition that the claim 
should be one of supreme authority ‘over’ some represented unity.  This in turn implies a self-constructed boundary 
between the inside and outside, rather than the more specific proposition that the imagined unity should involve an 
exclusive territorial claim and that the boundary should be one of physical borders.”  Neil Walker, “Sovereignty, 
International Security and the Regulation of Armed Conflict: The Possibilities of Political Agency,” in The Politics 
of Protection, ed. Jef Huysmans et. al. (London: Routledge, 2006,) 166-7.  It is a mistake to identify territorial 
sovereignty with modern sovereignty itself.  This mistake is especially pernicious whenever the incoherence, 
insignificance, or impracticality of territorially bounded sovereignty is taken as an argument for the incoherence, 
insignificance, or impracticality of modern sovereignty itself.   For instances of such arguments in the service of very 
different political ideals, see Krasner, Sovereignty; and Michael Hart and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2001) and Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (New York: Penguin, 
2004).  
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Similarly, there is no necessary connection between the jurisdiction of sovereign 
authority and the boundaries of a particular nationality, ethnicity, or ideology.  Various criteria of 
unity and difference may play important roles in facilitating sovereignty, and some, such as 
nationality, have been crucial to the development of today’s sovereign states.  Nonetheless, the 
ideal of sovereignty itself—as supreme, independent, and bounded political authority—need not 
refer to any particular territorial, national, ethnic, or ideological mode of structuring or 
representing relations between sovereigns, subjects, and non-subjects.  Sovereignty is necessarily 
bounded— at least in the sense that the reach of rightful command extends only as far as do the 
subjects over whom it is exercised—but the criteria for the specification of its boundaries are 
contingent. 
 The condition of sovereign supremacy refers to a political authority’s hegemonic status as 
the ultimate and overriding source of political command.  A supreme authority is the last court of 
appeal regarding all matters within its jurisdiction; it exercises the ultimate (recognized) right to 
command the subjects within its boundaries.  As Daniel Philpott puts it, “In the chain of 
authority by which I look to a higher authority, who in turn looks to a higher one, the holder of 
sovereignty is highest.”173  According to both theological and secular ideals of sovereignty, the 
supremacy of rightful command correlates to the supremacy of obedience.  Within their own 
realms, the sovereign authority of God, king, and state demand the deepest form of subjection.  
Obedience to the commands of a sovereign (usually expressed as law) trumps other obligations 
whenever they conflict, except where stipulated by sovereign authority itself. 
 The supremacy condition entails a kind of exclusivity; there can be only one supreme 
authority commanding a particular group of subjects in a particular sphere of sovereignty.174  
                                                
173 Philpot, Revolutions, 16-7.  See also Jackson, Sovereignty, 10.  
174 Caporaso, “Changes in the Westphalian Order,” 10.   
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Sovereign authority either subordinates, incorporates, or negates competing sources of political 
command within its sphere, or it bars them from that sphere all together.  This does not mean, 
however, that a sovereign is exclusively authoritative.  There may be multiple authorities—even 
multiple, potentially competing authorities—within a sovereign’s jurisdiction.  These authorities, 
however, must all be subject to sovereign authority, which, because of its supremacy, is 
exclusively able to establish, regulate, and coordinate intermediate authorities, such as mayors, 
police officers, judges, teachers, and presidents.  These intermediate authorities are not 
sovereign, because their authority and jurisdictions are dependent upon, and can be revoked by, 
another authority.  They are, however, unified by the supreme authority of the sovereign, which 
is the only authority that can organize the potential competition of all intermediate authorities 
into a coherent hierarchy of command.  Thus, the modern ideal of sovereignty rationalizes (in the 
Weberian sense) the specialization, and potential conflict, of diverse authorities by subjecting 
them all to the sovereign. 
Finally, the condition of sovereign independence refers to a political authority’s “external 
autonomy” vis-à-vis other authorities.”175  No external authority or power can be “regularly 
entitled to have a controlling or an overriding voice” in a sovereign’s authoritative relation to its 
own subjects, and no external authority or power can be the source of a sovereign’s authority 
over its subjects.176  If either of these is the case, the sovereign in question is a subordinate, rather 
                                                
175 Spruyt, Sovereign State, 3.  As Jackson puts it, “A sovereign is not someone else’s dependency.”  Jackson, 
Sovereignty, 10. 
176 Alan James, “The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society,” Political Studies 
47 (1999): 464.  See also James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 
1986): “Such a community may be said to possess sovereignty, or to be sovereign, if it does not look beyond its own 
borders for the ultimate source of its own legitimacy” (3).  See also the language of the 1948 Charter of the 
Organization of American States: “No State or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for 
any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.”  Quoted in Krasner, Power, the State and 
Sovereignty: Essays in International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2009), 195.   
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than supreme, political authority.177  Thus, the ideal of sovereign independence, like the ideal of 
sovereign supremacy, entails exclusivity; the independent authority of the sovereign necessarily 
excludes other independent authorities from commanding the subjects within its sphere of 
sovereignty.178  Sovereign independence entails non-interference.  
Sovereign independence does not mean, however, that a sovereign is never answerable to 
external political actors.  Rather, sovereigns may exercise their independence by participating in, 
and even obligating themselves to, external authority structures such as treaties, conventions, and 
cooperative organizations, as long as the relevant forms of participation, consent or cooperation 
are ultimately up to the sovereign.  If they are not, the sovereign’s authority is neither 
independent nor supreme, and thus not sovereign.179  This restricted notion of independence does 
not invoke an ideal of unconstrained agency; it does not imply a frictionless world in which a 
sovereign, unimpeded by any other political actor, can do whatever it wants.  Rather, it 
                                                
177 In non-sovereign forms of political authority, authority may indeed emanate from ‘on high’, as when a 
governor authorizes a police officer.  In such cases, the authority of the police officer is borrowed from, and 
continually depends upon, that of the governor (or of the state itself).  Subjects may recognize the authority of the 
governor or state, but not the officer, without forfeiting the officer’s authority (of course, they may also recognize 
the authority of the officer directly).  In relations of authority simpliciter, then, authorization can occur from ‘above’ 
and ‘below’.  However, in relations of sovereignty—which deny any possible ‘above’—authorization must come 
from below: “Sovereignty flows upward through an act of collective will only to move downwards in the form of 
supreme authority and political power.” Pemberton, Sovereignty, 19.   
178 As Neil Walker puts it, the modern ideal of sovereignty involves the “ideological assumption that ultimate 
authority over the internal operation of the polity is exhausted by internal sources and modes of expression and that 
there is no remainder available to external sources.” Walker, “Sovereignty and the Regulation of Armed Conflict,” 
157. 
179 Even Hans Morgenthau, who is notable for his realist emphasis on state interest, acknowledges the 
compatibility of sovereign independence and international convention and contracts: “A state can take upon itself 
any quantity of legal restraints and still remain sovereign, provided those legal restraints do not affect its quality as 
the supreme law-giving and law-enforcing authority.  But one single legal stipulation affecting that authority is in 
itself sufficient to destroy the sovereignty of the state.” Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for 
Power and Peace (Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), 247.  Quoted in Julie Bunk and Michael Fowler, Law, Power, and the 
Sovereign State: The Evolution and Application of the Concept of Sovereignty (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1995), 85.  Next to Morgenthau, Stephen Krasner’s neo-realist suspicion of international 
conventions and contracts seems hyperbolic.  See Krasner, Power, the State and Sovereignty, 198-208.  Even 
Krasner, however, admits that conventions and contracts can be consistent with sovereign autonomy, although his 
analysis of sovereignty as “organized hypocrisy” is devoted to exposing the constant violation of norms of 
sovereignty.  Less realist positions are more comfortable acknowledging the compatibility of sovereign 
independence and international cooperation.  See James, Sovereign Statehood, 53-57, 209-222; Hinsley, 
Sovereignty, 1986, 232; Bunk and Fowler, Law, Power, Sovereign State, 84-8; Jackson, Sovereignty, 10.   
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presupposes a modern world of multiple, bounded sovereigns, in which the independence of each 
is limited and enabled by the independence of the others.   
This limitation constitutes rather than undermines sovereignty.  The supremacy condition 
of sovereignty suggests that only actors beyond a sovereign’s jurisdiction can interfere with that 
sovereign’s authority over its subjects.  The independence condition affirms the possibility of 
this interference, but denies its actuality.  Sovereign authority is limited, beyond its own 
jurisdiction, by the only kind of political actor that can limit it—i.e., other sovereigns—but it is 
not impeded, within its own jurisdiction, by even those actors.  In other words, the exercise of 
sovereign independence requires the existence of other independent sovereigns to be independent 
from; external sovereignty is a denial of dependence upon the only kind of political actor that 
could exercise control over a sovereign.  In this way, sovereignty is like personal autonomy, 
which is meaningless except when it is achieved and exercised in relation to other agents.  In 
short, sovereign independence requires the existence of other sovereigns, and it is achieved, not 
despite, but in relation to, their own independence.  For this reason, the development of modern 
sovereignty is coeval with the development of the modern system (or ‘society’) of sovereign 
states. 
The three conditions of boundedness, supremacy, and independence are mutually 
enabling and mutually conditioning.  It is their interrelation, rather than simple addition, that 
marks the modern ideal of sovereignty as a conceptually, historically, and politically specific 
organization of authority.  This interrelation is most evident in the way that boundedness 
qualifies the other two conditions of sovereign authority.   
Whereas imperial and ecclesiastical authorities throughout the European medieval period 
aspired to supreme authority, this aspiration was bounded only by the practical limits of an 
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emperor or pope’s effective command.  Imperium and dominum could only extend so far, 
practically speaking, and whatever fell beyond the scope of a particular ruler’s authority could be 
interpreted, simply on the basis of its exteriority, as calling that authority into question.  In other 
words, whatever exceeds supreme but unbounded authority suggests the failure of that authority.  
Consequently, the exterior of medieval imperium and dominum had to be disqualified: only 
barbarians existed beyond the frontiers of imperial and ecclesiastical rule.180  Whatever exceeded 
the reach of unbounded authority was not worth reaching. 
The transformation of the thirteenth century principle Rex est imperator in regno suo (the 
king is emperor is within his own realm) changed this.181  While the principle had originally 
enabled the coexistence of secular and theological rulers, its application to multiple terrestrial 
realms enabled an ideal of political supremacy that was no longer undermined by the existence 
of secular authority elsewhere.  Boundedness enabled supreme authority to be qualified as 
internally supreme authority—the ultimate right to command subjects within a certain 
jurisdiction—and this is perfectly compatible with the fact of multiple supreme authorities.  The 
particular boundaries of supreme authority, of course, are the stakes of late medieval, modern, 
and contemporary power struggles.  What is not at stake is the boundedness of supreme political 
authority itself. 
Similarly, the ideal of independent authority was not absent from pre-modern European 
politics; there is nothing specifically modern about the aspiration of rulers to rule their subjects 
themselves.  The extension of Rex est imperator in regno suo to terrestrial spheres of authority, 
however, gave this aspiration a particularly modern form, insofar as territorial boundaries made 
evident which subjects a ruler considered to be its subjects.  In other words, the boundedness of 
                                                
180 Charles Maier, “Being There: Place, Identity, and Territory” in Identities, Affiliations and Allegiances, S. 
Benhabib, et al., eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 79. 
181 Jens Bartelson details this political-epistemic shift in Genealogy of Sovereignty, Chapters 4 and 5. 
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modern sovereignty gives definition to a ruler’s claim to exclusive rule over a particular set of 
subjects—those inscribed within the boundaries of authority—and thereby makes intelligible the 
ideal of sovereign independence and the complaint of interference.  Combined with the ideal of 
internal supremacy, this ideal of external independence creates the image of authority that is 
specific to modern sovereignty: authority that operates within a particular jurisdiction without 
depending upon, or answering to, anyone anywhere. 
In short, the boundedness of supreme and independent authority makes possible—both 
conceptually and politically—the distinction between internality and externality that is 
characteristic of modern sovereignty.182  By inscribing distinct, non-overlapping spheres that are 
“subversive of multiple claimants of authority,” the boundaries of sovereignty mark and facilitate 
the exclusivity that is required by both the supremacy and independence conditions.183  Once 
political authority is understood to be bounded, its supremacy and independence can be realized 
and maintained by subordinating any internal competition for rightful command, while excluding 
any external competition.   
While boundedness qualifies the supremacy and independence conditions, supremacy and 
independence also qualify the boundedness condition.  In order for a sovereign to exercise 
supreme and independent authority, the boundaries of that authority must be determined by the 
(bounded) sovereign itself.  In other words, a sovereign must exercise authority not only within 
its own boundaries, but over them as well.184  Sovereign authority must be self-bounding. 
This point can be helpfully illustrated by a comparison with non-sovereign political 
                                                
182 As Robert Jackson puts it: “Supremacy and independence are not two separate characteristics: they are two 
facets of one overall characteristic: sovereignty.  Facing inward, the sovereign is the supreme authority within the 
country… Facing outward a sovereign is but one of many among such authorities around the world.  In the outward 
exercise of their sovereignty states are never in a position of supremacy.  They are in a position of independence.”  
Jackson, Sovereignty, 11. 
183 Caporaso, “Changes in the Westphalian Order,” 10. 
184 Julie Mostov, Soft Borders: Rethinking Sovereignty and Democracy (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004) 19-
24; Walker, “Sovereignty and the Regulation of Armed Conflict,” 166-7. 
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authority.  Non-sovereign authority—political authority simpliciter—can thrive within externally 
imposed limits.  Indeed, imposed limits may even be generative of authority, as when a higher 
authority (e.g. a queen) delegates a particular sphere of command to a subordinate authority (e.g. 
a local lord).  However, sovereign authority is incompatible with such an imposition.  If the 
limits of a political authority’s command are heteronomously determined, then that authority is 
not supreme even within the imposed limits, because the imposition itself violates the finality 
and exclusivity of the authority’s command.  Nor is it independent with regard to the exterior of 
those limits, insofar as the reach of its own command is determined by the authority of another.  
The heteronomously bounded authority is thus dependent upon, and subject to, the command of 
another authority.  It is not, or not yet, sovereign.185  
Consequently, the boundedness necessary to supreme and independent authority must be 
achieved by a supreme and independent authority itself.  Modern sovereignty, then, is not merely 
supreme, independent, and bounded political authority—it is supreme, independent, and self-
bounding political authority.  These three conditions are all interdependent and must be achieved 
together.  It is only because a sovereign exercises supreme and independent authority that it can 
effectively bound an exclusive sphere of sovereignty, and it is only because a sovereign is self-
bounding that it can genuinely exercise supreme and independent authority.  
Although some sovereigns may originally establish their own limits, most achieve 
sovereignty within pre-existing limits.  The crucial point, however, is that in order to be 
sovereign, a political authority must appropriate these limits as its own boundaries, by assuming 
the exclusive prerogative to maintain and police them, and negotiating their alteration with other 
sovereigns.  Supreme and independent political authority must bound itself, and where this 
                                                
185 Thus, for example, states whose borders have been imposed by colonizing forces are not sovereign until they 
assume the prerogative to maintain—and potentially alter—those boundaries.  
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requires transforming imposed boundaries into self-imposed boundaries, it is the transformation 
itself that marks the achievement of sovereignty.  Where this requires negotiating boundaries 
with another sovereign—as in the case of territorial borders shared by two states—it is a mark of 
sovereignty that each supreme and political authority must participate in such negotiation.  Self-
boundedness, like supremacy and independence, is a relational condition, and this means that a 
sovereign usually does not act alone in bounding itself.186  Nonetheless, the relation particular to 
self-boundedness entails that no sovereign can have its boundaries altered for it, just as no 
sovereign can have its boundaries imposed upon it.  Every sovereign is an active agent—and, 
from the perspective of its subjects, the primary agent—of its boundedness.  
Sovereign self-bounding cannot be reduced to a single moment of boundary-setting.  
Rather, sovereign authority continually establishes, articulates, and maintains its own limits.  In 
contemporary political affairs, sovereign states determine the scope of their own authority by, for 
example, policing their territorial borders, enforcing and refining the criteria used to differentiate 
citizens from non-citizens or subjects from non-subjects, naturalizing immigrants and deporting 
illegal residents, regulating the actions of citizens at home and abroad, engaging diplomatically 
with other sovereigns, and deciding whether and how to be accountable to international 
institutions.  Not all of these operations involve drawing lines or establishing physical or social 
borders.  However, they all involve negotiations of the scope of supreme and independent 
authority.  Through such negotiations, sovereign authority continually bounds itself.187 
                                                
186 There are some boundaries of authority and subjection, such as the criteria for citizenship, residency, or civic 
belonging, that a sovereign has the exclusive prerogative to establish and alter.  These boundaries are still relational, 
though, insofar as they mark an inside and outside of sovereign authority, and thus put the sovereign into a particular 
relation vis-à-vis the actors within, and those beyond, its boundaries.  Other boundaries, such as the territorial 
borders shared by two or more sovereign states, can only be altered through the (violent or peaceful) negotiation of 
multiple sovereigns. 
187 It is worth reemphasizing that I do not mean to imply that sovereignty requires the exercise of perfectly 
supreme and independent authority within and over boundaries at all times.  Only a hyperbolically strict view would 
consider an unregulated border crossing, for example, to completely undermine state sovereignty.  According to my 
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In determining the scope of its own authority, the self-bounding sovereign interiorizes all 
those actors with regard to which its authority is supreme and exteriorizes all those actors with 
regard to which its authority is independent.  In so doing, the sovereign achieves and maintains 
its sovereignty.  This, then, is the full extent of the modern epistemic and political shift that 
resituated medieval aspirations to supreme and independent authority within bounded spheres of 
sovereignty: Whereas before, the existence of agents beyond the reach of a ruler’s command 
challenged that command simply by falling outside it, now such exteriority testified to, rather 
than undermined, sovereign rule.  While medieval authorities tended to deny or downplay the 
world beyond their realm, modern sovereigns could not only admit to that world, but also 
proclaim it as excluded from the boundaries that they themselves established, maintained, and 
policed.  In other words, Deleuze and Guatarri’s claim that “sovereignty only reigns over what it 
is capable of interiorizing,” is only partly correct.  According to the modern ideal of sovereignty, 
sovereign authority also reigns, negatively, over what it is capable of exteriorizing.188  What 
might be said to escape the reach of a particular sovereign is, from the perspective of the modern 
ideal of supreme, independent, and self-bounding authority, cast out or kept out and interpellated 
as an outsider or foreigner.189  This applies equally to stateless persons and sovereign states.  
                                                
exegesis of the modern ideal of sovereignty, sovereignty is something to be continually achieved, and although this 
achievement may be durable, it may also be eroded.  However, sovereignty is not eliminated every time this 
achievement is thwarted.  Because sovereignty is an active and ongoing project, rather than a static characteristic or 
status, the fulfillment of this project can be violated in full or in part. 
188 Giles Deleuze and Felix Guatarri, A Thousand Plateaus, (London: Continuum) 2004, 397.  
189 According to its modern idealization, sovereignty not only differentiates insiders from outsiders, but also 
discriminates between different kinds of insiders and outsiders.  In the same way that sovereign authority can 
rationalize intermediate authorities by organizing them hierarchically, it can differentiate and rationalize various 
forms of subjection as well.  Thus, while there is a real distinction between a full citizen and a mere member of a 
polity, according to the ideal of internally supreme, externally independent, and self-bounding political authority, 
citizens and members alike are subjects of the sovereign.  This is true even if some subjects (i.e., citizens in a 
democratic polity) formally participate in the exercise of sovereign authority, and even if some subjects bear the 
burdens of subjection more heavily than others.  As will be discussed below, the sovereign is authorized by all 
subjects who recognize its authority over them—including members and citizens alike—regardless of whether they 
are formally enfranchised.  Just as there are different forms and degrees of subjection to sovereign authority, there 
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It should not be surprising that the modern ideal of sovereignty as supreme, independent 
and bounded political authority implies a conception of authority that bounds itself.  After all, 
this ideal originally developed out of, and in connection with, Christian theological debates 
concerning God’s ability to place limits on his own powers.190  Despite this genealogy, however, 
contemporary political theory frequently overlooks the self-bounding character of sovereignty 
and, in so doing, mystifies the relation of sovereign authority to its (usually territorial) borders.  
As Jens Bartelson points out in A Genealogy of Sovereignty, political geographers and political 
theorists have long debated a chicken-or-egg question regarding sovereignty and boundaries.  He 
writes, “A bounded territory can either be interpreted as a necessary condition of sovereignty, or 
conversely sovereignty can be interpreted as a necessary condition of a bounded territory.”191  
According to the former interpretation, “sovereignty must be demarcated by boundaries, and 
therefore also [must be] logically and historically posterior to them;” according to the latter, 
“sovereignty has to exist prior to boundaries, and is that which demarcates territory through the 
drawing of boundaries.”192  These two interpretations, however, pose a false distinction.  Neither 
boundedness nor sovereignty is prior to the other.  Rather, a sovereign political authority both 
realizes and exercises its supremacy and independence through giving itself boundaries.  A self-
bounded sphere of sovereignty—territorial or otherwise—is coeval with sovereignty.193   
 
 
 
                                                
are different forms and degrees of authorizing sovereign authority, and not all are explicitly institutionalized.  For 
discussion of related points, see above, pages 47-51 and below, pages 72-5, 106-112, 176-189, 221-228.  
190 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 1-55.  See also Ernst Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997). 
191 Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, 30. 
192 Ibid. 
193 I will return to this discussion in Chapter 4, which directly interrogates the ways that modern territoriality 
facilitates modern sovereignty. 
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Part II: Sovereign Constitutive Authority 
 
I have shown that, as opposed to the tangled networks of personal obligation that 
characterize feudalism, as well as the overlapping aspirations to universal command that 
characterize imperial and ecclesiastical authority, the modern ideal of sovereignty conceptually 
and practically associates supremacy and independence with discrete and non-overlapping 
spheres of authority.194  I have argued that the modern ideal is only coherent, however, if the 
boundedness of sovereignty is understood as self-boundedness.  Each sovereign must inscribe its 
own sphere of authority if it is to be truly supreme and independent.   
In this section, I argue that by inscribing its own sphere of authority, a sovereign 
inscribes a correlative sphere of subjection and thereby determines which agents are, and which 
are not, subject to sovereign authority.  In so doing, the sovereign constitutes its own collective 
subject.  Sovereignty, then, is supreme, independent, self-bounding, and therefore constitutive 
authority, in the sense that sovereign authority, by bounding itself, binds together the members of 
the collective subject over which it is supremely and independently exercised. 
As with the arguments above, my arguments in this section refer to sovereignty as a 
modern political ideal, which exists today as a dominant norm of international political 
organization and a fundamental aspiration of state politics.  Although the ideal of sovereignty is 
fundamental to modern and contemporary politics, I do not mean to suggest that political 
authority ever fully lives up to this ideal.  In particular, I do not mean to suggest that sovereign 
authority creates its collective subject ex nihilo, or that it is an irresistible constitutive force that 
by itself sorts individuals into political communities, or that it determines nationalities or other 
‘thick’ forms of collective political identity.  Rather, I mean to argue that the political ideal of 
                                                
194 Spruyt, Sovereign State, 34, 56. 
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supreme, independent, and bounded authority is consistent only if this authority is self-bounding 
(the argument of part I, above) and, consequently, if it constitutes its own collective subject, in 
the minimal sense that I will describe below.  ‘Sovereignty’ names an ideal of political authority 
that constitutes the people it over which it rules.  This ideal warrants investigation, not because it 
is perfectly realized somewhere, but because it is striven for, or imposed, everywhere. 
 Sovereign self-bounding is not an act of self-isolation.  Boundary-setting is always a 
relational act, and by determining the limits of its own authority, a sovereign puts itself in a 
different relation to the actors that fall on the different sides of that limit.  The self-imposed limit 
inscribes a sphere of relationality that includes every actor subject to sovereign command and 
excludes those actors not subject to it.  It is through this dual action of inclusion and exclusion 
that sovereign authority constitutes its own collective subject. 
The sphere of sovereign authority is, correlatively, a sphere of subjection; every actor 
within it is subject to sovereign authority.195  By determining the exclusive boundaries of this 
sphere, a sovereign determines the extent of its authority and the extent of subjection to that 
authority.  It thereby determines which political actors are its subjects.  As Bartelson puts it, 
“Sovereignty… furnishes the very divide between what is internal and what is external with a 
meaning, and thus with political reality for the agents themselves, whose identity in turn hinges 
on this division.”196  By bounding itself, sovereign authority identifies its subjects qua subjects 
and distinguishes them from non-subjects.  This is not necessarily an act of political 
identification in any ‘thick’ sense; it need not attribute a common culture, aim, or ideology to the 
                                                
195 Just as this chapter relies upon the previous chapter for a provisional account of authority, it also relies upon 
the previous for a provisional account of subjection.  Thus, by ‘subjection’ I have in mind here the recognized 
“obligation to obey” a sovereign authority, where obedience refers to content-independent compliance motivated by 
an explicit or implicit recognition of the authoritative nature of the relevant commands themselves, or their source.  
The recognized obligation may not correspond to any actual moral obligation.  Sovereignty involves an explicit or 
implicit appeal, to the subjects in its bounded jurisdiction, for the recognition required for supreme authority; 
according to the modern ideal of sovereignty, this appeal is successful.  
196 Bartelson, Genealogy of Sovereignty, 47. 
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various actors who are subject to sovereign authority.197  These actors may have nothing in 
common other than their burden of sovereign law, and even this may vary—in degree and 
quality—among them.198  Moreover, different kinds of subjects will be differently related to the 
sovereign; citizens and non-citizen members of a polity, for example, will experience subjection 
to sovereign authority differently, and they will participate differently in the authorization of the 
sovereign.  Despite these differences, however, the actors inscribed by a sphere of sovereignty 
are all subject to the sovereign’s supreme authority.199  They share the status of ‘subject’, which 
differentiates them from actors outside the sovereign’s jurisdiction.  They are therefore united, in 
a ‘thin’ sense, as a collective subject. 
In the act of bounding itself, then, supreme and independent political authority constitutes 
its own collective subject.  As Étienne Balibar writes, “It is precisely the correlation between 
inside and outside that makes sovereignty what it is… and, above all, that constitutes a ‘political 
community’ submitted to a sovereign authority and in some sense ‘created’ by it…”200  This is 
only a community in the minimal sense of a collective subject composed of diverse actors united 
by their common subjection and differentiated from other actors who are not subject to the same 
                                                
197 Sovereignty’s identification of its subjects can be connected with (and either facilitate or be facilitated by) a 
more substantial act of political identification.  This occurs, for example, when the boundaries of sovereign authority 
are also national boundaries, such that inclusion within them interpellates actors as members of a national 
community.  Indeed, it may be the case that sovereign self-bounding is always a matter of this kind of ‘thicker’ 
political identification.  My claim, however, is the more minimal claim that sovereigns, in determining the limits of 
their own authority, also identify which actors are subject to that authority—namely, the ones inscribed by those 
limits.  This minimal claim is not a claim about ‘thick’ political identities like nationality.    
198 In particular, the burdens imposed by sovereign command will vary along with the attitudes, interests and 
social positions of both the subjects and the sovereign.  The common subjection of all to law, for example, does not 
mean that law weighs equally upon all.  Moreover, some subjects will occupy positions of intermediate authority, or 
enjoy sanctioned positions of power under the umbrella of sovereign authority, and others will not. 
199 There are of course some determinate exceptions to this, such as those related to norms of diplomatic 
immunity.  Insofar as such exceptions are granted by the sovereign itself, they affirm the ideal of sovereignty as 
supreme and independent authority over all actors within the sovereign’s jurisdiction. 
200 Étienne Balibar, We, The People of Europe?: Reflections on Transnational Citizenship, trans J. Swensen 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 158.   
 74 
sovereign.201  Nonetheless, insofar as the boundaries between unity and difference are drawn by 
the sovereign itself, it is accurate to say that the collective subject inscribed within those 
boundaries is “‘created’ by” sovereign authority.202 
In other words, the modern ideal of sovereignty is an ideal of constitutive authority.  
Sovereign authority does not merely command; it also constitutes—and maintains—the 
collective subject that it commands by determining which actors compose that collectivity.  The 
collective subject is constituted through both unification and differentiation.  Its members are 
internally united by their common obligation to sovereign authority, and externally differentiated 
from political actors who do not share that obligation.  Even though the relevant unity and 
difference are ‘thin’, in the sense described above, they are both necessary for the sovereign’s 
collective subject to be constituted as a determinate collective subject.  Determinate constitution 
is also negation.  Because each sovereign exercises supreme, independent, and self-bounding 
authority, to be included in one sovereign’s collective subject is to be excluded from all others.  
Thus, each sovereign constitutes a collective subject that is its and its alone. 
Sovereign constitutive authority is openly exercised in exceptional moments of political 
transformation, as when sovereignty is first achieved in relation to a newly defined collective 
subject, or when an existing sovereign extends its sphere of sovereignty—by conquest, 
colonization, or political incorporation—to include new subjects.  However, sovereign authority 
is also at work in the everyday acts of official inclusion and exclusion that, on a much more 
                                                
201 Frederick Whelan identifies “the establishment of political boundaries” with “the formation of a group of 
people sharing a common political identity” and “the determination of political membership;” this is the kind of 
‘thin’ sense of constitution that I have in mind.  Frederick Whelan, “Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary 
Problem,” in Nomos 25: Liberal Democracy, J. Pennock and J. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University 
Press, 1983), 15-6. 
202 Balibar is actually more ambivalent than I have here portrayed him.  He writes: “In reality it is precisely the 
correlation between inside and outside that makes sovereignty what it is (and, above all, that constitutes a “political 
community” submitted to a sovereign authority and in some sense “created” by it, or creating itself through the 
institution of sovereignty).”  Balibar, We, the People, 158.  This ambivalence gestures to the paradox of sovereignty 
that I will describe in the Interlude following this chapter and explore more fully in Chapters 3 and 4.   
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intimate scale, continually reconstitute the sovereign’s collective subject by allowing some 
persons to enter into the sphere of sovereignty while turning away, or actively expelling, others.  
Today, sovereign constitutive authority is most evident at the territorial borders between states, 
where passports, vehicles, suitcases, and personal histories are inspected to determine who is 
eligible to enter a particular sphere of sovereignty and subjection.  However, physical borders are 
not the only sites where subjects are differentiated from non-subjects—the former group to be 
further differentiated into citizens, residents, tourists, and aliens—or where sovereign authority 
“interiorizes” some persons while passing over, or actively exteriorizing, others.  Indeed, as I 
will argue in Chapter 4, the boundaries of sovereign authority need not map onto the physical, 
territorial borders of states.  At their territorial borders, as well as throughout and beyond their 
territory, states determine the jurisdiction of their sovereign authority through the operations of 
inclusion, exclusion, and differentiation that constitute and reconstitute their collective subjects. 
The ideal of sovereign constitutive authority has been articulated throughout the history 
of Western political philosophy, and it is essential to theories of absolutist and popular 
sovereignty alike.  From Machiavelli onward, supreme authority is associated with the 
prerogative or ability to constitute a collective subject, a people, through acts of inclusion and 
exclusion.  However, it is not until the 19th century, with Hegel, that the ideal of constitutive 
authority is paired with an ideal of reciprocal independence between sovereigns.  
Like the ideal of self-bounding sovereignty, the ideal of constitutive sovereignty can 
probably be traced to theological conceptions of a divine ruler who literally creates the subjects 
(the creatures) over whom it rules.203  Medieval and early modern conceptions of the divine right 
of kings certainly express the similarity.  The 1609 speech of King James I of England is 
exemplary: “For if you wil consider the Attributes to God, you shall see how they agree in the 
                                                
203 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 31-55. 
 76 
person of a King.  God hath power to create, or destroy, make, or unmake at his pleasure…  And 
like power have Kings: they make and unmake their subjects.”204  The parallel between God and 
King is revealing: the power to create and constitute is a consequence of supremacy alone.  The 
link between constitution and independence is not relevant until later, in the context of a society 
of sovereigns wherein each sovereign must claim its subjects as its own, to the exclusion of 
competing claims.  
In early republican philosophy, supreme authority is frequently claimed to be essential to 
the political community, not only for the maintenance of order, but as the source of the 
community’s form and unity—its constitution.  Indeed, insofar as early republicanism revived 
Roman political thought, a founding act of constitution could be both evidence for, and a source 
of, supreme political authority.205  Machiavelli, for instance, celebrates political founders who 
“introduced any form they pleased” upon the “matter” available to them by constituting disparate 
persons into a people or by reconstituting existing peoples into new collective subjects.206  
Moreover, Machiavelli is clear that maintaining supreme authority requires continually 
reconstituting the collective subject of authority.207  Similarly, for Jean Bodin, a republic cannot 
exist “without sovereign power, which unites all the members and parts thereof… into a body… 
for it is not the town or the individuals who make up a [state], but a union of the people under 
                                                
204 King James I’s speech, March 21, 1609, cited in Elshtain, Sovereignty, 98, italics added. 
205 See Hannah Arendt, “What is Authority?” in Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 
especially pages  120-8. 
206 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, H. Mansfield, trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 23, 102, 
104.  
207 For Machiavelli, the moment of political founding continues throughout the life of any political order.  See 
his Discourses on Livy, J. Bonadella and P. Bonadella, trans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 125, 246-
250.  As Leo Strauss puts it, “Foundation is, as it were, continuous foundation; not only at the beginning, but ‘every 
day,’ a commonwealth needs ‘new orders’.”  Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1995), 44.  The Discourses concludes with a parable of  supreme authority preserved through reconstituting 
the collective subject: “Quentin Fabius, who was the censor, placed all of these new people, who were the source of 
this disorder, within four tribes, so that they could not, reduced to such small spaces, corrupt all of Rome.  This 
matter was well understood by Fabius, and he provided a suitable remedy for it without changing the government; it 
was so widely accepted by that civic body that he deserved to be called Maximus" (Machiavelli, Discourses, 359). 
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sovereign strength.”208  For both Machiavelli and Bodin, rulers achieve supremacy by unifying 
individuals under their command and differentiating this unity its outside.  A similar idea is 
essential to Hobbes’s thought, which can be seen as a link between theories of absolutist 
sovereignty and later theories of full-fledged popular sovereignty.  For Hobbes, the disorganized 
multitude becomes an organized people only when its individual members submit themselves to 
the rule of the sovereign.  The sovereign’s command over these individuals constitutes them as a 
collective political subject, and the sovereign enjoys the right of further determining this subject 
by expelling certain individuals (i.e., lawbreakers) from the collective.209  
The sovereign’s constitution of the collective subject remains fundamental to later ideals 
of popular sovereignty, where sovereign and subject are (ideally) coextensive.210  Here, it is 
tempting to invert earlier political ideals and think of the collective subject of sovereignty as the 
agent that constitutes its sovereign.  There is some truth to this, insofar as the collective subject 
of sovereignty does authorize the sovereign.  However, as I will show in later chapters, this is 
ultimately true of all forms of sovereignty—including absolute sovereignty.  What gives popular 
sovereignty its specificity is that ‘the people’ (or populus, demos, or public) exercises sovereign 
authority; however, it is still through this exercise that ‘the people’ is constituted.  As Robert 
                                                
208 Jean Bodin, Les six Livres de la République: Faksimiledruk der Ausgabe 1583 (Darmstadt: Scientia Aaleen, 
1961) 12.  My translation from French. 
209 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, R. Tuck, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Chapters 16-22, 
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210 Recently, Andreas Kalyvas has derived from theorists of popular sovereignty a view of sovereignty as 
constituent power.  Kalyvas, “Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power,” Constellations 12, no. 
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“constituent sovereign” (225).  Sovereignty is a political ideal that brings together both command and constitution.  
 78 
Jackson writes: 
The people in a representative democracy are creatures of the constitutional 
arrangements of the state; they do not and cannot exist on their own.  There 
cannot be ‘a people’ in any meaningful sense without a democratic constitution 
and institutional arrangements deriving from it which enfranchise and organize 
the population into a political community.211   
 
The people constitutes itself through subjection to the sovereign authority that it, itself, 
exercises.212  As with Machiavelli’s and Bodin’s rulers, sovereign authority constitutes its 
collective political subject (even when this subject exercises sovereign authority), and not the 
other way around. 
This remains true even when sovereignty is achieved by individuals that are already 
organized as a group, such as the natural, pre-civil communities in Locke’s Second Treatise.  In 
this case, the natural community may constitute itself as sovereign, but, as sovereign, it 
reconstitutes the natural community into a collective political subject.  The pre-civil community 
is changed through the achievement of sovereignty; sovereignty makes it into ‘the people’.213  
Despite substantial disagreement with Locke, especially regarding the idea of pre-civil 
communities, Rousseau is also committed to the idea that the collective political subject is 
constituted—qua collective political subject—by sovereign authority.  Rousseau’s contracting 
individuals participate in two civil groups, the collective subject (“State”) and collective 
sovereign (“Sovereign”), and it is their participation in the latter (their role as “Citizens” rather 
than as “Subjects”) that first enables them to constitute themselves as a body politic.214  They do 
                                                
211 Jackson, Sovereignty, 92.  
212 This paradoxical formulation will be explored further in Chapters 3 and 4.  For an excellent critical discussion 
of contemporary (popular) sovereign self-constitution, see Hans Lindahl, “The Paradox of Constituent Power: The 
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so by exercising sovereignty over themselves.  For both Locke and Rousseau, then, the collective 
subject of sovereignty is constituted—as a political entity—by sovereign authority.  The ideal of 
popular sovereignty is an ideal of constitutive authority. 
This very brief survey is meant to show that the ideal of sovereign constitutive authority 
is consistent across theories of absolutist and popular sovereignty.  As such, it appears in the 
work of many modern political philosophers.  However, it does not become adequate to a 
‘Westphalian’ system of multiple, bounded sovereigns until it is theorized by Hegel.  While 
earlier thinkers acknowledge that sovereign authority constitutes its subject through exclusion as 
well as inclusion and differentiation as well as unification, Hegel understands these acts of 
exclusion and differentiation as interactions, not only between sovereigns and their potential 
subjects, but also among multiple sovereigns.  This enables him to theorize a world in which 
sovereign acts of self-bounding and constitution not only bind a sovereign to its collective 
subject, but also relate each sovereign, through reciprocal independence, to every other 
sovereign.  Hegel’s political philosophy contains one of the most important accounts of modern 
sovereignty.  This is not because it is politically admirable or a reliable guide for realpolitik, but 
because it accurately expresses the necessary interrelation of sovereignty’s internal and external 
aspects, and presents these aspects as active relations between a sovereign and its internal and 
external others.  
Hegel’s philosophy pairs the ideal of sovereign constitutive authority, which I have 
explained with reference to Machiavelli, Bodin, Locke, and Rousseau, with a commitment to the 
reciprocal independence of sovereigns.  This commitment emerges out of the law of nations 
tradition that includes Vittoria, Grotius, and Vattel, each of whom contributes to the modern 
                                                
view, with no division of the whole.”  Importantly, the individual contractors themselves are also doubled, prior to 
the social pact, so that each is “a private individual contracting with himself” (Ibid., 49-53). For a more detailed 
reading of Rousseau, see Chapter 3 below. 
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antecedents of contemporary international law.  Vattel’s account of sovereign independence has 
been especially influential.  He writes:     
Every nation that governs itself, under what form soever, without dependence on 
any foreign power, is a Sovereign State.  Its rights are naturally those of any other 
state.  Such are the moral persons who live together in a natural society, subject to 
the law of nations.  To give a nation a right to make an immediate figure in this 
grand society, it is sufficient that it be really sovereign and independent, that is, 
that it govern itself by its own authority and laws.215 
 
For Vattel, all sovereigns are equally sovereign insofar as they are all equally independent and 
individual members of the “natural society” of nations.216  Because each sovereign is independent 
in relation to the others, the subjects of each are off-limits to every other sovereign.217  Hegel’s 
innovation is to theorize this reciprocal independence in terms of each sovereign’s constitutive 
authority, essentially bringing Machiavelli’s form-giving founders into the modern system of 
states.218  What must be reciprocally independent, for Hegel, is precisely the ability of each 
sovereign to constitute and reconstitute its own collective subject.     
 For Hegel, sovereignty is not a property that a state possesses in isolation; rather, it is an 
achievement that must be constantly accomplished through the state’s relation other states and to 
its subjects.  On the basis of these two relations, Hegel theorizes two different moments or 
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University Press, 2003, especially 96, 99-105, 112-4.  See also J. E. Nijman’s, The Concept of International Legal 
Personality, which suggests that Kant intentionally opposes himself to Vattel regarding internal sovereignty (82-4). 
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aspects of sovereignty, which he calls “external” and “internal” sovereignty.219  These two 
aspects are equally important and practically indissociable in the modern, sovereign state. 
 Following Vattel, Hegel theorizes external sovereignty as a state’s independent 
“individuality [as] an exclusive unit.”220  This aspect of sovereignty is a matter of the state’s 
relation to, and orientation towards, the political actors beyond its jurisdiction—in particular, the 
other sovereigns with regard to which it is independent.  Hegel writes, “Individuality, as 
exclusive being-for-itself, appears as the relation [of the state] to other states, each of which is 
independent in relation to the others.”221  Independent individuality is reciprocally achieved.  In 
an encounter between two states, each recognizes itself as independent and exclusive only by 
differentiating itself from the other.222  By recognizing the other as like itself, but negating it as 
not itself, each state excludes the other from itself and recognizes itself as a particular, 
determinate individual.223  This negation may be violent; Hegel’s infamous bellicosity is tightly 
linked to his understanding of external sovereignty.224  However, external sovereignty can also be 
realized through other encounters in which two supreme authorities act, and are recognized, as 
independent sovereigns, such as the assumption of international obligations and contracts.225 
 Putting aside the idiom of encounter and recognition, Hegel’s basic thought accurately 
captures the social logic and political strategy of the modern interstate system.  In this system, 
                                                
219 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, A. Wood, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
315, 359. 
220 Ibid., 304; cf. 315, 359. 
221 Ibid., 359. 
222 Ibid., 359-360. 
223 Ibid., 315-6, 359-360. 
224 Ibid., 315-6, 360-5, 369-371. 
225 Ibid., 365-368.  Recognition is central to Hegel’s account of external sovereignty, which has been greatly 
influential on the legal and political practices of recognition through which states acknowledge one another’s 
sovereignty.  However, it is crucial to note that Hegel does not consider external recognition to be a source of 
sovereignty.  Rather, he is very clear sovereignty is a matter of the state’s own self-recognition.  This self-
recognition, however, is prompted by the presence of a formally identical but numerically distinct political entity.  
When a state confronts and differentiates itself from another sovereign state, it affirms this other as like itself, but 
negates it as not itself, thereby recognizing itself as a particular, independent individual.  See Ibid., 315-6, 359-360, 
366-7.  
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each state is an individual sovereign only in relation to other individual sovereigns, by virtue of 
their mutual exclusion and reciprocal differentiation.  In other words, it is because each 
sovereign bounds itself in relation to the others that it achieves external sovereignty.  In a system 
or society of multiple, bounded sovereigns, external sovereignty is both a matter of what each 
sovereign excludes and, equally, what it is excluded from. 
 By itself, however, external sovereignty says almost nothing about the authority 
exercised by a sovereign, other than it is independent.  An account of internal sovereignty is 
necessary to say what, precisely, is independent.  In a system or society of sovereigns, each is 
independent from the others with regard to its internal authority relations, and it is by virtue of 
these internal relations that each is the specific kind of political actor that can participate in a 
system or society of sovereigns. 
 Hegel theorizes internal sovereignty as “the organization of the state and the process of 
its organic life with reference to itself, in which it differentiates its moments within itself and 
develops them to established existence.”226  Internal sovereignty is the state’s achievement of an 
organic “internal constitution,” in which the various elements of civil society and the state 
apparatus, including the particular wills of individual citizens, “are ultimately rooted in the unity 
of the state as their simple self” and are “determined by and dependent on the end of the 
whole.”227  This constitutional unity is held together by a kind of authority in which, according to 
Hegel, the subjective freedom and particular interests of diverse individuals are mediated and 
realized, rather than overruled.228  Although this authority is exercised by the state itself, through 
its various organically linked components, Hegel understands supreme internal authority to be 
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personified by a single monarch.229  The monarch represents the organic constitution’s “ultimate 
instance and non plus ultra;” his decision is authority’s last word, under which the various 
moments of the constitution are unified.230   
In other words, for Hegel, internal sovereignty holds the state together.  It is supreme 
authority that, because it is interwoven through the apparatus of the state and culminates in the 
will of the monarch, unifies its various subjects into an organic political community.  As for 
Machiavelli, Bodin, Locke, and Rousseau, sovereign authority constitutes its own collective 
political subject.231  It does so for as long as it is the supreme source of political obligation for the 
various members of that collective. 
It is the exercise of this supreme constitutive authority that is rendered independent in the 
achievement of external sovereignty.  For Hegel, the reciprocal independence theorized by Vattel 
consists in this: that each sovereign is free to constitute its own collective subject without 
interference by any other sovereign.  This does not mean that each sovereign constitutes its 
subject in isolation.  Rather, each sovereign-subject pair—that is, each state—stands in a relation 
of mutual exclusion from all the other pairs within the system or society of sovereigns.  This 
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mutual exclusion is achieved and maintained by each sovereign’s exercise of supreme and 
independent constitutive authority over its subjects.  It is because each sovereign constitutes its 
collective subject independently that each state is an individual with regard to every other state, 
and a unity with regard to itself: a “single individual whole,” as Hegel puts it.232  In short, for 
Hegel, sovereignty is the independent exercise of supreme authority that constitutes and 
reconstitutes its own collective subject as its own and, in doing so, continually differentiates 
itself and its subject from other sovereigns and their subjects. 
Hegel’s theory of the state is an especially illuminating expression of the modern ideal of 
sovereignty, insofar as sovereignty’s internal supremacy and external independence are here writ 
large, in an almost exaggeratedly idealist image of the state’s organic unity and individual 
personality.  What is most revealing is the way that these internal and external aspects of 
sovereignty are dialectically inseparable, such that each makes possible and shapes the other.  
For Hegel, as for Machiavelli, Bodin, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, the supremacy of sovereign 
authority is expressed in the way it constitutes the collective subject over which it is exercised.  
Only for Hegel, however, is the independence of sovereign authority expressed in the way that it 
makes this subject its own, to the exclusion of all other sovereigns.  This collective subject is a 
determinate collective—an individual whole—by virtue of its internal unity and external 
differentiation, while the distinction between interiority and exteriority is determined, in turn, by 
the boundaries of sovereign authority.  Where boundaries of sovereignty meet, they are 
negotiated by the sovereigns that they bound.  Such negotiations may be violent or peaceful, but 
what is essential is that, for Hegel as well as for Vattel and the law of nations tradition, 
sovereigns negotiate only with one another, as equally individual and reciprocally independent 
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authorities that have no claim over each other’s internal affairs.  By bringing together external 
independence and internal constitutive authority in this way, Hegel accurately captures the 
“ideality” of modern sovereignty and affirms the conclusion of the argument that I have been 
making: Supreme, independent, and bounded political authority bounds itself, through 
interactions with actors both inside and outside its jurisdiction, and thereby constitutes its own 
collective subject.233 
Sovereign constitutive authority need not be exercised by an exceptional figure, like 
Hegel’s monarch, which is distinct from the collective subject that it constitutes.  Rather, as 
discussed in relation to Locke and Rousseau, the people itself may exercise sovereign authority 
over itself and thereby constitute itself as a collective political subject. Of course, in actual 
political practice, the popular sovereign and popular subject are never truly identical.  Even if 
they were, however, it would still be meaningful to distinguish, along with Rousseau, between 
the people-as-sovereign and the people-as-subject.  In the theory and practice of popular 
sovereignty, the people-as-sovereign constitutes the people-as-subject.  In actual democracies, 
representatives and agents of the sovereign people make and enforce decisions about 
immigration, nationalization, citizenship, and enfranchisement, all of which determine who is 
included in, and who is excluded from, the people-as-subject.  Such decisions, along with the 
acts that enforce them, continually constitute the collective subject of sovereignty, the version of 
‘the people’ that is subject to the law.  Whereas in instances of absolutist sovereignty, the 
sovereign constitutes ‘the people’ as its collective subject, in instances of popular sovereignty, 
sovereign constitutive authority is the means by which ‘the people’ constitutes itself.  
 Nonetheless, even in its most democratized forms, the self-constitution of the popular 
sovereign contains traces of the absolutism that characterizes Machiavellian form-givers, 
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Bodinian princes, and Hobbesian leviathans.  Whenever a democratic people constitutes itself as 
its own collective subject, subject to its own law, there is something in the act of constitution that 
exceeds, escapes, or is otherwise untouched by the popular or democratic aspect of that act.  
This thought was suggested in the Introduction, by way of reference to the paradoxes of 
democratic constitution elaborated by Whelan, Benhabib, and Gould, and it will become a 
central focus of the rest of this dissertation.  For now, however, I want to simply suggest that 
there is something imperious about the ideal of sovereign constitutive authority, regardless of 
whether the sovereign is a single monarch or the people itself.  I take Hegel’s theory of the state 
to be an essential moment in the history of the modern ideal of sovereignty, not because Hegel’s 
theory is politically laudable, but because it clearly illuminates sovereignty’s imperiousness in 
both the internal and external relations through which the sovereign constitutes its own collective 
subject. 
My argument thus far can be easily summarized.  According to the modern ideal of 
sovereignty, as defined in the Introduction, sovereignty is supreme and independent political 
authority within a bounded jurisdiction.  To be internally supreme and externally independent, a 
political authority must distinguish between the interior and exterior of its jurisdiction itself.  To 
do this is to determine the boundaries of authority and subjection, and thereby subject all 
political actors within those boundaries, while excluding political actors who are not subjected.  
To do this, in turn, is to constitute a collective subject, the members of which are unified by their 
common subjection to sovereign authority and differentiated from political actors that are not 
subjected to that authority.  In short, the modern ideal of sovereignty is an ideal of political 
authority that is supreme, independent, and self-bounding, and which constitutes its own 
collective subject. 
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Part III: Independence and Self-government 
 
The above arguments make clear that the modern ideal of sovereignty necessarily 
involves both internal and external relations.  Internally, the relations between a sovereign and its 
subjects are primarily relations of supreme constitutive authority, by which the sovereign 
constitutes its own collective subject.  Externally, the relations between sovereigns are primarily 
relations of independence.  On my account, which follows Hegel more than any other modern 
philosopher in this regard, the internal and external aspects of sovereignty are inseparable.  It is 
the internal aspect of sovereignty—i.e., supreme constitutive authority—that is rendered 
independent in the achievement of external sovereignty.   
Nevertheless, the modern ideal of supreme constituent authority does not feature 
prominently in much of the contemporary literature on sovereignty.  This is because that 
literature tends to concentrate on the external aspects of sovereignty—that is, the relations of 
reciprocal exclusion and independence that connect sovereigns within a system or society of 
sovereigns.  This focus is especially evident in disciplines that study the system of sovereign 
states directly, such as international relations theory and international law.  While it may be 
obvious that international studies would emphasize the relations between sovereign states, these 
disciplines are extremely influential in generating and elaborating contemporary theories of 
sovereignty, as well as in shaping political practices related to sovereign statehood.  International 
relations theory and international law essentially set the terms of wider discourses of sovereignty.  
As a result, some very influential conceptions of sovereignty emphasize the external relations 
between sovereigns in a way that overshadows the internal relations binding each sovereign to its 
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subjects. 
This subordination of internal to external sovereignty presents a challenge to the 
arguments I have made in this chapter.  According to those arguments, external independence is 
only one part of sovereignty, which qualifies the other part of sovereignty, namely supreme 
constitutive authority.  This does not mean that external independence is not a necessary 
condition of sovereignty; it does mean, however, that external independence is not a sufficient 
condition of sovereignty.  More importantly, my arguments deny that external independence is 
primary or prior to the internal aspects of sovereignty, which is precisely what is suggested by 
the contemporary focus on external relations between sovereigns.    
In order to meet this challenge, I will clarify and then argue against the primacy of 
external independence to internal authority that is frequently articulated by contemporary 
theories of sovereignty.  I will do so by referring to the political transformations that would seem 
to be prima facie evidence for the primacy of external independence, namely the successful 
decolonization struggles of the 20th century.  Where these struggles have resulted in the 
achievement of both the internal and external aspects of sovereignty, it is easy to mistake the 
whole for its part, and to understand the achievement of post-colonial sovereignty exclusively or 
primarily in terms of external independence.  However, where these struggles have resulted in 
external independence without supreme internal authority, so-called ‘state failure’ reveals the 
stakes of privileging relations between sovereigns over and above relations between each 
sovereign and its subjects.234 
                                                
234 The language of state ‘failure’ is problematic because it reiterates a notion of ‘success’ that obviously 
privileges, and is arguably imposed by, the former colonial powers whose domination of African, Middle Eastern, 
Asian, and Latin American states continues to hamper their chances of ‘success’.  When this is admitted, however, 
the entire ideal of modern sovereignty itself is revealed to be similarly problematic.  And indeed it is.  The modern 
ideal of sovereignty developed through practices of colonial hegemony, which it continues to support, albeit in 
different ways—and this is only one aspect of its problematic nature.  I will continue to use the language of state 
failure, with some reservation, to mark the tip of the iceberg, so to speak.  That the modern ideal of sovereignty (or 
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The contemporary subordination of internal to external sovereignty has its roots in 
Vattel’s influential contribution to the law of nations tradition, which deeply informs 
contemporary international law.  In outlining his theory of sovereignty as reciprocal 
independence, Vattel declines to provide a detailed account of the internal authority structures 
that bear on sovereignty.  In his view, constitutional matters like the exercise of authority over 
subjects, the generation of law, and the rights of subjects are not immediately relevant to the 
rights and duties exercised by sovereigns with regard to one another.  He writes:  
It is sufficient to establish the general principles necessary for the decision of 
those disputes that may arise between nations…  It is not here necessary to 
consider in detail what that constitution and those laws ought to be: that 
discussion belongs to public law and politics…  We here consider the duty of a 
nation toward itself, principally to determine the conduct that it ought to observe 
in that great society which nature has established among all nations.235  
 
This does not mean that Vattel completely ignores the internal composition of states; indeed, 
Book I of The Law of Nations focuses, in broad strokes, on “Nations Considered in 
Themselves.”236  However, he generally separates this discussion from Books II-IV, which focus 
on the external relations between states, themselves understood as unitary and independent moral 
persons within a society of such persons.237  The unity of each state is presupposed by Vattel’s 
                                                
at least, its global monopoly over legitimate political organization) generates a politically problematic concept like 
state failure suggests that the ideal itself is a site of political contest.  This dissertation engages in such contest, albeit 
in a very modest way, by attempting to show that the effects of sovereign authority—in particular, the constitution 
of the peoples that are subject to, and potentially the agents of, sovereignty—are never as finally, authoritatively, 
and incontestably accomplished as the language of sovereignty would suggest.  For a compelling and careful post-
colonial critique of sovereignty, which has greatly influenced the background of this dissertation, see Antony 
Anghie’s Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  
2004), especially Chapters 4 and 5. 
235 Vattel, Law of Nations, 65, 75.  
236 Ibid., 65.   
237 Vattel is an early and influential proponent of what Charles Beitz calls the “autonomy of states” argument, 
which understands the independence of sovereign states in terms of the independence of individual persons.  See 
Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 76-83.  
This view of sovereignty facilitates the subordination of internal to external sovereignty because, at least in the 
dominant modern political imaginary, individuals do not have relations to themselves.  Importantly, for Hegel, they 
do.  Beitz locates Hegel, with Vattel, in the autonomy of states tradition but, pace Beitz, the “organic wholes” of 
Hegel’s theory are achieved through internal, conflictual self-relation (Ibid., 76).   
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view of sovereignty as external independence among states, with the result that the operations of 
authority internal to each state become irrelevant to international relations, and thus to 
sovereignty itself.   
In other words, Vattel’s contribution to the law of nations, which forms the foundation of 
contemporary international law, takes the international arena to be the stage of sovereignty and 
removes the internal aspect of sovereignty—supreme constitutive authority—from that stage.  
This subordination of internal political organization to external independence has been as 
influential as the rest of Vattel’s account of sovereignty; as F. H. Hinsley puts it, “In the 
international context the theory of sovereignty has never implied more than the claim to 
independence.”238  While theorists since Bodin have noted the inseparability of sovereignty’s 
internal and external aspects, many since Vattel have construed external relations among 
sovereigns as more important to the theory and practice of sovereignty than internal relations 
between sovereigns and their subjects.239 
In contemporary political theory, Alan James, for example, has influentially theorized 
sovereignty as “constitutional independence,” which requires “being constitutionally apart… not 
being contained, however loosely, within a wider constitutional scheme.”240  Consistent with the 
Vatellian law of nations tradition, James considers sovereign independence to be the foundation 
of international law.  He writes, “International law presupposes sovereignty.  It makes sense only 
                                                
238 Hinsley, Sovereignty, 158.  See also Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia, 
2002): “From the perspective of any particular state what it chiefly hopes to gain from participation in the society of 
states is recognition of its independence of outside authority, and in particular of its supreme jurisdiction over its 
subjects and territory.  The chief price it has to pay for this is recognition of like rights to independence and 
sovereignty on the part of other states" (16-17, emphasis mine). 
239 Hinsley mistakenly locates this priority in Hegel and his followers; Bull and Nijman attribute it to late 
eighteenth and nineteenth theorists of sovereignty more generally.  See Hinsley, Sovereignty, 208-9; Bull, 
Anarchical Society, 16-7, 35; Nijman, Concept of International Legal Personality, 84.  
240 James, “Practice of Sovereign Statehood,” 461; cf. James, Sovereign Statehood, 24-5.  Like Vattel, James 
equates sovereign independence with membership in a community of sovereigns.  He writes, “International society 
admits only those governed entities which are sovereign in the sense of being constitutionally independent.” (James, 
“Practice of Sovereign Statehood”).  Unlike Vattel, however, James does not derive the formal equality of states 
from their common membership in international sovereignty.  See James, Sovereign Statehood, 51. 
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on the assumption that there are sovereign states to which it can be applied.  And those sovereign 
states are sovereign because they are independent in terms of their own constitutions.”241  Also 
like the Vattelian tradition, James has little to say about the internal organization of sovereign 
states, except that the constitution of each state is independent from that of other states.  He 
writes, “Whether or not a government behaves properly in internal matters is neither here nor 
there so far as the independence of its constitution is concerned.”242  When he does recognize the 
inextricability of sovereignty’s external and internal aspects, James claims that the latter is 
merely derivative of the former.  On his view, a sovereign’s authority over its subjects is merely 
an “internal reflection” of its external independence from other sovereigns.243   
This subordination of internal sovereignty to external sovereignty is frequently affirmed 
in contemporary international law.  As James Crawford notes, in his careful and comprehensive 
book, The Creation of States in International Law, “Sovereignty is the term for the ‘totality of 
international rights and duties recognized by international law’ as residing in an independent 
territorial unity—the State.”244  Because external independence is “the central criterion for 
statehood” within international law, it is also the central feature of sovereignty: “Sovereignty in 
the relations between states signifies independence.”245  The 1931 opinion of Judge Anzilotti of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice (the precursor to the ICJ) is taken to be “the classic 
statement” and “widely accepted definition” of sovereignty-as-independence in current 
                                                
241 James “Practice of Sovereign Statehood,” 463. 
242 James Sovereign Statehood, 25. 
243 “What this amounts to is that… a state is master in its own house…  Thus sovereignty has real meaning for a 
state’s internal freedom of action…  All this is the internal reflection of constitutional independence.  It is because a 
state is constitutionally separate from others that, without its authority, others are not entitled to act in or in respect 
of its territory as if they owned it (Ibid., 52). 
244 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 32, 
citing Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (ICJ Rep 1949 p 174, 180).  He notes, 
“The term ‘sovereignty is sometimes used in place of ‘independence’ as a basic criterion for statehood.  However, it 
has another more satisfactory meaning as an incident or consequence of statehood, namely, the plenary competence 
that States prima facie posses” (89).  Importantly, this preferred meaning retains the primacy of external 
independence, but construes it as a characteristic of, rather than condition for, statehood. 
245 Ibid., 62; Judge Huber, Islands of Palmas Case (1928), cited in Ibid.  
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international law.246  Anzilotti writes:  
Independence as thus understood is really no more than the normal condition of 
States according to international law; it may also be described as sovereignty 
(suprema potestas) or external sovereignty, by which is meant that the State has 
over it no other authority than that of international law...”247 
 
This influential definition of independent statehood identifies independence with sovereignty 
itself, via the subordination of internal sovereignty to external sovereignty.  This subordination is 
especially characteristic of international legal definitions of sovereignty in the post-World War I 
era.  Gerhard Kreijen writes: 
While traditional legal doctrine essentially conceived of internal sovereignty as a 
necessary pre-condition for the establishment of external sovereignty or 
independence, modern doctrine does not seem to insist upon such a link...  The 
commonly accepted modern condition of independence...  allows for the 
exclusion of traditional aspects of internal sovereignty as relevant conditions for 
statehood.”248 
 
The result is that aspects of internal sovereignty—including the supreme authority that 
constitutes the sovereign’s collective subject—frequently drop out of discussions of sovereignty 
in contemporary international law.  One aspect of sovereignty—external independence—is taken 
to be the whole of sovereignty itself. 
 Finally, contemporary international relations theory and policy-making also reflect this 
priority of external to internal sovereignty.  For example, the methodological framing of Stephen 
Krasner’s very influential studies of sovereignty emphasize independence over internally 
supreme authority.249  Krasner’s typology of sovereignty is itself evenly split into internal and 
external aspects.  It includes:  
                                                
246 Crawford, Creation of States, 65; Gerard Kreijen, State Failure, Sovereignty and Effectiveness (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhof, 2004), 23. 
247 Judge Anzilotti, Austro German Customs Unit case (1931), PCIJ, Ser. A.B, No 41, cited in Kreijen, State 
Failure, 23 and Crawford, Creation of States, 65. 
248 Kreijen, State Failure, 33.   
249 Krasner’s work has been frequently cited (even by philosophers!) as central to contemporary understandings 
of sovereignty.  Krasner himself has served as the Director of Policy Planning at the US State Department, and as a 
member of the National Security Council Staff, both during the administration of George W. Bush. 
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domestic sovereignty, referring to the organization of public authority within a 
state…; interdependence sovereignty, referring to the ability of public authorities 
to control transborder movements; international legal sovereignty, referring to the 
mutual recognition of states or other entities; and Westphalian sovereignty, 
referring to the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority 
configurations.250 
 
However, Krasner’s studies of sovereignty focus almost exclusively on the external aspects of 
sovereignty, which are captured by the concepts of “international legal sovereignty” and 
“Westphalian sovereignty.”  This focus is due to his overall aim of examining violations of 
sovereignty norms, and only international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty are 
“defined by clear logics of appropriateness.”251  In other words, Krasner’s methodological 
preference for external sovereignty is explained by the prevalence of that aspect in determining 
“rules” of the sovereignty “game.”252  His subordination of internal to external sovereignty 
reflects a more general emphasis on external independence in theoretical, legal, and policy 
discussions of sovereignty.  Krasner affirms this emphasis by arguing, on the basis of violations 
of external sovereignty norms alone, that sovereignty itself can be characterized as “organized 
hypocrisy.”253   
In sum, the Vatellian emphasis on external sovereignty is alive and well today.  This 
focus on independence presents the international sphere as the primary terrain upon which 
sovereignty must be achieved and maintained, and construes the influence of other sovereigns as 
the main obstacle on this terrain.  When the space in which sovereigns interact is understood as 
the space of sovereignty, the internal aspect of sovereignty—supreme constitutive authority—
can be construed as a derivative side-effect of the interactions of sovereigns, as if the 
                                                
250 Krasner, Power, the State, and Sovereignty, 184.  In later versions of this typology, Krasner incorporates the 
first two types of sovereignty as simply domestic sovereignty.  The three-element typology makes clearer his 
emphasis on external sovereignty.  See Ibid., 15. 
251 Ibid., 182. 
252 Ibid., Sovereignty, 46. 
253 Ibid., Power, the State, and Sovereignty, 19-20, and Sovereignty, passim. 
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achievement of external political independence is also, simply by default, the achievement of 
internal political authority.  Something like this construal is evident in the international legal 
discourse surrounding twentieth-century decolonization, which was—for good reason—
significantly focused on the external aspects of sovereignty.  Nevertheless, while this discourse 
evidences the one-sided Vatellian emphasis on the independence of every sovereign state, the 
contemporary successes and failures of post-colonial states attest to the vital importance of each 
sovereign’s internal constitutive authority.      
The modern ideal of sovereignty was enlisted (and also imposed), along with the 
emerging norm of national self-determination, in twentieth century struggles for decolonization, 
devolution, and secession.  In the context of these struggles, ideals of sovereign statehood were 
articulated primarily in opposition to colonial rule and similar forms of imposed dependency, 
with the result that sovereignty became increasingly associated with external independence over 
and above internal authority.254  In international law especially, sovereignty and independence 
were identified in ways that construed the achievement of even formal independence as 
tantamount to the achievement of sovereignty.255  In the context of world-wide struggles against 
colonial administration, independence from external authority was widely articulated as the 
necessary and sufficient condition for sovereignty.256 
Even where the goal of decolonization was described in terms of “self-government,” as in 
                                                
254 Pemberton, Sovereignty, 120-4. 
255 “The decolonization process created a new category of sovereign entities…  Juridical statehood no longer 
presupposes certain inherent positive qualities which may serve as the foundation for sovereignty…  For the 
‘juridical State’, sovereignty is merely the result—rather the acknowledgment—of having been in subject colonial 
status…  Self-determination provided the conceptual backbone to independence, not positive or, for that matter, 
internal, sovereignty.”  Kreijin, State Failure, 148-9.  See, more generally, Robert Jackson, Quasi-states: 
Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Siba 
N’Zatioula Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1996); Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, 179-204. 
256 “Independence essentially came to rest on categorical self-determination and arrived as a matter of right.  The 
internal development of a unit no longer lay at the root of its outward manifestations as a sovereign State” Kreijen, 
State Failure, 142. 
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Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter, self-government itself was widely articulated in terms 
of external independence, rather than internally exercised political authority.  For example, UN 
General Assembly Resolution 1541 clarifies: 
A Non-Self-Governing Territory can be said to have reached a full measure of  
self-government by: 
   (a)  Emergence as a sovereign independent State; 
  (b)  Free association with an independent State; or 
   (c)  Integration with an independent State.257 
 
Because colonial administration suppressed indigenous self-government, independence from 
colonial administration was understood to be normatively and practically prior to self-
government.  When it was related to sovereignty at all, internal authority was understood to 
follow, and follow from, external independence. 
 This priority of external to internal sovereignty would seem to be vindicated by the 
creation of so many sovereign post-colonial states on the basis of recognized independence.  
However, where the internal and external aspects of sovereignty have been achieved together, it 
is easy to mistake external independence—the most visible goal of decolonization—for the 
entirety of sovereignty.  On the other hand, where external independence has been achieved in 
the absence of internally supreme authority, the specific and irreducible importance of internal 
sovereignty becomes strikingly manifest.  In the cases of so-called ‘failed states’ like Somalia 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, supreme internal authority has neither followed nor 
followed from independence. 
                                                
257 GA Res 1541 (XV), Annex, Principle VI.  Available online at: 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/15/ares15.htm.  Accessed June 3, 2010.  The first method of self-government is 
the most common; as Crawford states, “In the terms of the Colonial Declaration and in practice, independence has 
been the central and most usual form of self-government.” Crawford, Creation of States, 623, emphasis added.  
While the other two methods (b and c) are coherent ways of achieving independence, it is not clear that they are 
coherent ways of achieving any notion of self-government that is not defined primarily in terms of independence.  
Independence may be transitive in a such a way that it can be achieved through integration with an already 
independent state.  Self-government, understood as supreme political authority (let alone supreme constitutive 
political authority), would not be similarly transitive. 
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In an influential study of postcolonial Africa, Robert Jackson has persuasively argued 
that although sub-Saharan states possess juridical statehood on the basis of their external 
independence, “many have not yet been authorized and empowered domestically and 
consequently lack the institutional features of sovereign states as also defined by classical 
international law.”258  According to Jackson, these “quasi-states” enjoy only a formal, “negative 
sovereignty” insofar as their recognized independence does not correspond to “capabilities which 
enable governments to be their own masters.”259  The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a 
widely cited example.  According to Kreijen, “the Belgian Congo became a sovereign State 
without an effectively functioning government;” as Crawford remarks concerning the early years 
of Congolese independence, “anything less like effective government… would be hard to 
imagine.”260  In later years, institutions of state government within the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo have been generally restricted to the capital city, and for a period of several months 
during 1993, the country (then Zaire) had “two concurrent governments and two concurrent 
parliaments.”261  In short, since decolonization, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has not 
maintained internally supreme authority.  It has been recognized as a sovereign state, however, 
purely on the basis of its independence from other sovereigns.   
The more general point is that, by emphasizing external independence over internal 
authority, “the international community has accepted the sovereignty of states lacking effective 
government or governing institutions and organs.”262  However, in the case of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and elsewhere, these states have remained without effective government 
                                                
258 Jackson, Quasi-States, 21. 
259 Ibid., 27, 29. 
260 Kreijen, State Failure 137; Crawford, Creation of States, 57.  See also Krasner, Sovereignty, 201, 217.   
261 Neyire Akpinarli, The Fragility of the Failed-State Paradigm: A Different International Law Perception of 
the Absence of Effective Government, (Leiden: Martinus Nojhof, 2009), 16. 
262 Ibid., 113. 
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despite the achievement of external independence and, correspondingly, the recognition of 
sovereign statehood.  Independence, in other words, has not led to self-government in any robust 
sense.  As Krasner puts it, “One of the most striking aspects of the contemporary world is the 
extent to which domestic sovereignty has faltered so badly in states that still enjoy international 
legal, and sometimes even Westphalian/Vatellian sovereignty.”263  The attribution of sovereignty 
to states like the Democratic Republic of the Congo is possible only when sovereignty, 
understood entirely in terms of external independence, has been completely separated from 
internal authority. 
There are good reasons to hesitate before accepting Jackson’s and Krasner’s analyses of 
post-colonial sovereignty tout court.264  Nevertheless, one can acknowledge the discrepancies 
studied by Jackson and Krasner while challenging the presuppositions of their studies, remaining 
skeptical of their conclusions, and interrogating the language of state failure.  The sovereign 
status of states like the Democratic Republic of the Congo suggest that, in a contemporary 
expression of the Vattelian tradition, sovereignty has indeed been divorced from internally 
exercised supreme authority.  This holds true regardless of whether independence is granted by 
                                                
263 Krasner Power, the State, and Sovereignty, 234. 
264 For instance, these authors fail to consider how the experiences, norms, and procedures of colonial 
domination, as well as of decolonization and even contemporary international relations, contribute to a (potentially 
racist) legal and political hegemony that favors former colonial powers over postcolonial states.  Grovogui 
persuasively criticizes Jackson on these grounds in Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans, Chapters 1, 2 and 6.  
Additionally, the use of language like ‘failed’, ‘quasi’, and ‘negative’ attributes to post-colonial political 
communities the intention or desire (and so, the failure) of achieving the very form of sovereignty that, during the 
colonial period and perhaps even now, contributed to their subalternity.  Recently, Anghie has made a very 
compelling case for the continuation of colonial practices and norms through theories and practices of sovereign 
recognition.  Importantly, he argues that whether or not emerging nations (in particular, African polities) are 
recognized as sovereign, they are subject to the norms of Western international hegemony that are manifest in 
contemporary recognitive practices and ideals of sovereignty in general.  See Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, 75-
8, 98-100.  According to both Grovogui and Anghie, aspirations to sovereignty—regardless of the degree to which 
these aspirations were imposed or unavoidable—have had significantly detrimental effects of former African 
colonies and on the project of genuine decolonization.  On the political implications of contemporary discourses of 
state failure more generally, see Margaret Denike, “The Human Rights of Others: Sovereignty, Legitimacy, and 
‘Just Causes’ for the ‘War on Terror’,” Hypatia 23, no. 2 (2008): 95-121. 
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former colonizers, or achieved or taken by the colonized themselves.265  It also holds true whether 
or not histories of colonial imposition and oppression are recognized as contributing significantly 
to the internal political organization of post-colonial states.  Finally, it holds true whether or not 
contemporary conditions that perpetuate subalternity are acknowledged.  One does not have to 
share Jackson’s and Krasner’s perspectives (and I do not share their perspectives) in order to see 
that certain post-colonial states owe their sovereign status to a conceptual and practical 
separation of sovereignty from internally supreme authority. 
In part I, I argued that the supremacy, independence, and boundedness conditions of 
sovereign authority are mutually enabling and mutually conditioning, and that their interrelation 
is characteristic of the modern ideal sovereignty.  The states studied by Jackson and Krasner, 
which enjoy independence but do not exercise supreme authority, are not sovereign according to 
the modern ideal, insofar as they do not fulfill all of its conditions.  As evidence against the 
Vattellian tradition, these states demonstrate that sovereignty without supreme authority is no 
sovereignty at all.  This is not simply because such states lack internal authority, but because 
externally recognized independence, absent something approaching internally supreme authority, 
does not even live up to the Vattellian ideal of sovereign independence. 
In The Creation of States in International Law, Crawford distinguishes between formal 
independence and actual independence:   
Formal independence [‘l’exclusivité de la compétence’] exists where the powers of 
government in a territory (in internal and external affairs) are vested with the separate 
authorities of the putative state…  The vesting of power, in this sense, may… be the 
                                                
265 For instance, in The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove, 2004), Franz Fanon makes clear that even well 
organized and successful opposition to colonial administration does not translate directly into post-colonial 
authority.  He writes: “Instead of inspiring confidence, assuaging the fears of its citizens and cradling them with its 
power and discretion, the State, on the contrary, imposes itself in a spectacular manner, flaunts its authority, 
harasses, making clear to its citizens they are in constant danger…  Such a dictatorship cannot, in fact, go very far” 
(111). 
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result of a grant of full power from the previous sovereign; it may be established, or 
recognized, by bilateral or multilateral treaty.   
 
Actual independence [‘plenitude de la competence’] is relative… a matter of degree…  
[I]t may be defined as the minimum degree of real governmental power at the disposal of 
the authorities of the putative [sovereign] State that is necessary for it to qualify as 
‘independent’.266   
 
The states studied by Jackson and Krasner enjoy formal independence.  However, insofar as they 
lack institutionalized internally supreme authority, they enjoy little or no substantial 
independence.  This does not mean that their independence is unreal or worthless.  The 
recognized right to non-interference makes a significant difference in a state’s affairs, and, to the 
extent that it is respected by other states, it is no mere formality.   
Nevertheless, the formal character of this independence becomes evident in cases like the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1993.  While it contained two conflicting governments, the 
state (then Zaire) was recognized as externally independent—despite the fact that there was no 
one supreme political authority that governed independently.  In such cases, where formal 
independence exists without supreme political authority and therefore without substantial 
independence, it is not immediately clear what is protected by the right of non-interference.  As 
discussed in parts I and II, sovereign independence means that a sovereign’s authoritative 
relation to its subjects must be independent—but this authoritative relation is missing, or 
extremely limited, in states that enjoy only formal independence.  Formal independence that is 
not also substantial is not sovereign independence. 
                                                
266 Crawford, Creation of States, 67, 72. The distinction is motivated, at least in part, by the experiences of 
decolonization: “In particular it is important to distinguish independence as an initial qualification for [sovereign] 
statehood and as a condition for continued existence.  A new State attempting to secede will have to demonstrate 
substantial independence, both formal and real, from the State of which it formed a part before it will be regarded as 
definitively created.  On the other hand, the independence of an existing State is protected by international law rules 
against unlawful invasion and annexation, so that the State may, even for a considerable time, continue to exist as a 
legal entity despite lack of effectiveness” (63). 
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To clarify, the distinction between formal and substantial independence can be mapped 
onto a distinction between a state’s being ungoverned by external authority, and its being self-
governed.  Originally, the Vattellian tradition understood sovereign independence in terms of 
self-government, or substantial independence.  Vattel writes, “To give a nation a right to make an 
immediate figure in this grand society, it is sufficient that it be really sovereign and independent, 
that is, that it govern itself by its own authority and laws.”267  By the mid-twentieth century, 
however, the Vattellian tradition had retained its emphasis on external independence as the key 
criterion for sovereignty, but had redefined it in terms of formal independence—that is, being 
ungoverned by the authority and laws of others.  
Although this shift facilitated decolonization, it also evacuated independence of its 
positive meaning, insofar as formal independence is compatible with a lack of self-government, 
or even with the absence of government altogether.  Kreijen writes:      
The expansion of international society was paralleled by a transformation of the 
notion of independence from an inherently material concept based on internal 
sovereignty to a mere formal legal condition primarily depending on external 
recognition.  This implies that independence no long automatically means the 
ability to stand on one’s own feet… ‘independence has lost its meaning’.268 
 
When the criterion of external independence is entirely separated from the criterion of supreme 
internal authority, the former loses its meaning.269  The lack of centrally institutionalized 
authority in states like the Democratic Republic of the Congo prompts the question: What, 
precisely, is externally independent?  What is it that is recognized as not dependent on external 
authority structures?  Whether it is formulated as equal subjection to the law of nations, 
individual participation in the system of states, “constitutional independence,” or “formal 
                                                
267 Vattel, Law of Nations, 66.  Italics added. 
268  Kreijen, State Failure, 152. 
269 That formal independence is explained entirely in terms of its being granted or recognized—in other words, 
that it is entirely dependent upon other sovereigns—is a clear sign that it is insufficient for sovereignty.  See pages 
62-4 above. 
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juridical independence,” the independence necessary to sovereignty must be grounded in a 
criterion of internally exercised supreme authority.270  Simply being ungoverned by external 
structures of authority is an insufficient criterion of sovereignty, because it is an insufficient 
criterion of external independence.271   
The separation of external independence from internally supreme authority is tantamount 
to separating sovereignty’s form from its content.  By theorizing sovereignty in terms of formal 
independence from external government, the contemporary Vattellian tradition focuses on the 
borders and exteriors of spheres of sovereignty, without adequately considering their interiors.  
James almost says as much, when he writes: 
A helpful way of envisaging sovereignty is as a kind of shell encasing an 
appropriately qualified state… not a physical but a constitutional shell…  Using a 
different metaphor, sovereignty may be seen as a moat, cutting the state off from 
constitutional subordination to other states…272 
 
James’s moat metaphor reduces sovereignty to a barrier between sovereigns, which is to be 
achieved only in relation to the external political actors that are construed as the major obstacles 
sovereignty.  In doing so, it illustrates the failure of contemporary Vattellian views to say 
anything substantive about the character and quality of sovereign authority as it is exercised, 
internally, over subjects.  By understanding sovereignty as independence, and independence as 
simply being ungoverned by external structures of authority, these views affirm the conceptual 
                                                
270 James, “Practice of Sovereign Statehood,” 464. Krasner, Power, the State, and Sovereignty, 180; c.f. 188-193.  
271 The contemporary identification of sovereignty with formal independence cannot admit the self-bounding and 
constitutive character of sovereignty, to disastrous effect.  In the UN Charter and other sources of international law 
relevant to decolonization, the ‘peoples’ that enjoy a right of self-determination and, consequently, liberation from 
colonial rule are defined, almost exclusively, by the territorial borders that were established by colonial powers in 
their conquest of Africa, the Americas, and the Middle East.  As I argued in section I, preexisting borders are 
compatible with sovereign self-bounding insofar as these borders can be appropriated by a sovereign.  There is good 
reason to think, however, that the determination of post-colonial political communities by borders imposed by 
colonialism has a deleterious effect on the establishment of internally supreme authority within, and over, these 
borders.  On the determination of peoples eligible for self-determination (I mean this formulation without irony), see 
Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 122-8.  See also pages 202-3.   
272 James, Sovereign Statehood, 39. 
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contradiction and practical danger manifested by so-called ‘failed’ states: sovereignty without 
authority. 
 States like Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo owe their sovereign 
statehood to twentieth century notions of sovereignty that separate the form of sovereignty, 
external independence, from its content, internal authority.  This separation was beneficial 
insofar as it facilitated decolonization and independence—but these do not themselves amount to 
sovereignty.273  That some post-colonial states lack effectively supreme internal authority shows 
that this authority does not necessarily follow, or follow from, formal independence.  Most 
importantly, the experiences of these states suggest that the international sphere is not the only 
terrain upon which sovereignty must be achieved, and that interference by other sovereigns is not 
the only obstacle to this achievement.  The elimination of external governance does not default to 
the internal exercise of supreme authority, because the internal aspect of sovereignty must be 
achieved in relation to different agents than the external aspect.  Far from being an “internal 
reflection” of external independence, then, the achievement of internally supreme authority is its 
own political task, and one that is necessary to sovereignty.274  An adequate account of 
sovereignty must specify the authority that is exercised as, and may be recognized as, 
independent. 
 Recently, Alan Buchanan has provided such an account, notwithstanding his hesitation 
concerning the concept of political authority.275  In Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, 
                                                
273 This point is importantly double-edged.  While I am here arguing that independence is not the same as 
sovereignty (i.e., the external aspect of sovereignty is not sovereignty itself), it is important to understand 
independence and decolonization as their own political ideals and political tasks.  They should not be subsumed to 
sovereignty, and pursuit of these may, in some cases, be much more libratory than the pursuit of sovereignty—
whether achieving decolonization and independence requires achieving sovereignty first, or resisting sovereignty 
altogether.  See Anghie] and [Grovogui] for arguments to this effect, and important post-colonial critiques of 
sovereignty more generally.   
274 James Sovereign Statehood, 25. 
275 See Chapter 1, above, page 1, note 7.  I discuss this further below. 
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Buchanan develops a normative theory of “recognitional legitimacy,” which specifies the criteria 
that members of the international community should use when recognizing new claimants to 
sovereign statehood.  For the purposes of the present discussion, Buchanan’s theory is most 
significant for the way that it directly opposes the separation of sovereignty’s internal aspects 
from its external aspects.276  The theory is all the more important because it unites internal and 
external sovereignty within the framework of juridical recognition, which, as discussed, has been 
a key site for the subordination of internal to external sovereignty.    
 On Buchanan’s view, states are morally justified in recognizing “the independent 
statehood or sovereignty” of claimants to these only when certain criteria are fulfilled.277  Put 
schematically, these criteria are “a minimum internal justice requirement,… a nonusurpation 
requirement, and… a minimal external justice requirement.”278  Already it is evident that the 
recognition of sovereignty cannot focus only on a potential state’s external relations.  Moreover, 
Buchanan is clear that the external requirement is an extension of the internal requirement.  A 
potential state’s internal affairs—in particular, the degree to which justice is realized within its 
borders—is the fundamental basis of its claim to sovereignty.279  
 Buchanan avoids the concept of political authority in order to avoid serious philosophical 
difficulties concerning the moral justification of political obligation.280  He focuses instead on 
“political legitimacy,” which requires being “morally justified in wielding political power, where 
                                                
276 Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 266-
281.  Later, Buchanan directly objects to the ‘autonomy of states’ view, which treats states as if they were 
independent and unitary persons (in a moral or legal sense) within a society of such persons (Ibid., 304).  Vattel is 
one of the original proponents of this view, which is directly connected to his emphasis on external sovereignty.  See 
page 89, note 237, above. 
277 Ibid., 263. 
278 Ibid., 266. 
279 Ibid., 269-272. 
280 Ibid., 237-247.  I too have attempted to avoid the issue of political obligation’s moral justification, by 
outlining a descriptive account of the kind of authority that, as I showed in the Introduction, is central to the modern 
ideal of sovereignty. 
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to wield political power is to (make a credible) attempt to exercise supremacy, within a 
jurisdiction, in the making, application, and enforcement of laws.”281  This, in turn, is a matter of 
protecting and furthering basic human rights, by means that themselves respect, rather than 
violate, human rights.282  Importantly, one of the basic human rights that Buchanan emphasizes 
repeatedly is a qualified “basic right to democratic governance.”  Realizing this right requires 
representative institutions for lawmaking, the non-exclusion of all competent adults from 
participation in these institutions, institutionalized means of removing government officials, and 
a measure of free speech and free association sufficient “for reasonably free and informed 
deliberation about political decisions.”283  Despite his reservations about committing to a moral 
account of political obligation, then, Buchanan builds into his theory of recognitional legitimacy 
a substantial description of the institutions through which internally supreme authority—in the 
sense I have used it here—should be exercised in order for a political entity state to be 
recognized an independent, sovereign state.  In doing so he affirms, as against the Vatellian 
tradition and its echoes in twentieth century international law, the indissociabilty of 
sovereignty’s external and internal aspects.  Sovereignty is both a matter of relations among 
sovereigns and a matter of relations between a sovereign and its subjects. 
 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine Buchanan’s theory in any further detail.  
In addition to noting that it, too, rejects any one-sided emphasis on external sovereignty, I want 
to simply add the thought that if sovereignty is indeed a matter of internal political organization, 
as Buchanan argues it is, then the achievement and maintenance of sovereignty requires internal 
recognition as well as external recognition.  Buchanan focuses on a framework for guiding the 
international community’s recognitive practices, but this does not mean that international 
                                                
281 Ibid., 235. 
282 Ibid., 247-249, 267-8. 
283 Ibid., 279. 
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recognition is by itself sufficient for the achievement sovereignty, even when that recognition is 
attentive to internal political structures.  Rather, insofar as sovereignty is also a matter of internal 
political relations, achieving sovereignty requires something like the internal equivalent of the 
external recognition that Buchanan theorizes.  It requires internal political authorization, in the 
sense I have described in Chapter 1. 
Sovereignty must be achieved, not only in relation to other sovereigns, but also in relation 
to the subjects over whom it is exercised.  Sovereignty that only exists in the eyes of other 
sovereigns is not sovereignty, because it is not authority, which depends upon recognition by its 
subjects.  And it is the special prerogative of sovereignty, as I argued in part II, to determine who 
these subjects are, and to constitute them as a collective subject.  Sovereignty, according to its 
modern idealization, is internally supreme, externally independent, and self-bounding political 
authority that constitutes the collective subject—the people—over which it is exercised. 
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INTERLUDE 
 
Part I: Collective Subjection and the Paradox of Sovereignty 
 
 The aim of this dissertation is to identify and explain the paradox internal to modern 
ideals of sovereignty and to show that more familiar paradoxes of democracy are instances of 
this more foundational paradox.  By now, enough has been said to make some progress toward 
the first aim.  In this short interlude between chapters, I bring together arguments from the 
Introduction and Chapters 1 and 2 in order to give an initial description of the paradox of modern 
sovereignty.  Chapters 3 and 4  will be dedicated to complicating and enriching this description. 
In the Introduction, I began with a prevalent and general definition of modern 
sovereignty, according to which sovereignty is supreme and independent authority within 
boundaries.  In Chapter 2, I argued that in order for political authority to be supreme, 
independent, and bounded—in order for it to be sovereign—it must also be self-bounding.  
Moreover, sovereign authority must constitute its own collective subject, insofar as 
independently self-bounding authority determines not only the limits of its own rightful 
command, but also the limits of subjection to that command.  By subjecting the political actors 
circumscribed within its boundaries, sovereign authority constitutes these actors as its own 
collective subject.  Sovereignty, according to its modern idealization, constitutes ‘the people’ 
over which it is exercised.   
 However, there is more to the relation between sovereign and subject than unilateral 
constitution and command.  Modern sovereignty is a form of authority and, as such, involves a 
bilateral and reciprocal interaction between two or more agents.  According to the arguments of 
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Chapter 1, the subjects of authority are never merely subjects; they are also agents of the 
authority that is exercised over them, insofar as they authorize that authority.  If these arguments 
hold for sovereign authority, then the collective subject of sovereignty is also a collective agent 
of sovereignty—not because the sovereign and its subject are necessarily identical (as in the 
ideal-type of popular sovereignty), but because sovereign authority, like authority more 
generally, requires authorization by the subject over which it is exercised.  To see whether these 
arguments do hold for sovereign authority, they must be reviewed in detail. 
Recall that authority is a particular kind of practical compulsion in which command is 
correlated with obedience.  This correlation depends, not on the legitimacy of authority, but the 
recognized legitimacy of authority.  In contradistinction from power, authority makes an implicit 
or explicit claim to rightfulness that is accepted, acknowledged, and acceded to by the subjects 
over which it is exercised.  This act of acceptance, acknowledgement, and accession—which I 
have indicated with the general concept of recognition—is necessary to authorize the authority 
and subject the subject.  
In other words, in order for authority to be exercised, the subject over whom it is 
exercised must actively submit to it.  The language of submission is central to Weber’s 
influential account of authority, and it is echoed by Wolff’s language of forfeiture.  These idioms 
suggest the subject’s complicity in her own subjection.  Noting Raz’s objections to Wolff and 
Weber, I have used the more neutral idiom of participation, rather than submission or forfeiture.  
A subject of authority necessarily participates in her own subjection, in the limited ways I have 
described, regardless of whether authority is detrimental or instrumental to her autonomy or her 
ends.  The idiom of participation allows me to convey the central thought that is common to the 
work of Weber, Wolff, Raz, and Arendt, namely that authority makes a claim upon, and indeed 
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depends upon, the agency of the subject over which it is exercised.   
This dependence is not always (and perhaps not usually) obvious.  Authority does not 
advertise its indebtedness to its subjects, and subjects can authorize authority without intending 
to do so.  Although authority does not compel obedience unless it is recognized as a legitimate 
source of command, its subjects need not understand the authorizing function of their own acts of 
recognition.  In particular, subjects may misrecognize the bases of their acts of recognition for 
the bases of authority itself.  In other words, they may mistake whatever motivates them to 
authorize an authority for the independent grounds of authority, and thereby fail to perceive their 
own role in enabling the authority that is exercised over them.  Because of this, authority may 
appear to originate in divine election, heredity, tradition, or raison d’état, rather than in a relation 
between authorities and their subjects.  However, these apparently external reservoirs of 
authority are, in fact, reasons why subjects recognize authorities as legitimate sources of 
command.  It is the subjects’ acts of recognition, and not the reasons behind those acts, that 
authorize an authority.  
The subjects of authority, then, are not mere subjects.  They are also agents of the 
authority to which they are subject, insofar as that authority cannot be exercised without their 
active participation in its authorization.  As argued in the conclusion of Chapter 2, this means 
that every authority depends, for its authority, upon the agency of the actors over which that 
authority is exercised.  Every authority is, to a degree, subject to its subjects.  Put differently, an 
authority’s ability to command obedience is predicated upon the authority’s indebtedness to the 
subjects that it commands.   
 Sovereignty, as a kind of authority, is characterized by a similar form of indebtedness.  
Like any other type of authority, sovereignty must be authorized in order to be exercised.  The 
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three characteristics that define sovereignty as a unique kind of authority—internal supremacy, 
external independence, and (self-)boundedness—do not eliminate the indebtedness of the 
sovereign.  Supremacy is a matter of degree, and it does not change the fact that the sovereign 
must be authorized by the subject over which authority is exercised, while external independence 
simply means that sovereign authority cannot depend upon any external authority, such as 
another sovereign.  In fact, it is because sovereign authority is internally supreme and externally 
independent that the source of its authority must be immanent to its jurisdiction, insofar 
internally supreme and externally independent authority cannot be bestowed by an external actor.  
The final characteristic of sovereignty, (self-)boundedness, specifies that the sovereign itself 
determines the jurisdiction over which its authority is exercised, and within which its authority 
originates.   
However, the source of sovereign authority is not the individual subjects within a 
sovereign’s jurisdiction, but those subjects “all together,” as Machiavelli puts it.284  Sovereign 
authority is exercised over a collective subject and its individual members, but in order to be 
supreme—i.e. authoritative over all individual subjects and any faction of subjects—this 
authority must be authorized by the collective subject as a whole.  One recent study expresses 
this well: “Sovereignty has its source in the community but it is located in the state which rules 
over it.  Sovereignty flows upwards through an act of collective will only to move downwards in 
the form of supreme authority... Sovereignty depends for its existence on communal willing.”285  
Whereas authority simpliciter is ultimately indebted to the agency of individual subjects, 
                                                
284 Machiavelli, The Prince, H. Mansfield, trans. (Chicago: Chicago University Press), 104. 
285 Joanne Pemberton, Sovereignty: Interpretations (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 19, 38.   
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sovereignty emanates from and depends upon the agency of its collective subject.286  This thought 
is central to the political philosophy of Locke, Rousseau, Marx, and others.  More generally, it is 
embedded in the modern ideal of internally supreme and externally independent authority, which 
cannot be authorized by just any faction within its jurisdiction or by any authority beyond its 
jurisdiction.  In both its absolutist and popular forms, modern sovereignty, as a kind of authority, 
must be authorized by the people itself.  Every sovereign is ultimately indebted, for its sovereign 
authority, to the collective subject over which that authority is exercised. 
As with authority in general, the indebtedness that is characteristic of sovereignty is not 
always apparent.  Here too, the bases of the act of recognition through which the people 
authorizes the sovereign may be mistaken for the origin of sovereignty itself.  The sovereign 
authority of a king, for example, may appear to be grounded in divine investiture or venerable 
tradition, but these are simply empty stories unless the people accepts them and, on the basis of 
the perceived link to divinity or tradition, collectively recognizes the king as a rightful ruler.  
Even when the authority of the sovereign appears to originate from ‘on high’, it in fact originates 
‘from below’, in the sovereign’s relation to its collective subject. 
Bringing together the arguments from Chapters 2 and 1, it becomes clear that there is a 
tension internal to the modern ideal of sovereignty.  On one hand, sovereignty is idealized as a 
unique kind of authority that constitutes its own collective subject.  On the other hand, 
sovereignty is idealized as a unique kind of authority that originally and continually depends 
upon the agency of its own collective subject.  The tension lies in the fact that it is the 
sovereign’s supreme, independent, and self-bounding authority that engenders the constituted 
subject, even as it is the constituted subject that engenders the sovereign’s supreme, independent, 
                                                
286 Even if each subject recognizes the authority of the sovereign, the sovereign does not depend upon each of its 
subjects.  Rather, it depends upon all of its subjects together, united as a collective subject.  But this does not mean 
that one subject can simply ‘opt out’ and undermine a social network of authority.  See above, pages 47-8, 51. 
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and self-bounded authority.  This is the paradox of sovereignty.   
This paradox appears, in theory and practice, as a problematic circularity.  In order to 
constitute its collective subject through subjection to sovereign authority, the sovereign must be 
authorized by its collective subject.  Consequently, the collective subject of sovereignty—the 
constituted people over which the sovereign rules—is both a necessary condition of sovereign 
authority, and its effect.  The sovereign itself, insofar as the sovereign does not exist separate 
from its sovereign authority, is both the creator and the creature of the constituted people. 
Surprisingly, this circularity is essential, rather than accidental, to the modern ideal of 
sovereignty as supreme, independent and bounded political authority.  Taken together, the first 
three components of this ideal (supremacy, independence, and boundedness) entail that 
sovereignty must be exclusive and self-bounding.  Exclusive and self-bounding authority, as I 
have argued, necessary constitutes its own subject, at least in the ‘thin’ sense of uniting its 
subjects through their common subjection and differentiating this unity from whatever is not 
subject to it.  The fourth component of this ideal (political authoritativeness) entails a need for 
authorization.  The potential sources of authorization, however, are limited by the internal 
supremacy and external independence that are essential to sovereignty: authorization cannot 
come from a particular faction within the sovereign’s jurisdiction, or from any actor beyond that 
jurisdiction.  Thus, when the four components of the ideal are combined, the need for 
authorization is specified: supreme, independent, self-bounding, and constitutive authority must 
be authorized by the collective subject bounded by the sovereign’s jurisdiction.  According to the 
modern ideal of sovereignty as a whole, sovereignty constitutes its own collective subject and 
also requires authorization from that collective subject for any sovereign act—including the act 
by which it constitutes the collective subject. 
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In short, the modern ideal of sovereignty is essentially characterized by a circular relation 
between the sovereign’s constitutive authority and its dependence, for that authority, upon the 
subject that it constitutes.  The sovereign is not self-authorizing; its authority comes from the 
constituted collective subject.  The collective subject, however, is not self-constituting; its 
constitution comes from the authorized sovereign.  The authority of the sovereign and the 
constitution of the people each presuppose one another.  This chicken-or-egg problem of 
authorization and constitution is inherent to the modern ideal of authority so imperious that it 
constructs its own political foundation.  Modern sovereignty is an internally paradoxical ideal. 
 
Part II: The Paradox of Sovereignty between Hegel and Marx 
 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I will explore modern and contemporary philosophical engagements 
with the paradox of sovereignty.  Here, however, I want to quickly illustrate the paradox with a 
brief reading of Hegel and Marx.  Marx’s disagreements with Hegel are well known, and he 
famously declared his dialectical method to be “exactly opposite” to Hegel’s own, which he 
thought “must be inverted in order to discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.”287  
One particular site of inversion is relevant here: Marx’s trenchant criticisms of Hegel’s theory of 
sovereignty.  In his posthumously published “Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State,” Marx 
proceeds section by section through Part III of Hegel’s The Philosophy of Right, cataloguing his 
disagreements in the form of a running commentary.  In doing so, he opposes the Hegelian view 
of sovereignty claim by claim, and at times line by line.  Leaving aside any evaluation of Marx’s 
critique, I want to point out that both Hegel’s theory of the state, and Marx’s almost total 
inversion of that theory, correspond to the apparently opposed but equally essential aspects of the 
                                                
287 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, B. Fowkes, trans. (New York: Penguin, 1992), 102-3. 
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modern ideal of sovereignty.  The paradoxical nature of that ideal is manifest in the way that it is 
equally well reflected in Hegel’s and Marx’s “exactly opposite” understandings of the relation 
between the sovereign and its collective subject. 
In Chapter 2, I claimed that Hegel’s theory of the state is a superlative expression of the 
modern ideal of sovereignty insofar as it loudly proclaims the sovereign’s constitutive authority.  
For Hegel, sovereignty is supreme and independent authority that constitutes its collective 
subject as an internally unified and externally differentiated whole.  This authority “belongs to 
the state.”288  Sovereignty is founded in the state’s constitution—the organic interdependence of 
its various elements—and it is exercised by a sovereign monarch, who is the individual 
personification of the state itself.289  The constitution of the state in general, and the monarch in 
particular, are to be regarded as “divine and enduring, and as exalted above the sphere of all 
manufactured things.”290  Moreover, they are the “inner life” and “eternal foundation” of the 
people itself.291   
According to Hegel, the exercise of sovereign authority unites the people as a collective 
subject, helps to organize its individual members into the various components of civil society 
and the state apparatus, and differentiates the collective people from other, foreign peoples.292  
Thus, the people is an artifact of the sovereign state.293  Hegel firmly rejects the idea that “‘all 
                                                
288 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 318. Cf. 314-6. 
289 Hegel’s sovereign monarch is both authorized and constrained by the organic constitution of the state, in 
which each element of the state apparatus (the democratic legislature, the bureaucratic executive, and the individual 
sovereign himself) is “determined by and dependent on the end of the whole” (Ibid., 315).  Cf. 308-312, 316-325.  
290 Ibid., 312.  “The very concept of monarchy is that it is not deduced from something else but entirely self-
originating.  The idea that the right of the monarch is based on divine authority is therefore the closest 
approximation to this concept, because it conveys the unconditional aspect of the right in question” (318). 
291 Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science: Heidelberg 1817-1818 with Additions from the 
Lectures of 1818-1819. Translated by J. Stewart and P. Hodgson. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 
301, 240. 
292 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 304-366. 
293 “The first and most important question seems to be: By whom is the constitution of a people or nation to be 
made?  Yet the constitution should be regarded as the foundation of a people’s life in the sphere’s of rights and 
ethics, existing in and for itself, and essentially not as something made and something subjectively posited…  In this 
 114 
business relating to public affairs would gain its life from below, from the people itself’,” insofar 
as the people, prior to the state’s sovereign authority, is “only an atomistic aggregate of 
individuals,” “a formless mass,” and “a shapeless, wild, blind force.”294  This mass is given a 
determinate shape by the sovereignty founded in the state and exercised by the monarch.  For 
Hegel, in short, the sovereign constitutes the people. 
 Lambasting Hegel for beginning with a view of “objectified” sovereignty as “something 
independent,” Marx writes: 
Hegel proceeds from the state and conceives of man as the subjectivized state; 
democracy proceeds from man and conceives of the state as objectified man.  Just 
as religion does not make man, but rather man makes religion, so the constitution 
does not make the people, but the people make the constitution.295   
 
According to Marx, the material basis of sovereignty—of the state’s constitution and the 
monarch’s authority—are “real subjects” that do indeed form a mass, but a mass differentiated 
into the families and strata of civil society that make up an organized people.296  The state 
evolves out of the “real differences” within this mass and remains an “abstraction” of these 
differences; “only the people is a concrete reality.”297  Thus the sovereign state is an artifact of 
the socially organized people. 
There is a democratic impulse to Marx’s inversion of Hegel, insofar as it makes the (self-
differentiated) collective subject of sovereignty into the basis of sovereign authority, and thereby 
                                                
section we pose the question: Who is to make the constitution—the people or someone else?  And the answer is: No 
one, it makes itself…  The constitution is the foundation, the basis on which everything transpires.  It must therefore 
be regarded as an eternal foundation, not as an artifact.” Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right, 239-40.  Cf. Philosophy 
of Right 311-312. 
294 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 15, 311, 319; Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, W. Wallace and A. V. Miller, trans. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 273.  Cited in Allen Wood’s notes to Philosophy of Right, 470.  The view 
that Hegel rejects is held by Jacob Fries; see Philosophy of Right, 15. 
295 Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State” in Early Writings (New York: Penguin, 1992), 80, 83. 
296 Ibid., 80, 63. 
297 Ibid., 66, 85. 
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makes sovereignty depend upon its subject.298  For Marx, this democratic impulse is relevant to 
all political constitutions insofar as they are all based upon material organization of the people.  
He writes:  
Democracy is the truth of monarchy; monarchy is not the truth of democracy.  
Monarchy is by necessity democracy in contradiction with itself…  In monarchy 
the whole, the people, is subsumed under one of its forms of existence, the 
political constitution; in democracy the constitution itself appears only as one 
determining characteristic of the people, and indeed as its self-determination.  In 
monarchy we have the people of the constitution, in democracy the constitution of 
the people.  Democracy is the solution to the riddle of every constitution.  In it we 
find the constitution founded on its true ground: real human beings and the real 
people; not merely implicitly in essence, but in existence and reality.299   
 
Marx’s ideal of democracy can be described as a form of self-determination without sovereignty.  
However, Marx does not simply oppose this ideal to existing forms of sovereignty.  Rather, his 
ideal is an expression of the democratic preconditions of actual instances of sovereignty (“the 
truth of monarchy”), which are also the conditions of sovereignty’s revolutionary Aufhebung.  
Sovereignty—even when it “belongs to the state” and is exercised by the monarch—always 
emanates from, and depends upon, the people.  Popular sovereignty institutionalizes this 
dependence by identifying the people-as-sovereign with the people-as-subject.  Absolute 
sovereignty, on the other hand, institutionalizes the denial of this dependence, but the absolute 
sovereign is not for that reason independent of its collective subject.  In either case, Marx’s 
critical diagnosis is the same: sovereign authority ultimately emanates from, and depends upon, 
                                                
298 This is the basis of Marx’s criticism of sovereignty, which takes the form of “irreligious criticism” insofar as 
a potentially oppressive source of command (the sovereign state, God) is revealed to be an abstract artifact of those 
it would command (subjects, believers).  See Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Introduction” in Early 
Writings, especially pages 243-250.  Marx’s critical project is not merely to dispense with the abstraction via 
revolution, but to revolutionize the material conditions that give rise to the abstraction—or perhaps to the need for 
the abstraction— in the first place (Ibid, 244).  Marx’s ideal form of democracy, then, may ultimately dispense with 
sovereignty.  However, his critique of actual sovereignty involves revealing its real democratic aspect—its 
foundation in the people—which is the condition of possibility of its revolutionary overthrow, and so also of any 
form of post-sovereign or un-sovereign democracy.   
299 Ibid., 87. 
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the people, even where it frustrates the people’s free development.  The people constitute the 
sovereign even if, ideally, the people might constitute itself without the sovereign.300 
 Both Hegel and Marx express something true about sovereignty.  Hegel’s thought 
epitomizes one aspect of the modern ideal of sovereignty insofar as it construes sovereignty as a 
unique kind of authority that constitutes its own collective subject.  This is not the simplistic 
claim that sovereignty somehow creates a political community ex nihilo.  Rather, sovereign 
authority, exercised over a set of individuals, constitutes those individuals as a community united 
by their subjection.  This is true, I argued, whether sovereignty is exercised by a single monarch 
or an entire people; either way, it is through sovereign authority that the collective subject of 
sovereignty is constituted and continually reconstituted.  Far from being some kind of mystical 
spirit, the supreme, independent, and self-bounding constitutive authority that defines 
sovereignty is evident, I argued, in the day-to-day operations by which contemporary states 
determine who can enter or remain within their jurisdiction.   
However, Marx’s thought can be read as suggesting something equally essential about 
the modern ideal of sovereignty, namely the way that sovereigns depend, for their authorization, 
upon the collective subject over which sovereignty is exercised.  This is not the simplistic claim 
that the collective subject of sovereignty invents the sovereign at will, nor the contractualist 
fantasy of the people rationally choosing its sovereign.  Rather, the people collectively (and often 
implicitly, through its everyday activity) recognizes the sovereign as supremely and 
                                                
300 Whereas a liberal like Locke might take the people’s constitution of the sovereign to be an argument for 
sovereignty’s legitimacy, it can also be read as a frustration or perversion of creative social activity.  In this way, the 
people’s constitution of the sovereign can be read as simultaneously an indicator of revolutionary potential and 
(following Weber, Adorno, and Marcuse) as an indicator of the obstacles to the realization of that potential.  This 
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separated from the material conditions that both engender and require those ideals, and also potentially frustrate their 
realization. 
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independently authoritative, and this recognition authorizes the sovereign to command the 
people.  For Marx, the sovereign’s dependence upon this authorization indicates the possibility 
of democratic organization without sovereignty or the abstraction of the state.  Indeed, the 
sovereign’s collective subject can ‘unmake’ the sovereign by stripping it of its authority, but this 
is an exceptional matter of revolution.301  However, Marx’s democratic ideal also has a diagnostic 
function.  Short of revolution, and as the condition of possibility of revolution, the sovereign’s 
dependence upon the people is legible in the everyday operations by which states continually 
solicit the allegiance of their collective subjects, usually in the name of providing protection, 
justice, or some other good to those subjects.  Such allegiance is frequently granted, not through 
explicit and obvious acts of authorization, but through the ongoing activities, dispositions, and 
forms of life through which the people implicitly acknowledges, accepts, or accedes to sovereign 
authority.302    
 The contrast between Hegel and Marx can be expressed in terms that will be useful for the 
following chapters: Hegel presents sovereignty as a fully imperious and almost divinely creative 
authority, while Marx presents sovereignty as a fully indebted and artificially created authority.  
According to Hegel, sovereignty knows no limits other than those it gives itself, and, in addition 
to issuing commands that trump all competing sources of obligation, it brings into existence the 
                                                
301 This task is especially difficult if, as I am arguing, the people owes its constitution to the sovereign and, 
ultimately, to its own recognition of the sovereign as an authoritative source of constitution.  In that case, the people 
risks dissolving itself in overthrowing the sovereign.  Hannah Arendt believes that the experience of the French 
Revolution illustrates this risk; see Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin, 2006), page 181, 311. 
Marx’s philosophy offers another alternative: affirming the transformation of the revolutionary subject through 
human emancipation rather than mere political revolution. 
302 Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1972) may be instructive for a Marxian 
reading of the people’s authorization of the sovereign.  However, the people’s continual authorization of the 
sovereign should not be reduced to ‘false’ consciousness, insofar as it responds to actual material conditions.  
Adorno provides an important corrective to any such reduction: “Inasmuch as these massive social forces and 
institutions were once human ones, are essentially the reified work of living human beings, this appearance of self-
sufficiency and independence in them would seem to be something ideological, a socially necessary mirage which 
one ought to be able to break through, to change.  Yet such pure appearance is the ens realissimum in the immediate 
life of men.  The force of gravity of social relationships serves only to strengthen that appearance more and more.”  
Adorno, “Society,” Salmagundi 10 (1969): 151-2. 
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collective subject that it commands.  This theological image of the imperious sovereign is by no 
means exclusive to Hegel.303  As Marx’s critical work indicates, on the other hand, sovereignty 
owes its authority to the collective subject, the people, that precedes it and institutes it.  This 
“irreligious” image of the indebted sovereign is by no means exclusive to Marx.304  Taken by 
themselves, each of these images accurately illustrates one aspect of the modern ideal of 
sovereignty.  Taken together, they illustrate something crucial about the ideal as a whole: 
sovereignty is both imperious and indebted in its relation to ‘the people’.   
According to its modern idealization, the sovereign constitutes its own collective subject 
through subjection to its own authority (the Hegelian moment of sovereign imperiousness) and 
the sovereign depends upon its own collective subject for its own authority (the Marxian moment 
of sovereign indebtedness).  In terms of practice, the tension internal to modern sovereignty 
marks a political circle, insofar as the (Hegelian) moment of sovereign constitution presupposes, 
and is presupposed by, the (Marxian) moment of popular authorization.  In terms of theory, the 
tension marks a paradox, insofar as a single ideal of internally supreme, externally independent, 
and (self-)bounded political authority accurately reflects both Hegel’s theory of the state and 
Marx’s “exactly opposite” inversion of that theory.  Modern sovereignty is an internally 
paradoxical ideal that indicates a circular political task. 
 
 
                                                
303 On this general point, see Arendt, On Revolution, 177-8; Jean Bethke Elshtain, Sovereignty: God, State and 
the Self (New York: Basic Books, 2008), chaps. 1-7; and Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the 
Concept of Sovereignty, G. Schwab, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 36.  Importantly, the 
theological image of the sovereign appears in theories of sovereignty that reject the notion of divine investiture.  
Famously, Hobbes speaks “reverently” of the sovereign as a “Mortall God,” and Rousseau claims, “The Sovereign, 
by the mere fact that it is, is always everything that it ought to be.”  Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press,  1996), 120-1; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract, V. Gourevitch, trans. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 52.  Similar theological images occur in the work of Bodin, Locke, 
Sieyès, Schmitt, Negri and Agamben, among others. 
304 Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” 244. 
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Part III: Democratic Circles and the Paradox of Sovereignty 
 
 The circularity that I have described as a paradox of sovereignty is frequently understood 
as a political problem exclusive to popular sovereignty or democratic constitutionalism.  The 
basic thought runs like this: No body politic can constitute itself democratically, or through 
popularly legitimated procedure, insofar as there is, prior to the act of constitution, no demos or 
people to legitimate the act.  As Rousseau writes, speaking of the popular sovereignty of the 
constituted people, “The effect would have to become the cause.”305  At stake is not merely an 
issue concerning how the people will constitute itself, but a more fundamental issue concerning 
who is the people, prior to its constitution. 
Contemporary democratic theorists are quick to point out that this circularity does not 
only affect mythical moments of original political founding.  Rather, it affects instances of 
popular reconstitution as well, as when a revolutionary assembly convenes to constitute a new 
body politic, or secessionists declare themselves a distinct and independent political community, 
or suffragists extend the demos to the previously disenfranchised, or citizens vote on the criteria 
by which persons can be made citizens.  In such instances, constitutive legitimacy cannot be 
grounded in any existing body politic, because that version of the people is precisely what is 
being challenged.  These exceptional moments of reconstitution suggest something about the 
normal functioning of democratic constitution, namely that any attempt to democratically 
legitimate a particular demos will invoke a “vicious circle,” as Hannah Arendt puts it; a 
“fundamental” and “elusive problem” according to Robert Dahl; a “boundary problem,” as 
Frederick Whelan elaborates it; a “constitutional circle,” in Carol Gould’s terms, or a “paradox 
                                                
305 Rousseau, Social Contract, 71.  
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of democratic legitimacy,” as Seyla Benhabib has recently described it.306 
Whereas these thinkers understand the circular logic of popular sovereignty and 
democratic constitution as a problem to be solved or mitigated, another tradition of democratic 
theorists celebrates the paradoxical nature of democracy.  Claude Lefort, William Connolly, and 
Chantal Mouffe, for instance, understand democratic politics to require, as Lefort puts it, “the 
experience of an ungraspable, uncontrollable society in which the people will be said to be 
sovereign, of course, but whose identity will be constantly open to question...” 307  The 
impossibility of any final democratic determination of the people is, for these thinkers, a 
condition of political possibility.308 
Despite their differences, both of these lines of thought agree that the circularity in 
question is characteristic of, and exclusive to, democracy in particular or popular sovereignty 
more generally.  I disagree.  As I will show in the next two chapters, the paradox that 
characterizes the democratic constitution of the people is, in fact, characteristic of sovereignty 
itself.  The paradox is more obvious as regards democracy, because there the interdependence of 
the people-as-sovereign and the people-as-subject is more explicitly institutionalized, and the 
circular relation between constitution and authorization results in a clear democratic deficit 
whenever the people attempts to constitute itself.  However, the paradox becomes visible in 
undemocratic forms of sovereignty once the people is understood to be constituted by the 
                                                
306 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, 175-6; Robert Dahl, After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 46; Frederick Whelan, “Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary 
Problem,” in Nomos 25: Liberal Democracy, J. Pennock and J. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University 
Press, 1983), 22, 40; Carol Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 39-41, 174-5; Seyla Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 33, 
167. 
307 Claude Lefort, “The Image of the Body and Totalitarianism” in The Political Forms of Modern Society: 
Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism, J. Thompson, ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), 303-4.  See also 
William Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 139; Chantal 
Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000) and On the Political (London: Routledge, 2005). 
308 Toward the end of Chapter 4, I identify a similar commitment in the work of Benhabib and Gould. 
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authorized sovereign, and the sovereign is understood to be authorized by the constituted people.  
This circular interrelation also results in a deficit, not of democratic legitimacy, but of sovereign 
authority more generally.  Regardless of whether the sovereign is the people itself, a group of 
people, or a single person, it is never sufficiently authorized to fully constitute the people as a 
collective subject in the way that is characteristic of sovereignty—i.e., through supreme, 
independent, and self-bounding authority.  In cases of democratic and undemocratic sovereignty 
alike, the paradoxical interdependence of sovereign constitution and popular authorization 
ensures that neither of these political tasks is finally and incontestably accomplished.  The 
familiar paradoxes of democracy are expressions of the more fundamental paradox of 
sovereignty. 
Nevertheless, the specifically democratic versions of the paradox of sovereignty reveal 
something important about sovereignty itself.  In the estimation of several of the theorists 
mentioned above, including Gould, Benhabib, and Connolly, the deficit that results from the 
paradox of democratic constitution may be an occasion for more democratic engagement, rather 
than less.  Because the democratic authorization of the sovereign and the democratic constitution 
of the people are never finally complete, these unfinished political tasks become opportunities 
for new forms of engagement, negotiation, and contest that, while perhaps not democratic in a 
narrowly procedural sense, may be robustly democratic in a wider normative sense.  In other 
words, the gap in democratic legitimation presents an opportunity for contesting, from beyond 
the scope and procedures of a particular constituted demos, the acts of authorization and 
constitution that define the demos as, simultaneously, collective sovereign and collective subject.   
Because the more fundamental paradox of sovereignty entails a similar deficit of 
authority and a corresponding incompleteness of constitution, perhaps the paradoxical nature of 
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sovereignty itself also presents an occasion for more political contest, rather than less.  This 
would be contrary to appearances.  Insofar as sovereignty is idealized as unambiguous internal 
supremacy and inviolable external independence, ‘sovereignty’ would appear to name a 
particular end of political contestation.  However, because the internal and external aspects of 
sovereignty depend upon interrelated acts of authorization and constitution that are never finally 
accomplished, ‘sovereignty’ may in fact name a particular site for ongoing political contestation.  
Although sovereignty is indeed a mode of continual political closure, the paradoxically related 
preconditions of this closure—the authority of the sovereign and the constitution of the people—
may themselves be sites of open political engagement.  
This seemingly postmodern thought is the lesson of Machiavelli’s The Prince, which 
emphasizes that the prince’s ability to found a state depends upon, not the individual Italians who 
are his potential subjects, but these subjects “all together,” united under the prince’s command as 
his “own arms.”309  The text ends with the aporetic exhortation to constitute the people via the 
kind of “power and virtue” that can only come from the constituted people itself.310  It thus 
emphasizes, at the inauguration of modern political theory, the paradox inherent to modern ideals 
of sovereignty.  For this reason, the second half of this dissertation begins with Machiavelli.   
                                                
309 Machiavelli, The Prince, 104.  
310 Ibid, 31. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE CIRCULAR LOGIC OF SOVEREIGNTY 
 
The modern ideal of sovereignty is inherently paradoxical, insofar as it construes the 
sovereign as both the creator and creature of its own collective subject, and construes that 
subject—the people—as both the source and artifact of sovereign authority.  I outlined this 
circular logic in the brief interlude prior to this chapter, and I made a case for its central premises 
in the Introduction and Chapters 1 and 2.  The overall argument can be easily summarized: 
Sovereignty is supreme, independent, and bounded political authority (from Introduction).  
Political authority that is supreme and independent must be self-bounding, and authority that is 
supreme, independent, and self-bounding constitutes its own collective subject by determining 
the boundaries of its own jurisdiction.  Sovereignty is, in other words, a kind of constitutive 
authority (from Chapter 2).  However, authority cannot be unilaterally imposed upon subjects.  
Rather, the subjects must authorize the authority that is exercised over them.  The compelling 
force of authority, as distinct from that of power, requires that its subjects actively participate in 
their own subjection.  For this reason, every authority depends, for its authority, upon the agency 
of its subjects (from Chapter 1).  Sovereignty is no different in this regard, except that it depends 
upon the agency of its collective subject.  The source of sovereign authority must be the 
collective subject, insofar as sovereignty is internally supreme (i.e., authoritative over all 
individual subjects and any faction of subjects) and externally independent (i.e., neither 
originating in, nor dependent upon, anything beyond its jurisdiction).  Thus sovereign authority, 
by constituting its collective subject, constructs its own foundation (from Interlude).  In short, 
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according to its modern idealization, sovereignty is a unique kind of authority that constitutes the 
collective subject—the people—from which it emanates.  This is a paradoxical political ideal.   
In the present chapter, I aim to elaborate and complicate this rather schematic argument 
by exploring the work of modern thinkers who directly engage the circular logic that is 
characteristic of modern sovereignty.  Specifically, I examine the ways that Niccolò Machiavelli, 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Emmanuel Sieyès theorize the imperiousness and the indebtedness 
of any modern ruler—be it a prince or people—that constitutes the collective subject over which 
it rules.  Although I focus on thinkers whose work has been influential to later modern and 
contemporary theories of sovereignty, my intent is not to present a comprehensive history or 
genealogy of sovereignty.311  Nor do I focus on the thinkers who have had the most influence 
over contemporary understandings of sovereignty (such as Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf in the 
natural law tradition, or Bodin and Schmitt in the decisionist tradition).  Rather, I focus on 
thinkers who best illuminate the paradoxical nature of modern sovereignty, as well as the 
political stakes of its paradox.   
As is indicated by the arc of this chapter—which moves from Machiavelli’s princely 
founders, through Rousseau’s popular sovereign and Sieyès’s constituent nation, to Napoleon 
Bonaparte’s achievement of popular despotism—the paradox of sovereignty marks an 
ambivalent tension between the democratic and autocratic potentials latent in the ideal of 
supreme, independent, and (self-)bounded authority.  This political ambivalence has already been 
suggested by the previous discussion of Hegel and Marx, and it will be explored further in 
                                                
311 There are already several very admirable studies of sovereignty that do the historical work of tracing the 
influences and innovations that connect modern and contemporary political thinkers.  I will continue to rely upon 
them, but I will not try to repeat their work.  See F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986); Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Jean 
Bethke Elshtain, Sovereignty: God, State and the Self (New York: Basic Books, 2008); Joanne Pemberton, 
Sovereignty: Interpretations (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).  
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Chapter 4, where I show several contemporary paradoxes of democracy to be, in fact, instances 
of the more foundational paradox of sovereignty.  The present chapter builds toward this later 
work, and toward an enriched understanding of the politics of modern and contemporary 
sovereignty more generally, by tracing an unexpected continuity between modern ideals of 
absolutist and popular sovereignty.  
 In part I, I begin with the political writings of Machiavelli.  Although Machiavelli does 
not have a modern concept of sovereignty per se, he clarifies the paradoxical interdependence 
that will become essential to later modern ideals of sovereignty.  For Machiavelli, the modern 
world is characterized by an absence of the supposedly pre-political reservoirs of authority—
such as divine investiture, righteousness, or lineage—from which medieval rulers could draw in 
order to maintain their rule.  Instead, modern rulers depend, for their “power and virtue,” upon 
the ruled themselves—the many, the multitude, the people—that “all together” are more 
powerful than any ruler.312  The ruled, however, depend upon their rulers for the constitution and 
organization that makes them powerful.  This is the form of political interdependence that 
underlies the paradox of sovereignty. 
 In part II, I turn to Rousseau’s On the Social Contract, which contains two distinct 
versions of the paradox of sovereignty.  The first concerns the inability of a “blind multitude” to 
constitute itself as, simultaneously, sovereign and subject, while the second reveals a moment of 
heteronomy that haunts the foundation of even a robustly popular sovereign polity.313  Distantly 
following Machiavelli, Rousseau reveals that even this moment of heteronomy expresses not 
only the imperiousness, but also the indebtedness, that are essential to sovereign constitutive 
authority.  
                                                
312 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince.  H. Mansfield, trans. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998), 31, 104. 
313 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract. V. Gourevitch, trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 68.  
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 Whereas Machiavelli and Rousseau are frequently cited in histories of sovereignty and 
discussions of political paradox, Sieyès and Bonaparte are not.314  This is unfortunate, because 
Sieyès’s revolutionary writings pose the paradox of sovereignty as, not merely a theoretical 
aporia, but a problem to be overcome in political practice.  In part III, I argue that Sieyès’s 
failure to solve this problem—as evidenced by Bonaparte’s practical reassertion of the paradox 
in the aftermath of the French Revolution— illustrates one potential, and common, orientation to 
the paradox of sovereignty.  Pace Sieyès, the circles or regresses of constitution and 
authorization that are essential to modern sovereignty cannot be eliminated by positing or 
assuming a pre-political and incontestable source of either authority or constitution, because the 
act of doing so is itself political and deeply contestable.  This thought, which Machiavelli took to 
describe the basic conditions of modern political life, is reasserted in the autocratic close of 
France’s democratic revolutions.  As I will argue in the following chapter, resisting similar forms 
of closure today requires recovering this thought—the acknowledgement of the interminability 
of sovereignty’s paradox—in the name of democratic politics. 
 
Part I: Machiavelli 
 
Machiavelli dedicates both of his major political works to exploring the tension between 
imperiousness and indebtedness that characterizes later modern ideals of sovereignty.  In his 
political thought, the rulers of principalities and republics alike are founders who impose form 
and bring order to disparate subjects, continually constituting these subjects as collective 
subjects, as peoples.  At the same time, the acts of founding and maintaining a polity—the two 
                                                
314 Two notable exceptions, which introduced me to this illuminating historical moment, are Hannah Arendt’s 
On Revolution (New York: Penguin, 2006) and Loughlin and Walker’s The Paradox of Constitutionalism: 
Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).  
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ends of Machiavelli’s politics—require a kind of “power and virtue” (potenzia and virtù) that 
result from a particular relation between a ruler and the ruled.315  Machiavelli’s rulers are always 
dependent upon their collective subjects—the people—for their ability to marshal power and 
order virtue.  This dependence cannot be admitted, however, without sacrificing the ability to 
rule.  Consequently, founding and maintaining a polity requires projecting an image of 
imperiousness that can hide the ruler’s indebtedness to the ruled.316  Far more than offering crafty 
advice to would-be princes, then, Machiavelli’s major works capture something essential about 
modern politics.  In a world characterized by the absence of divine investiture and natural right, 
political power flows from the many—the multitude, the masses, or the people.  Durable and 
authoritative rule over the many requires a distinctly modern negotiation of imperiousness and 
indebtedness, because the ability to constitute and command a people is ultimately, even if 
secretly, dependent upon the constituted and commanded people itself.   
 The Prince and Discourses on Livy are both primarily concerned with political 
foundation.  In The Prince, Machiavelli’s emphasis is on the acquisition of principalities, and he 
is clear that the best and most secure, but also the most difficult, means of acquiring a 
principality is to found one anew.  In an early chapter, he claims that the greatest examples of 
political foundation involve “principalities that are altogether new both in prince and in state.”317  
With this phrase, he connects the newness of the prince with the newness of the polity, signaling 
that he will discuss princes who become princes by founding the polities over which they rule.  
As he later puts it, “Nothing brings so much honor to a man rising newly as new laws and new 
                                                
315 Machiavelli, The Prince, 31.  Power is related to potential, and virtue to ability or strength.   
316 Ibid., 70-1, 96.  Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, J. Bonadella and P. Bonadella, trans. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 79, 119. 
317 Machiavelli, The Prince, 21. 
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orders found by him.”318  This connection between prince’s rule and the polity’s foundation is 
reinforced by Machiavelli’s ambiguous use of the word “stato” (‘state’), which throughout The 
Prince variously signifies ‘power’ and ‘government’, as well as that which power and 
government are exercised over, namely ‘people’ and ‘territory’.319  In the “altogether new” 
principalities, ruler and ruled come into being together, and in relation to one another, through 
the foundation of a new stato.  Machiavelli’s favored examples of new princes are founders who 
become great rulers by introducing “any form they pleased,” as well as “new modes and orders,” 
upon the “matter” of disparate populations.320  The greatest and most difficult means of acquiring 
a principality is to constitute a new collective subject—a people—through its subjection.321   
This is the task Machiavelli puts to Lorenzo De Medici in the final chapter of The Prince, 
entitled “Exhortation to Seize Italy and to Free Her from the Barbarians.”  To free Italy requires 
founding Italy anew.322  A new constitution is needed because the Italians are “enslaved,” 
“servile,” “dispersed… without a head, without order,” just as were the Israelites, Persians, and 
Athenians before Moses, Cyrus, and Theseus brought them order.323  Properly speaking, there is 
no Italy, only once and future Italians “ready” to be constituted as a coherent stato, an ordered 
and ruled people.324  The dismal condition of the Italians thus presents a rare opportunity for the 
acts of foundation that make great princes and great polities.  “So many things are tending 
toward the benefit of a new prince,” Machiavelli writes, “that I do not know what time has ever 
                                                
318 Ibid., 103-4. 
319 Bartelson, Genealogy of Sovereignty, 268.  Mansfield notes that “stato means both status… and state, as 
today, but the meanings are more closely connected; stato is the status of a person or group while dominating 
someone else.  Although NM sometimes speaks of ‘the state’, he always means someone’s state,” i.e., that which 
someone rules over (Machiavelli, Prince, 5 fn. 2). 
320 Ibid., 23. 
321 Ibid., 25. 
322 The new prince must “introduce a form that would bring honor to him and good to the community of men 
there.” Ibid., 102. 
323 Ibid. 
324 Ibid. 
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been more apt for it…  Matter is not lacking for introducing every form.”325  It is only by giving 
form to this matter—that is, constituting the dispersed Italians as a united people—that the new 
prince will become a prince. 
Machiavelli’s exhortation, together with his review of the mythical founders of the past, 
would seem to suggest the opportunity and the need for acts of foundation are rare.  However, 
the Discourses belies this impression by contextualizing acts of foundation in a Polybian cycle of 
political beginning, degeneration, and renewal.326  In order to preserve their polities, rulers must 
renew them by imposing new forms, new constitutions, upon the ruled.  Foundation, then, is not 
a singular event.  As Leo Strauss puts it, “Foundation is, as it were, continuous foundation; not 
only at the beginning, but ‘every day,’ a commonwealth needs ‘new orders’.”327  A great ruler is 
one who can identify this need and satisfy it. 
It is sometimes suggested that The Prince focuses on acquiring a polity while the 
Discourses focuses on maintaining it.  This distinction is too simple, given Machiavelli’s thought 
that acquisition requires foundation, and maintenance requires constant refoundation.328  Nor can 
it be said that The Prince focuses on principalities and kingdoms, while the Discourses focuses 
on republics.  In addition to discussing principalities and kingdoms in the Discourses, as well as 
republics in The Prince, Machiavelli is clear that republics are to be renewed in the same ways 
that princes found principalities.  He writes, “Never or rarely does it happen that a republic or 
kingdom is organized well from the beginning or is completely reformed… unless it is organized 
                                                
325 Ibid.,102, 104.  See also Discourses 66-7, 278. 
326 Machiavelli, Discourses, Bk I Chap 2, Bk III Chap 1. 
327 Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 44.  See also Peter 
Breiner, “Machiavelli's ‘New Prince’ and the Primordial Moment of Acquisition,” Political Theory 36, no. 1 (2008): 
66-92. 
328 See Machiavelli, Discourses, 125, 246-50, 280-2, 310-1, 358-9.  
 130 
by one man alone” who “gives it shape” and assumes “sole authority” over its constitution.329  In 
other words, the distinction between principality and republic disappears during moments of 
refoundation: “What princes are obliged to do at the beginning of their expansion republics must 
do as well.”330  Accordingly, Machiavelli’s discussions of political renewal in the Discourses 
frequently echo his advice in The Prince, with the added insight that all polities, in order to 
remain “healthy,” must be made to “return to beginnings” by an innovative form-giver.331   
Machiavelli may ultimately prefer republics to principalities, but this preference affirms, 
rather than renounces, his advice to princes.  The Prince and the Discourses are linked by the 
common theme of foundation, in which a solitary ruler is said to achieve greatness by 
constituting the ruled as a collective subject.  In order to acquire a principality or renew a 
republic, a “new prince” must employ violence, deception, and exemplarity when required, 
cultivate goodwill and inspire fear at all times, and “with absolute and excessive power… 
impose a restraint on the excessive ambition and corruption of the mighty.”332  Most of all, the 
(re)founder of a stato must act alone to constitute a people through “his own power and 
virtue.”333 
                                                
329 Ibid., 45, italics added.  In republics, this authority may be exercised lawfully, “through the special excellence 
of a single regulation,” but it is crucial that such laws “be given life by the exceptional ability of a single citizen, 
who courageously strives to enforce them against the power of all those who fail to observe them” (247-8). 
Alternatively, “this return to beginnings in republics also arises from the simple talents of a single man without 
depending upon a law,” when the refounder is “of such reputation and exemplary behavior that good men wish to 
imitate them” (248).  According to Machiavelli, Rome was repeatedly renewed—and saved from disaster—
according to both means; in all cases, a prince-like individual acted alone to reform the people (247-9). 
330 Ibid., 186.  “As for changing all these institutions all at once… ordinary practices are no longer sufficient, 
once ordinary methods have become wicked, and it is necessary to turn to extraordinary methods, such as violence 
or arms, and to become, above all else, prince of the city and arrange it as one wishes” (70, emphasis added). 
331 Ibid., 248, 246.  “If a republic were so fortunate… that it could often have a man who, with his exemplary 
action, could renew its laws and who would not only prevent it from racing toward ruin but would pull it back, that 
republic would be everlasting” (311).  See also Ibid., 136, 248-9, 330. 
332 Ibid.,136.  See also pages 45, 186, 221-3, 247-9, 311-314. 
333 Machiavelli, Prince, 31.  The title of this crucial chapter explicitly links “New Principalities” with the 
founder’s “Own Arms and Virtue” (Ibid., 21).   
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 However, Machiavelli continually troubles the idea of the ruler’s own power and virtue, 
ultimately indicating that the location of power and virtue is not a single exemplary individual, 
but the constituted people itself.  A founder or ruler never truly owns his power and virtue.  
Rather, they are effects of his particular relationship to the ruled.  This relationship is not 
sovereignty per se, and Machiavelli’s concepts of power and virtue are not identical to modern 
concepts of authority, although here they function in similar ways.  Nonetheless, in his 
discussion of the ruler’s relationship to the ruled, Machiavelli reveals the interrelation of 
constitution and authorization, as well as the tension between imperiousness and indebtedness, 
that are characteristic of later modern ideals of sovereignty.  
In The Prince’s first chapter on new princes, Machiavelli briefly considers “whether 
these innovators stand by themselves or depend upon others; that is, whether to carry out their 
deed they must beg or indeed can use force.”334  He concludes that “when they depend on their 
own and are able to use force,” new rulers are free from peril.335  Here and throughout both 
books, the achievement and maintenance of independence requires commanding a military that is 
strong, united, and loyal.  Power and virtue are repeatedly (though not exclusively) linked to 
such a military, which is needed not only for conquest, but also for the foundation and 
maintenance of a polity.336  The new ruler’s own power and virtue will depend on whether he is 
the “total owner of his own arms,” i.e., whether he can command a military in a way that 
preserves, rather than undermines, his independence from “the fortune and force of someone 
else.”337 
                                                
334 Machiavelli, Prince, 24. 
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336 Ibid., 21-5, 48-60. 
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 The ruler’s power and virtue are an effect, then, of his relationship with his military.  This 
relationship is one of mutual dependence.  The ruler always depends upon his own soldiers for 
his ability to rule independently of the whims and arms of other rulers, while the soldiers always 
depend upon their prince for their unity: “the former has need of the latter and the latter of the 
former.”338  Because ruling and commanding both require good arms, a ruler must cultivate this 
relationship of mutual dependence in times of peace as well as war.339  At all times, the ruler 
must strive to keep his soldiers united, confident, faithful, and trusting in him.340  Above all, they 
must esteem him.341  If the ruler relates to his soldiers in this way, then their power and virtue 
will be at his disposal, and he will be safe from both internal and external threats.  Machiavelli 
writes: 
For a prince should have two fears: one within, on account of his subjects; the 
other outside, on account of external powers.  From the latter one is defended with 
good arms and good friends; and if one has good arms, one will always have good 
friends.  And things inside will always remain steady, if things outside are 
steady.342  
 
If the ruler fails to maintain the unity of his soldiers, or squanders the esteem that they hold for 
him, then he will lack the power and virtue necessary to prevent uprising and conquest, and the 
polity itself will be “wholly obliged to fortune since it does not have virtue to defend itself in 
adversity.”343  To put it in the language of the previous chapter, the ruler depends upon his own 
“good arms”—his own loyal military—for his internal supremacy and external independence. 
Machiavelli subtly generalizes this relation between the ruler and his soldiers to a wider 
relation of interdependence connecting the ruler and the people as a whole.  First, he warns rulers 
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against the common practice of employing mercenaries and auxiliary forces sent by other rulers.  
Those kinds of soldiers will only undermine their employer’s independence; they are never truly 
a ruler’s own arms.  Rather, “one’s own arms are those which are composed of either subjects or 
citizens or your creatures…  It is necessary, in order to hold on to a government and maintain a 
kingdom, to arm oneself with one’s own subjects.”344  Rulers who follow Machiavelli’s advice 
will not be beholden to external forces for their power and virtue.  However, they will ultimately 
depend upon “internal forces,” insofar as a ruler’s power and virtue really reside in his “good 
arms,” and these are his own subjects.345  The dependence is mutual, insofar as the subject-
soldiers need the ruler-commander to unite them, train them, and lead them in battle.346  
Nonetheless, the ruler’s dependence on the subject-soldiers runs deep, insofar as his power and 
virtue, and indeed his stato itself—in the double sense of his state and his rule over it—all 
depend upon his military.347  If the ruler cannot maintain this relation of mutual dependence, the 
subject-soldiers will not protect him from his internal and external enemies.  External 
independence and internal supremacy are thus purchased at the cost of internal dependence.  
Rulers who “stand by themselves” and “depend on their own and are able to use force” are, in 
fact, dependent upon their own subjects.348   
In addition to establishing the ruler’s dependence upon some of his subjects, Machiavelli 
gradually presents the ruler’s relationship to his “own arms” as one aspect of a more general 
interdependence that binds together ruler and ruled.349  The people itself—that is, the united 
individuals that make up make up the ruler’s stato—is repeatedly described as a source of power 
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and virtue, but also a source of danger, for the new ruler.350  On one hand, the people can elevate 
a ruler to a position of supreme authority, and a ruler who has the people on his side can defend 
against foreign and the domestic usurpation.351  On the other hand, a ruler “can never secure 
himself against a hostile people,” which may rebel against him or support his adversaries.352  
Because the people can easily enable or undermine any individual’s rule, “it is not fortresses, but, 
rather, the will [volontà] of the people that maintains rulers in their position of power.”353  Here 
again, the relation of dependence is not one-sided; the people depends upon the ruler for its 
constitution, the unity and order that gives it power and virtue.354  This does not, however, lessen 
the significance of Machiavelli’s point: Every ruler is ultimately indebted to the people—the 
united collective subject—that can, if it so wills, rebel against him. 
Importantly, it is not only republican rulers who are dependent upon the ruled.  
According to Machiavelli, principalities and tyrannies are also founded upon, and maintained by, 
the interdependence of ruler and ruled.355  Tyranny is particularly dependent upon the people and 
susceptible to the rebellion of dissatisfied subjects.  This is because the conditions that create 
tyranny are also those that undermine it, namely “an excessive desire on the part of the people to 
be free, and… an excessive desire on the part of the nobles to rule.”356  The people will welcome 
a tyrant that promises liberation, but if this promise is not quickly fulfilled, the people will rebel 
against the tyrant.357  If a tyrant wishes to be independent of the people, he may align himself 
with the nobles, but this is a losing strategy, because the people is stronger than the tyrant and 
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nobles combined.358  Finally, a tyrant can attempt to rule the people by force, but he will lack 
“good arms,” since these come from the people itself.359  In order to successfully rule the people, 
a tyrant must continually indebt himself to the people and win over their power and virtue.  This 
entails a crafty and apparently benevolent form of tyranny, if not a different form of rule 
altogether.  
The ruler’s indebtedness to the people, then, is not unique to any particular type of 
regime.  Instead, it is simply an aspect of what it means to rule the many, whose power and 
virtue always outweigh the power and virtue of the few.  Effective rule of the many requires 
effectively indebting oneself to the many, who are complicit in their own subjection.  This is one 
of Machiavelli’s most significant lessons for modern politics, and it will become crucial to later 
modern ideals of political sovereignty.  In the absence of external reservoirs of authority, such as 
divine investiture, righteousness, or venerable tradition, the ability to effectively and durably rule 
the many originates in the many itself.  Thus, any ruler, even an absolute or tyrannical ruler, will 
be ultimately indebted to the people for his or her rule.  
Machiavelli’s most concrete advice concerns the ruler’s negotiation of his indebtedness 
to the people.  In order to rely upon the people’s power and virtue, the ruler must keep his 
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subjects satisfied and “united and faithful” to his rule.360  To this end, he should refrain from 
oppressing the people and, when cruelty is necessary for effective rule, this should be minimally 
offensive and “turned to as much utility for the subjects as one can.”361  On other occasions, he 
should reward his subjects for their service to the polity.362  Additionally, the ruler should 
cultivate the people’s love, or, if this is fickle or impossible, at least their respectful fear—but 
never their hatred.363  This requires respecting the settled norms, customs, and culture of the 
ruled.364  Finally, and above all, the ruler must continually ensure that his dependence upon the 
people is mirrored by its dependence on him.  Machiavelli writes, “A wise prince must think of a 
way by which his citizens, always in every quality of time, have need of the state [status: rule] 
and of himself; and then they will always be faithful to him.”365  By making himself needed, the 
ruler does not free himself of his dependence on the ruled.  Rather, he doubles his indebtedness, 
insofar as “the nature of men is to be obligated as much by benefits they give as by benefits they 
receive.”366 Nevertheless, the mutual obligation of the ruler and ruled prevents either from being 
obligated to “the fortune and force of someone else,” i.e. to a foreign ruler.367 
All of this is necessary to prevent the ruled from turning on the ruler, and all of it falls 
under the activity that Machiavelli calls ‘government’.  He writes: 
In substance, government is nothing more than the control of subjects in such a 
way that they cannot and must not harm you; this is achieved either by making 
yourself completely safe from them, by taking away from them every means from 
doing you harm, or by bringing them benefits in such a way that it would not be 
reasonable for them to desire some change in fortune.368 
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For Machiavelli, government simply is the negotiation of the ruler’s indebtedness to the ruled, 
from whom the he derives the power and virtue necessary to maintain his stato.  In the passage 
above, Machiavelli apparently suggests two ways of doing this.  However, the second is far 
superior to the first, because the means by which subjects might do harm to their ruler are the 
means by which they become “good arms” when they are well ruled.  The power and virtue of 
the ruled always poses a latent threat to the ruler, but this threat cannot be eliminated without 
eliminating the power and virtue upon which the ruler depends.  To govern well, then, requires 
ensuring that this dependence is always mutual.  For Machiavelli, a lasting and independent stato 
is one in which the mutual—but not equal, and not obvious—interdependence of the people and 
prince can be preserved. 
In short, Machiavelli’s “new princes”—the founders and refounders of polities—embody 
both the imperiousness and the indebtedness that I have argued are characteristic of modern 
sovereignty.  Reading The Prince and the Discourses together, it becomes apparent that 
Machiavelli considers founding and ruling to be continuous activities.  The greatest rulers of the 
greatest polities are all “new princes,” because the renewers of republics face the same 
difficulties, and must employ the same tactics, as the founders of principalities.369  In both cases, 
the founder’s task is to give form to a population that is disparate and disorganized, either 
because it lacks a state altogether, or because it is the corrupt material of a state in need of 
refounding.370  In either case, the founder must act “alone” to “assume sole authority” and, with 
“enormous power” and “exceptional ability,” “turn to extraordinary methods, such as violence or 
arms, and… become, above all else, prince of the city and arrange it as one wishes.”371  Here is 
the imperiousness that is characteristic of the modern ideal of sovereignty—the supremacy and 
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independence that enable a sovereign authority to constitute its own collective subject, 
apparently without prior authorization.  It characterizes Machiavelli’s great founders and great 
rulers alike.      
However, if ruling is continuous with founding, then founding is continuous with ruling, 
and Machiavelli’s remarks on rulers apply to founders as well, just as his remarks on founding 
apply to rulers.  As I have shown, Machiavelli is clear that rulers depend, for their own power 
and virtue, and their own arms, upon the people over whom they rule.  Where divine investiture 
and natural right are absent, the power and virtue of the few resides in the many, and rulers 
maintain their stato by negotiating their indebtedness to the ruled.  Moreover, it is not simply a 
population or mass that rulers depend upon, but the population or mass “all together,” as 
Machiavelli puts it in a crucial passage.372  Effective and lasting rule requires the power and 
virtue that comes, not from individual subjects or a disparate population, but from a united and 
ordered collective subject—a constituted people.  Here is the indebtedness that is characteristic 
of modern sovereignty—the dependence of every sovereign authority upon its collective subject.  
In the first half of this dissertation, I argued that there is a paradoxical tension between 
sovereignty’s characteristic imperiousness and indebtedness, insofar as a sovereign depends, for 
its constitutive authority, upon the collective subject that it constitutes.  Although he lacks a 
modern concept of sovereignty, Machiavelli explores this tension by casting it as an aporia of 
political founding.  Whereas rulers have access to the power and virtue of the unified people, 
political founders do not, because the powerful and virtuous people does not exist prior to the act 
of founding that gives form and unity to a population.  In the case of “altogether new” polities, 
the population is unformed and, in some of Machiavelli’s examples, “enslaved and oppressed” or 
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“dispersed.”373  In the case of existing polities in need of renewal, the refounder cannot count 
upon the people’s power and virtue, because “the material is corrupt” and “the social fabric has 
broken down over time.”374   In both cases, the (re)founder requires exceptional power and virtue, 
and good arms, to impose form upon the population, but the one source of power, virtue, and 
arms that Machiavelli continually emphasizes—the united and ordered people—is as yet absent. 
Generally and for the most part, Machiavelli’s examples of “new princes” do not 
illustrate where, other than from the constituted people itself, founders may obtain the power and 
virtue necessary to single-handedly take over an entire population, give it a form and constitution 
that it will likely resist, and thereby ascend from the status of private individual to great prince.  
The one apparent exception is the example of Moses who, as “a mere executor of things that had 
been ordered for him by God,” received his power and virtue from ‘on high’.375  But, for 
precisely this reason, Machiavelli disqualifies Moses’s methods from those that may be imitated 
by his readers: “one should not reason about Moses.”376  Instead, Moses is invoked as an 
illustration of what, in the absence of divine authority, modern founders must accomplished by 
secular means.  Nevertheless, Machiavelli is notably silent regarding all secular sources of 
power, virtue, and good arms other than the constituted people.  This silence affirms what he 
says in one of the most important chapters of The Prince, just after invoking Moses: “Nothing is 
more difficult to handle, more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to manage than to put 
oneself at the head of introducing new orders.”377  In a modern and secular age, where power and 
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virtue reside in the people rather than in natural or divine right, founding a people through power 
and virtue is an aporetic task.378   
This aporia appears twice in Machiavelli’s major works.  The most obvious appearance is 
in the Discourses, in a chapter devoted to the relationship between commanders and soldiers.  
Just after declaring that exceptional troops and exceptional commanders reciprocally “have 
need” of one another, Machiavelli writes, “It is possible to consider something else: is it easier 
for a good commander to create a good army or for a good army to create a good 
commander?”379  The question is interesting because the interdependence of commanders and 
armies is Machiavelli’s synecdoche for the aporetic interdependence of ruler and ruled, founder 
and founded.  Like a political founder, the commander unifies and orders the army but, like a 
constituted people, the unified and ordered army is the source of the commander’s ability to 
unify and order.380 
Machiavelli’s curious answers to his own question affirm this aporetic interdependence.  
At first, he quickly and confidently answers in a way that contradicts his explicit remarks about 
founders, but affirms what I have noted regarding the dependence of rulers upon the ruled.  He 
writes, “On this topic, I would say that this question is settled, because it is much easier for many 
good men to find or instruct one man so that he may become good than it is for one to do so with 
many.”381  However, he immediately gives three examples that all contradict this “settled” 
answer.  Two of the examples are clearly examples of good commanders creating good armies: 
Sempronius Gracchus “in a brief time created an excellent army,” and Pelopidas and 
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Epaminodas “in very little time created out of Theban peasants excellent soldiers.”382  The 
remaining example is the only one that affirms Machiavelli’s answer: the “inexperienced” 
Lucullus was made into a good commander by his soldiers.383  However, this example is peculiar 
because it is false; Machiavelli misrepresents history here.384  Lucullus was a good commander 
who created a good army out of bad soldiers, according to Plutarch’s Lives, which is 
Machiavelli’s source for his other discussion of Lucullus in the Discourses.385  These examples 
unsettle the quickly settled question.   
Machiavelli does not note his self-contradiction, but he immediately reconsiders his 
answer: “Hence, the matter is even, because one good thing can find another.”386  But this 
conclusion is also undermined by the previous examples.  Machiavelli offers a third answer, this 
time in a more hesitant tone: “I believe more confidence can be placed in a commander who has 
the time to teach his men and the opportunity to arm them than in an insolent army with a leader 
created by the army on the spur of the moment.”387  In a single paragraph, then, he affirms all 
three possible answers to the question he posed.  There is no settled answer, and no clear way to 
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ground the interdependence that characterizes the commander and commanded, the ruler and 
ruled, or the constituting founder and the constituted people. 
Attention to this aporia enables a new reading of the final chapter of The Prince, in which 
Machiavelli exhorts his reader, ostensibly Lorenzo de’ Medici, to constitute anew the people of 
Italy.  As discussed above, the task is to impose form onto the matter of a dispersed and 
oppressed population, and successful completion of the task will result in a great polity and a 
great prince.  But with what power, virtue, and good arms, can Lorenzo impose form upon the 
Italian population and constitute a new stato?  The preceding twenty-five chapters make the case 
that a ruler’s power, virtue, and good arms come from the constituted people itself.  Power, 
virtue, and good arms, in other words, are the effect of stato, in the double sense of rule and what 
is ruled.  What power, virtue, and good arms, then, are available to the founder of the constituted 
people?  The dedicatory letter preceding the text notes that Lorenzo is not yet great, and the text 
itself makes clear that princely greatness depends upon founding a great polity.388  How then, can 
Lorenzo be great enough to found a great polity and constitute a great people?  The text ends 
with an exhortation to constitute the people via the kind of “power and virtue” that can only 
come from the constituted people itself.389  This aporia of founding is a direct antecedent to the 
paradoxical interrelation of constitution and authorization that characterizes the modern ideal of 
sovereignty.  
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Part II: Rousseau 
 
The paradox of sovereignty appears in Rousseau’s work as a problem inimical to popular 
sovereignty, and it affects a people’s self-constitution, rather than its constitution by a princely 
founder.  Nevertheless, Rousseau’s treatment of the paradox very much resembles Machiavelli’s 
illustrations of the prince’s and people’s interdependence, and there is evidence in On the Social 
Contract to suggest that Rousseau greatly admired both The Prince and the Discourses.390  
Questions of influence aside, however, it makes sense that Machiavelli and Rousseau would be 
similarly interested in the same paradox, insofar as it marks a tension, but also a continuity, 
between the most absolutist and popular aspects of sovereign authority.  The paradox of 
sovereignty is neither a paradox of absolute sovereignty, nor a paradox of popular sovereignty.  
Rather, the paradox is inherent to modern sovereignty itself, insofar as sovereignty is an ideal of 
authority that constitutes the very collective subject—the people—from which it emanates.   
 In On the Social Contract, Rousseau presents popular sovereignty as a political ideal that 
unites self-legislation and self-constitution.  The social contract, through which every individual 
“puts his person and his full power in common under the supreme direction of the general will,” 
is the origin of a political association and the “act by which a people is a people.”391  However, 
this act is not consummated, and the association does not become a sovereign people, until the 
association consults the general will and legislates for itself.  There are thus two stages through 
which the people constitutes itself.  During the first, individuals contract together and alienate 
their rights to the association.  During the second, the “nascent people” gives itself laws 
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according to the general will.392  It is only in the second stage that the people fully constitutes 
itself as a body politic that is both sovereign and subject.393  
 By making self-legislation key to the “fulfillment” of the merely “ideal and conventional” 
body politic established by the social contract, Rousseau connects authority and constitution in 
the way that is characteristic of the modern ideal of sovereignty.394  In the second stage of self-
constitution, sovereign authority constitutes its own collective subject.  Here, however, the 
people is both sovereign and subject.  In order to adequately express the way that the political 
association gives laws to itself, and thereby constitutes itself, Rousseau characterizes the 
association and its members in terms of their active (authoring legislation) and passive (receiving 
legislation) capacities.  He writes: 
The public person thus formed by the union of all the others formerly assumed the 
name City and now assumes that of Republic or body politic, which its members 
call State when it is passive, Sovereign when it is active…  As for the associates, 
they collectively assume the name people and individually call themselves 
Citizens as participants in the sovereign authority, and Subjects as subjected to the 
laws of the State (51).  
 
The association formed by the social contract does not become Sovereign or State, and its 
members do not become Citizens or Subjects, until the association begins actively legislating for 
itself, on the basis of its general will.  That activity is the expression of sovereignty (“the 
declaration of this will is an act of sovereignty and constitutes law”), and it is the means by 
which the association, in its capacity as Sovereign, constitutes itself as its own collective subject, 
in its capacity as State.395 
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It is conceivable that the two stages of collective self-constitution could be fulfilled 
together, or at least that the body politic could begin to legislate for itself immediately after 
forming through the social contract.  Rousseau’s various remarks, however, suggest that the two 
stages are indeed distinct.396  This thought is most explicit in his early draft of On the Social 
Contract, known as The Geneva Manuscript.  He writes:       
Since the social union has a determinate object, its fulfillment must be sought as 
soon as the union is formed…  Laws are the sole motivation of the body politic, 
which is active and sensitive only through them.  Without laws, the newly formed 
State is only a dead body without a soul; it exists but cannot act.  For it is not 
enough for everyone to be subject to the general will; to follow it, one must know 
it.  From this arises the necessity for legislation.397  
 
After the original social contract, the people must give itself laws in order to fully constitute itself 
as a collective sovereign and collective subject.398  This gap between the contract and the 
beginning of self-legislation is important, because it is the site of Rousseau’s engagement with 
the paradox of sovereignty.   
In book II of On the Social Contract, Rousseau raises serious doubts about the people’s 
ability to collectively exercise sovereignty and constitute itself as its own collective subject.  He 
writes: 
The People subject to the laws ought to be their author; only those who are 
associating may regulate the conditions of the society; but how will they regulate 
them?  …How will a blind multitude, which often does not know what it wills 
because it rarely knows what is good for it, carry out an undertaking as great, as 
difficult, as a system of legislation?399 
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The issue is not that the people lacks a general will, but that it does not recognize what it wills.  
Consequently, the people “must be made to see objects as they are,… shown the good path 
which it is seeking, secured against seduction by particular wills.”400  Individually, the members 
of the people “must be obligated to conform their wills to their reason;” collectively, the people 
“must be taught to know what it wills.”401  Until this is accomplished, the people cannot legislate 
for itself and thereby constitute itself as a popular sovereign—i.e., as both its own sovereign and 
subject. 
 However, the force that could teach the people what it wills, thereby enabling it to 
legislate for itself and fully constitute itself, is precisely what the people lacks, namely law.  As 
Rousseau writes in The Geneva Manuscript, law is the “celestial voice that tells each citizen the 
precepts of public reason, and teaches him to behave according to the maxims of his own 
judgment and not be constantly in contradiction with himself.”402  Law is a transformative force 
that would enable the people to know the general will, but the people cannot give itself law until 
it knows the general will.403  Bonnie Honig expresses this chicken-or-egg problem well: 
In order for there to be a people well formed enough for good law-making, there 
must be good law, for how else will the people be well formed?  The problem is: 
Where would that good law come from absent an already well-formed, virtuous 
people?  …In the paradoxical moment of founding, however, no member of the 
community can yet be said to possess the needed perspective, which can only 
come post hoc, to form the rules or identify or advocate for a collective good by 
which the people need to have already been acculturated in order to be not a 
“blind multitude” but a “people” capable of the autonomous exercise of popular 
sovereignty.404  
                                                
400 Ibid. 
401 Ibid. 
402 Rousseau, Geneva Manuscript, 177-8.  Cf. Social Contract, 68-9. 
403 Laws are capable of “transforming each individual who by himself is a perfect and solitary whole into a part 
of a larger whole from which that individual would as it were receive his life and his being.” Rousseau, Social 
Contract, 69. 
404 Bonnie Honig, Emergency Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 15, 19.  Honig’s discussion of 
Rousseau, here and in an earlier essay, have been very influential on my own reading of Rousseau, and my attention 
to political paradoxes more generally.  While I share Honig’s thought that paradoxes like Rousseau’s might be sites 
of democratic (and potentially radically democratic) contest, I do not want to downplay the possibility that they may 
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The circular logic that prevents the people from legislating for itself also prevents the people 
from fully constituting itself, insofar as the exercise of sovereign authority, expressed in law, is 
necessary to consummate the foundational contract by which individuals unite as a political 
association.405  The paradox of self-legislation is a paradox of self-constitution.   
The problem of the people’s initial self-legislation is structured much like the problem of 
the good commander and good army in Machiavelli’s Discourses.406  Whereas there, the 
commander is distinct from the army that he commands and constitutes, here the Sovereign 
(made up of citizens) is simply a different aspect of the commanded and constituted State (made 
up of subjects).  That is the difference that popular sovereignty makes—the people is both 
collective sovereign and collective subject.  However, because “the former has need of the latter 
and the latter of the former,” the question is the same for Rousseau as it is for Machiavelli: How 
to command and constitute if, within this particular relation of mutual dependence, commanding 
and constituting presuppose the very effects that they would bring about?407  In Rousseau’s 
version of the paradox of sovereignty, the people must perform the role of sovereign by giving 
itself law in order to fully constitute itself as a people that knows the general will.  However, it 
must already be fully constituted as a people that knows the general will in order to give itself 
law.  If the accomplishment of each task presupposes the accomplishment of the other, how can 
either be accomplished?   
Rousseau’s proposed solution initially appears to sacrifice popular sovereignty in the 
                                                
also be sites of autocratic (and potentially radically autocratic) closure.  This is why, in the next section, I follow 
Rousseau’s paradox with the paradoxical continuity linking Sieyès and Bonaparte.    
405 The problem is circular because, in order to achieve popular sovereignty, the people is supposed to legislate 
for itself and thereby constitute itself as a people bound by the general will, and knowledge of the general will is 
both the condition and the effect of legislation.  With the introduction of the Lawgiver, who is not of the people, 
Rousseau opens up the circle by dropping the supposition that the people must initially legislate for itself.  This, as 
we shall see, does not solve the problem.    
406 See pages 140-2 above. 
407 Machiavelli, Discourses, 292. 
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name of sovereignty itself, by transforming the paradox of self-constitution into something that 
even more resembles Machiavelli’s aporias.  He introduces a god-like “Lawgiver” to initially 
give the people the laws that will, over time, transform the human nature of its members into a 
civic disposition, teach the people what it wills, and enable the association to finally constitute 
itself as a Sovereign and State.  Importantly, the Lawgiver is not a member of the people, and he 
does not exercise sovereign power.  Rousseau writes: “The office which gives the republic its 
constitution has no place in its constitution.  It is a singular and superior function that has nothing 
to do with human empire… [H]e who drafts the laws has, then, or should have no legislative 
right.”408  The exteriority of the Lawgiver seems to solve the chicken-or-egg problem of the 
people’s self-legislation by importing, from somewhere beyond the “blind multitude,” the 
“celestial voice” that will initially make the people good, thereby enabling it to give itself good 
laws and eventually achieve sovereignty for itself.409 
This apparent solution is problematic, however, for several reasons.410  Most obviously, it 
would seem to make the realization of civic freedom and equality contingent upon a 
heteronomous act of constitution by an actor that is radically superior to the members of the 
association.  Like a divine watchmaker, the Lawgiver designs the republic, starts it running, and 
then exits.  There is no logical inconsistency in this solution, but it does eliminate the exercise of 
popular sovereignty at the very moment when the people is constituted as sovereign and subject, 
and this seems at odds with Rousseau’s ideals of self-determination, self-legislation, and self-
constitution.  Additionally, the introduction of the god-like legislator seems to give up on 
                                                
408 Rousseau, Social Contract, 69-70.  Rousseau consistently describes the Lawgiver as foreign to the republic.  
For an analysis of the Lawgiver’s exteriority, see Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner, 18-25.  
409 Rousseau, Social Contract, 69, and Geneva Manuscripts, 177-8. 
410 According to Christopher Bertram, there is a potential regress problem here.  The Lawgiver must come from 
somewhere with good laws, but “how did the people of the lawgiver’s native country get themselves guided to just 
laws?” Bertram, Rousseau, 134.  Bertram makes a convincing case that Rousseau was himself aware of this problem 
(133-5).  He also outlines a problem similar to the one I describe, which he calls the “problem of natural inequality” 
(Ibid.).   
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Rousseau’s method of “taking men as they are” in order to ground political ideals in political 
reality.411   
Rousseau himself seems skeptical that the introduction of the Lawgiver solves the 
original chicken-or-egg problem.412  Most importantly, he suggests that the Lawgiver cannot 
simply impose the gift of law upon a passive people; it remains up to the people to actively 
accept the law.  The Lawgiver must “prove his mission” to the people, which must recognize, 
understand, accept, and “freely obey” the laws given to it.413  It is unlikely that the people will do 
so, however, given the obstacles that require the external introduction of law in the first place, 
notably that the “blind multitude… rarely knows what is good for it.”414  Rousseau suggests that 
the Lawgiver’s gift will be refused for this very reason: “The wise who would speak to the 
vulgar in their own rather than in the vulgar language will not be understood by them.”415  The 
people that needs good laws is no more likely to understand and accept them than it is to author 
them itself.   
Because the gift of law depends upon the people’s reception of it, the introduction of the 
Lawgiver only replaces the circular problem of  autonomous legislation and constitution with a 
problem of heteronomous legislation and constitution.  In a passage that succinctly expresses the 
problem and, more generally, the circular logic of modern sovereignty, Rousseau writes:    
For a nascent people to be capable of appreciating sound maxims of politics and 
of following the fundamental rules of reason of State, the effect would have to 
become the cause, the social spirit, which is to be the work of the institution 
would have to preside over the institution itself, and men would have to be prior 
to laws what they ought to become by means of them.416 
 
                                                
411 Rousseau, Social Contract, 41. 
412 “So that one finds at one and the same time two apparently incompatible things in the work of legislation: an 
undertaking beyond human force, and to execute it an authority that is nil” (Ibid., 70). 
413 Ibid., 71. 
414 Rousseau, Social Contract, 68. 
415 Ibid., 70. 
416 Ibid., 70-1, italics added. 
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Despite the exteriority and superiority of the Lawgiver, the chicken-or-egg problem remains.  
The “blind multitude” that cannot give itself laws until it is legally reformed also cannot receive 
laws until it is legally reformed.  The people that needs the gift of law cannot accept it; the 
people that can accept it will not need it.  The people’s self-constitution remains incomplete, 
because the act of founding remains at least partly, but importantly, in the hands of the “nascent” 
people.   
 Even if the Lawgiver claims to be—or indeed is—ordained by a divine authority, this 
authority must still be recognized by the people, or it will not accept the law.417  Rousseau writes, 
“The great soul of the Lawgiver is the true miracle which must prove his mission.  Any man can 
carve tablets of stone, bribe an oracle, feign secret dealings with some divinity, train a bird to 
speak in his ear, or find other crude ways to impress the people.”418  Because it is up to the people 
to distinguish the true source of law from its imposters, it is ultimately the people that performs 
the act of authorization that enables the Lawgiver to give it law.419  As Honig puts it, “The 
lawgiver may offer to found a people, he may attempt to shape them, but in the end it is up to the 
people themselves to accept or reject his advances.  They may be dependent upon his good 
offices, but he is no less dependent upon their good opinion.”420  Until it is properly founded, 
however, the people cannot properly authorize the Lawgiver to found it.  Thus, like 
Machiavelli’s commander and army, the Lawgiver and the people “have need” of one another in 
                                                
417 Ibid., 71.  In terms of the account of authority that I sketched in Chapter 1, the people must recognize the 
Lawgiver as a legitimate source of command.  Proof of his divine mission—such as symbols of divinity, the 
performance of miracles, divine knowledge, etc—would be the bases of the people’s recognition of his authority.  
Other bases could be the superior intellectual and moral virtue that Rousseau attributes to him (68-70).  These bases 
do not themselves authorize the Lawgiver.  Like symbolic capital, they are the reasons (perhaps implicit or even 
non-intellectual reasons) that the people recognizes the legitimacy of the Lawgiver’s command, and it is this act of 
recognition that does the work of authorization.  See pages 42-3, above.     
418 Ibid., 71 
419 Rousseau quotes Machiavelli’s Discourses here, approving the use of political theology to secure obedience 
(71).  As we have seen, Machiavelli knew well that securing obedience entailed making oneself dependent upon the 
obedient subjects. 
420 Honig, Emergency Politics, 21, italics added. 
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order to constitute each other qua legislator and collective subject, qua founder and state: “The 
effect would have to become the cause.”421  That is the paradox of sovereignty: the imperious 
authority that would constitute a people is ultimately indebted to the constituted people for the 
authority required by the act of constitution.   
 
Part III: Constituent Power 
 
In very different ways, the writings of Machiavelli and Rousseau illustrate the mutual 
indebtedness of ruler and ruled in an age when divine right and hereditary privilege have proven 
inadequate bases for supreme authority.  Machiavelli’s emphasis on rule by power and virtue 
does not yet amount to a modern concept of sovereign authority.  However, Machiavelli’s work 
clearly suggests that effective rule, regardless of its legitimacy, requires the complicity of the 
ruled in their own subjection.  The ruler and ruled have need of one another, and this mutual 
dependence presents the initiation of rule—the constitution of stato, in its double sense—as an 
aporetic task.  The modern ideal of sovereignty incorporates this aporia as a paradoxical tension 
between a sovereign’s constitutive authority and its dependence, for that authority, upon the 
collective subject that it constitutes.  
By the time that Rousseau writes On the Social Contract, the participation of the ruled in 
their own subjection has been widely (but not uniformly) recognized as a legitimate basis of 
sovereign authority: “The People subject to the laws ought to be their author.”422  Yet, even 
Rousseau’s passionate commitment to popular sovereignty does not prevent him from 
introducing the solitary and exceptional Lawgiver.  Rousseau resorts to this moment of 
                                                
421 Rousseau, Social Contract, 71.  
422 Ibid., 68. 
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heteronomy in order to avoid the paradox of sovereignty, which first appears in his work in a 
distinctly popular form, as a vicious circle that prevents the people from its initial act of 
sovereign self-constitution.423  The introduction of the Lawgiver, however, merely recasts the 
paradox as a vicious circle of unpopular sovereignty that, much like the mutual dependence 
theorized by Machiavelli, reveals even heteronomous sovereign constitution to be an aporetic 
task.  The paradox remains because the act of constitution, if it is to be effectively authoritative 
(that is, if it is to be truly hetero-nomos, rather than simply a violent imposition), ultimately 
requires authorization by the collective subject that it constitutes. 
In his political writings, Emmanuel Sieyès attempts to retrieve popular sovereignty from 
this heteronomous foundation by substituting a collective actor—the nation—for Rousseau’s 
Lawgiver.424  Like the Lawgiver, the nation is intended to be the unconstituted, unauthorized, and 
unsubjected source of constitution, authorization, and subjection.  Also like the Lawgiver, the 
nation is a singular, unitary founder that remains distinct from what it founds.  Unlike the 
Lawgiver, however, the nation is not foreign to the people that it will constitute.  It is the people, 
albeit in a pre-political, unconstituted, but naturally unified state.  It is, to use the language that 
                                                
423 The foreignness of the Lawgiver is essential to Rousseau’s attempt to dissolve the paradox.  Sieyès’s own 
solution to the paradox—the introduction of the nation as a pre-political site of sovereignty—is characterized by a 
similar exteriority, as are the other potential solutions discussed in the following chapters.  
424 An in depth study of the relations between sovereignty and nationality, or of nationalism’s role in shaping 
modern sovereignty, is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  However, I intend this discussion of Sieyès to indicate 
one direction such a study might take, and to foreground future work on nationalism.  Sieyès’s writing is particularly 
illuminating because he explicitly intends his concept of the nation to side-step a version of the paradox of 
sovereignty (the “petition of principle or a vicious circle” inherent in the idea of a constituted constituent power) 
(Ibid., 139).  As I argue, this maneuver fails because the nation itself is a political artifact rather than a natural or 
pre-political community.  In other words, it does not fall outside the circle of authorization and constitution that is 
essential to sovereignty.  However, the nation’s role in Sieyès’s theory, and its failure, are suggestive of the ways 
that nationality may, in other contexts, unintentionally hide the paradox of sovereignty by displacing it onto the 
concept of the nation, so that the sovereign’s collective subject, the people, is originally defined by ethno-national 
boundaries that appear to be prior to, or separate from, sovereign acts of constitution and authorization.  
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Sieyès introduced to modern political thought, the people’s constituent power, the origin of 
popular sovereignty.425 
 Constituent power is the ability to constitute a legal-political order.426  Because the concept 
of constituent power was articulated during the democratic revolutions of the 18th century, it is 
usually understood as the ability of a collective to constitute itself as its own supreme political 
authority through the foundation of a legal-political structure.427  As such, “unformed constituent 
power is… the condition of possibility of the modern idea of popular sovereignty.”428  This is a 
potentially revolutionary power, insofar as the ability to found a new legal-political order always 
latently or openly threatens to overturn existing orders.429  As Arendt writes, “Revolution on the 
one hand, and constitution and foundation on the other, are like correlative conjunctions.”430  
Constituent power threatens constituted power—the institutional power of existing legal-political 
orders—precisely because it is the ability to constitute constituted power anew.  
 By locating constituent power in the French nation, Sieyès attempts to transform the nation 
into a revolutionary force capable of constituting a legitimate legal-political order in place of the 
                                                
425 Sieyès, “What is the Third Estate?” in Political Writings, M. Sonenscher, ed.  (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003), 
136. 
426 “Constituent power” also sometimes refers to the agent that exercises constituent power, and “constituted 
power” sometimes refers to the legal-political order constituted  by constituent power.  
427 See Andreas Kalyvas, “Popular Sovereignty, Democracy and the Constituent Power” Constellations 12 
(2005): 223, 226; A. Negri, Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State, M. Boscagali, trans 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); M. Louglin and N. Walker, eds. The Paradox of 
Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
428 James Tully, “The Imperialism of Modern Constitutional Democracy,” in Paradox of Constitutionalism, 320.  
Constituent power is also latent in instances of absolutist or otherwise unpopular sovereignty, for example in a 
republican monarchy. 
429 “We may understand the exercise of the constituent power as a constitutional revolution where political 
energies are transferred into legal institutions.”  Ulrich Preuss, “The Exercise of Constituent Power in Central and 
Eastern Europe” in Paradox of Constitutionalism, 213.  For a more radical view of constituent power’s 
revolutionary potential, see Negri, Insurgencies.  Its importance to revolutionary thought notwithstanding, 
constituent power may also be exercised in the reconstitution, reauthorization, and perpetuation of an existing 
political order.  For this reason, not only revolutionary manifestos, but also actual constitutions themselves, refer to 
the power of a constituent agent—usually “the people”—as a criterion of political legitimacy and a renewable 
source of political authorization.  Moreover, like any revolutionary concept or ideal, the concept of political power 
can be powerfully appropriated and articulated by counter-revolutionary forces; it has no essential link to revolution.  
430 Arendt, On Revolution, 117.  
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ancien régime.  Writing toward the beginning of the French Revolution, he condemns the Estates 
General of 1789 for failing to represent or incorporate the unprivileged majority of the French 
nation.  He argues that only the entire united nation—as opposed to any government or 
constitutional committee that merely represents a part of the nation—has the ability, right, and 
obligation to constitute a new and legitimate government.  He writes, “If we lack a constitution, 
then a constitution must be made, and the Nation alone has the right to do so…  The Nation is 
always the master of every reform to its constitution.”431  In other words, it is the nation itself that 
must exercise constituent power.432  Insofar as the nation is the people, Sieyès’s invocation of the 
national constituent power is an appeal to the basic premises of popular sovereignty.  
It would appear that the initial exercise of constituent power, by which the nation gives 
itself a constituted, legal-political form, falls into the problem that confronts Rousseau’s people 
at the second stage of its self-constitution.  Recall that, for Rousseau, an exercise of the general 
will is necessary for the associated people to fully constitute itself as Sovereign and State—but 
“how will a blind multitude, which often does not know what it wills,” be able to accomplish 
this?433  In his study of contemporary constituent power, Ulrich Preuss poses Rousseau’s 
dilemma as a problem for popular constitution in general: 
How can it be explained that the unorganized, atomized, and hence impotent mass 
of individuals—in fact, the opposite of a ‘We’—is vested with the capacity to 
transform itself into an organized political entity?  …If the constitution is a device 
which empowers a multitude of individuals to act collectively and to develop the 
capacity of self-determination, how can the preconstitutional and un- and 
disorganized multitude arrogate the capacity of constituting themselves as a 
Self?434 
 
This crucial problem expresses a version of the paradox of sovereignty, insofar as the multitude’s 
                                                
431 Sieyès, “Third Estate?,” 133, 141. 
432 Ibid., 92-162.  See especially 133-141. 
433 Rousseau, Social Contract, 68. 
434 Ulrich Preuss, “The Exercise of Constituent Power,” 213. 
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self-constitution depends upon acts of authorization and constitution that each require the other.  
However, Sieyès intends his concept of the nation to solve this problem.  On his view, although 
the nation is by definition pre-constitutional, it is never a “blind multitude,” an atomistic 
aggregate of individuals, or association without a general will.  Rather, the nation is always-
already united, albeit in an unconstituted and pre-political sense, by the common will of its 
members.   
According to Sieyès, even at its most disorganized, the nation is an association of 
individuals bound together by a shared aim: political constitution.  This aim distinguishes the 
nation from a multitude; even before political constitution is accomplished, the nation possesses 
and knows its “natural, common will.”435  Importantly, there is no political mechanism of 
association: “If a nation had to wait for a positive mode of being in order to become a nation, it 
would simply never have had an existence.  A nation is formed solely by natural law.”436  
Because the nation is prior to any constitutional form, there is neither a regress of constitutors 
nor a circle of self-constitution here: “A nation is all that it can be simply by virtue of being what 
it is.”437  The nation’s natural, pre-constitutional, and pre-political unity enables it to give itself a 
political constitution in a way that a multitude’s disunity would prevent.   
In this regard, the nation is a synthesis of Rousseau’s blind multitude and Lawgiver.  Like 
the Lawgiver, the nation does not need to be constituted as a coherent whole, so it does not 
invoke the problem of the multitude’s self-constitution.  However, unlike the Lawgiver, the 
nation is not fundamentally other than the individuals that it would constitute.  ‘The nation’ is 
                                                
435 Sieyès, “Third Estate,” 138.  “In the first of these epochs, one can imagine a more or less substantial number 
of individuals seeking to unite.  This fact alone makes them a nation.  They have all the rights of a nation: it is 
simply a matter of exercising them” (Ibid.). 
436 Ibid., 136-7. 
437 Ibid.  Cf. 138-9: “How can it be imagined that a constituted body can decide upon its constitution?...  Even if 
the Nation had held regular sessions of the Estates-General, it would not be up to this constituted body to pronounce 
on a dispute affecting its own constitution.  To do so would be a petition of principle or a vicious circle.”  
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the name of the latent people’s natural unity, and although this unity is importantly pre-
constitutional, it is not foreign to the constituted people in the way that the Lawgiver is.438  Nor is 
it distinct from the people in the way that Machiavelli’s commanders and princes are.  Thus, the 
nation’s exercise of constituent power is not a foundational moment of heteronomy, and it avoids 
the problems of the Lawgiver’s gift.  Neither blind multitude nor foreign legislator, Sieyès’s 
nation unites aspects of both to avoid the problems of each.  
The nation can play this constituent role because it is essentially exterior to the entire 
realm of political organization and positive law.  Sieyès writes: 
The nation exists prior to everything; it is the origin of everything…  A nation 
never leaves the state of nature and, amidst so many perils, it can never have too 
many possible ways of expressing its will…  A nation is independent of all forms 
and, however it may will, it is enough for its will to be made known for all 
positive law to fall silent in its presence, because it is the source and the supreme 
master of all positive law.439  
 
Although Sieyès identifies the nation with the politically excluded and unprivileged Third Estate, 
the nation’s exteriority is not a contingent effect of the existing legal-political order.  Rather, the 
nation is beyond all legal-political constitutions.  From outside the realm of politics and positive 
law, the nation delegates a body of “extraordinary representatives” to serve as “a surrogate for 
the Nation in its independence from all constitutional forms.”440  These representative convene a 
constitutional assembly and constitute a new government.  In this way, constituent power 
engenders constituted power—the nation founds a government—without ever leaving the state of 
nature.   
 Sieyès is clear that the constituted power of the government continually depends upon the 
                                                
438 As Tully writes, “‘Constituent powers’ refers to these powers in abstraction or separation from any specific 
form they take in order to be exercised.  They take different forms in different constitutional forms (since the 
constitutional form is the form that the constitutional powers take).” Tully, “Imperialism,” in Paradox of 
Constitutionalism, 320. 
439 Ibid, 136-8, italics added. 
440 Ibid, 139. 
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constituent power of the nation.  He writes, “The body entrusted with the legislative power, or 
the exercise of the common will, exists only by way of the mode of being which the nation 
decided to give it.  It is nothing without its constitutive forms; it acts, proceeds, or commands 
only by way of these forms.”441  Whatever authority the constituted order enjoys, it does so 
because it serves the nation that constitutes it; “All parts of a government are answerable to and, 
in the last analysis, dependent upon the nation,” which remains “master of every reform to its 
constitution.”442  Because constitution may be a matter of continual reconstitution, constituted 
power continually depends upon constituent power.   
 However, Sieyès is emphatic that the reverse is not true.  The nation is not subject to the 
government that it constitutes, and constituent power never depends upon constituted power.  Of 
course, the individual members of the nation are, as citizens, obligated by the positive law that is 
institutionalized in the government; they are subject to constituted power.  The united nation 
itself, however, is not.  Its “natural, common will,” remains “free and independent of all civil 
forms,” including those that it constitutes.443  Sieyès writes: 
It would be ridiculous to suppose that the nation itself was bound by the 
formalities or the constitution to which it had subjected those it had mandated…  
Not only is a nation not subject to a constitution, it cannot and should not be…  A 
nation cannot alienate or prohibit its right to will and, whatever its will might be, 
it cannot lose its right to change it as soon as its interests require it.444  
 
Because it “never leaves the state of nature,” the nation remains radically exterior to the 
government that it constitutes.445  This ensures a unilateral relation of dependence: the constituted 
government is subject to and dependent upon the nation that constitutes it, but the nation itself is 
essentially and finally independent of what it constitutes. 
                                                
441 Ibid, 135.  “Government can exercise real power only insofar as it is constitutional” (137). 
442 Ibid, 136, 141. 
443 Ibid., 138, 137. 
444  Ibid 136-7. 
445 Ibid., 136. 
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By imagining the nation as naturally united and fully exterior to the political realm, 
Sieyès sidesteps another crucial problem of modern political thought.  Readers of Rousseau 
rightly wonder where the Lawgiver’s authority (and knowledge of good laws) originates, and 
some have identified a potential regress of authorization.446  Following Honig, I have interpreted 
Rousseau as intentionally constructing a circle rather than a regress: the Lawgiver is authorized 
by the people to which he would give law.  This potential regress and circle of authorization are 
by no means exclusive to Rousseau.  Rather, they haunt all acts of political founding or 
constitution wherein the authority to constitute is said to derive, not from an exterior source of 
absolute right, but from the will of the many, the ruled, or the people.  As Arendt writes: 
Those who get together to constitute a new government are themselves 
unconstitutional, that is they have no authority to do what they have set out to 
achieve.  The vicious circle in legislating is present not in ordinary lawmaking, 
but in laying down the fundamental law, the law of the land or the constitution 
which, from then on, is supposed to incarnate the ‘higher law’ from which all 
laws ultimately derive their authority.447 
   
In Sieyès’s language, the government’s constituted power derives its authority and legitimacy 
from the constitution that the nation gives to it.  If the nation’s own constituent power derived its 
authority and legitimacy from the constituted government, then the authority and legitimacy of 
both the nation and the government would be suspect.  This would be a version of the paradox of 
sovereignty.  If this circle is avoided, however, then what authorizes or legitimates the nation’s 
                                                
446 Bertram, Rousseau, 144. 
447 Arendt, On Revolution, 175-6. Carol Gould has recently articulated a more specific version of this problem, 
which she calls “the constitutional circle.”  She writes, “Isn’t there a circularity involved in the establishment of 
constitutional guarantees of rights by means of a consensual or democratic procedure that in turn presupposes some 
of the very rights to be institutionalized?  For the very idea of consensus implies the free and equal status of those 
who entered into the agreement, and it is this freedom and equality that give consensus its authority.  Without this 
free and equal agreement to accept as binding what is agreed upon, the consensus has no force and is merely verbal.  
Thus it would seem to presuppose the very rights that it would authorize.”  She also identifies a potential regress as a 
problematic alternative to this circle.  Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 39.  See also her Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, 
Economy, and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), where she critiques Habermas using an 
early version of the constitutional circle (127). 
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constituent power in the first place?  How can it be a source of authority and legitimacy if it itself 
is neither authorized nor legitimated?      
 Sieyès answers these questions by completely removing the nation from the political 
realm.  The nation is unconstituted, unauthorized, and unlegitimated—but it is not the kind of 
thing that can or should be constituted, authorized, and legitimated.  Rather, its united will 
simply is the source of authority and legitimacy, not because it has been invested with authority 
and legitimacy, but because it conforms to natural, rather than positive, law: 
Its will is always legal.  It is the law itself.  Prior to the nation and above the 
nation there is only natural law…  The national will… simply needs the reality of 
its existence to be legal.  Every nation on earth has to be taken as if it is like an 
isolated individual outside all social ties or, as it is said, in a state of nature…  
Since they exist only in the natural order, their will needs only to have the natural 
character of a will to produce all its effects.448 
 
The regress and circle of constitutive authority are avoided with an unauthorized authorizer; “It 
is the origin of all legality.”449  If the nation were a part of the political realm, then it would admit 
of, and require, the same kind of authorization that is required of the government.  Since it 
remains in the state of nature, however, the nation’s constituent power is held to a different 
standard: morality and natural law.450  The nation’s naturally unified will is the product of “a 
legitimate association, one that is voluntary and free,” and it remains “pure and unmixed,” 
because it is completely outside the divisions and conflicting interests of the political realm.451  
The moral legitimacy of this collective will provides the basis of political authorization; its 
conformity to natural law provides the basis of positive law. 
In short, Sieyès avoids familiar versions of the paradox of sovereignty by removing the 
                                                
448 Sieyès, “Third Estate?,” 136-7. 
449 Ibid., 137.  As noted, Sieyès does not believe that the nation has to “prove” itself to anyone, since it is already 
the common will of the individuals that will be constituted into a legal-political order.  
450 “In morality, nothing can stand in for simple and natural means.” Ibid., 133. 
451 Ibid., 137, 128. 
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constituent nation, itself a synthesis of Rousseau’s multitude and Lawgiver, to a state of nature 
beyond the political realm.  In her clear analysis, which my interpretation has closely followed, 
Arendt puts it well: 
Sieyès… broke the vicious circle, and the petitio principii of which he spoke so 
eloquently, first by drawing his famous distinction between a pouvoir constituant 
and a pouvoir constitué and, second, by putting the pouvoir constituant, that is, 
the nation, into a perpetual ‘state of nature’…  Thus, he seemingly solved both 
problems, the problem of the legitimacy of the new power, the pouvoir constitué, 
whose authority could not be guaranteed by the Constituent Assembly, the 
pouvoir constituant, because the power of the Assembly itself was not 
constitutional and could never be constitutional because it was prior to the 
constitution itself; and the problem of the legality of the new laws which needed a 
‘source and supreme master’, the ‘higher law’ from which to derive their validity.  
Both power and law were anchored in the nation, which itself remained outside 
and above all government and laws.452 
 
This solution is entirely dependent upon the nation’s complete exteriority to the political realm.  
Because the nation “never leaves the state of nature,” it can be an ultimate source of positive law.  
Because it is unconstituted, but still united, it can exercise constituent power.  Finally, because it 
remains separate from what it constitutes, it can be the constant moral arbiter of political 
constitutions, which it may reform at will.   
 The exteriority that Sieyès attributes to the nation is common in later theories of 
constituent power.  As Lucien Jaume notes, “The idea of constituent power has… generally 
evoked a sense of the exteriority of the sovereign people in relation to their institutions.”453  
Because constituent power is understood as a “capacity or potentiality, prior to taking on a 
concrete form,” which may always “establish itself otherwise” than any actually constituted 
government, it would appear to be essentially distinct from, and prior to, constituted power.454  
                                                
452 Arendt, On Revolution, 154. 
453 Lucien Jaume, “Constituent Power in France: The Revolution and its Consequences” in Paradox of 
Constitutionalism, 67-8. 
454 Tully, “Imperialism,” in Paradox of Constitutionalism, 320; Christodoulidis, “Against Substitution: The 
Constitutional Thinking of Dissensus,” in Paradox of Constitutionalism, 189. 
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By virtue of this exteriority, constituent power can be theorized as “a power absolutely free in 
scope,” whereas constituted power is necessarily “limited by the terms of the constitution” that 
constituent power generates and authorizes.455  If this is right, then Sieyès’s nation squares the 
circle of sovereign constitution in a way that Rousseau’s Lawgiver would, were it not itself 
dependent upon the subjects to whom it legislates.  In that case, constituent power would 
manifest what I have denied throughout this chapter: sovereign imperiousness without sovereign 
indebtedness.456  The paradox of sovereignty would be dissolved.  
However, Sieyès’s own writing suggests that the nation, and the constituent power it 
exercises, are not so external to the political realm after all.  This becomes most evident when 
Sieyès attempts to explain the unconstituted or natural unity of the nation.  Because the nation 
“never leaves the state of nature,” its composition must be achieved through natural means.457  
There must be some natural principle of unity and differentiation, separate from the divisions of 
any particular constituted order, that gives the nation its pre-political composition.  Otherwise, 
the nation cannot be a coherent collective agent—the agent of constituent power—prior to its 
political constitution as a collective subject.  In other words, before it is constituted as a people, 
the nation is a voluntary association of individuals within the state of nature—but it must 
nevertheless be a determinate association.  As discussed, if the nation were either an 
indeterminate mass of individuals, or a politically constituted collective subject, the theory of 
                                                
455 Paolo Carrozza, “Constitutionalism’s Post-Modern Opening,” in Paradox of Constitutionalism, 174. 
456 This is precisely what one contemporary philosopher identifies as the major significance of Sieyès’s legacy. 
Kalyvas writes: “For theories of the constituent power, therefore, the fundamental norms and rules (and institutions) 
have no other ground than the groundless instituting sovereign act.  A true sovereign act always escapes 
subsumption under any rule or norm because, in fact, it constitutes their ultimate origin…  In other words, the 
constituent act occurs outside a given constitutional horizon to radically redefine the very contours and content of 
that horizon.” Kalyvas, “Popular Sovereignty,” 228.  For Kalyvas, who draws heavily upon Sieyès’s thought, the 
exteriority of constituent power ensures its independence from the institutions of constituted power, while its 
constitutive and revolutionary potential ensures its superiority to its creation.  This is a divine image of sovereignty, 
secularized but still transcendent, and imperiousness without a trace indebtedness. 
457 Sieyès, “What is the Third Estate?,” 138. 
 162 
constituent power would merely repeat a version of the regresses and circles that Sieyès attempts 
to avoid.  Separate from any particular legal-political order, there must be some means of 
specifying which individuals make up the nation, and of differentiating this nation in particular 
from other nations, as well as from any individuals that it excludes.   
This need for specification is political as well as theoretical, and satisfying it requires a 
statement of who, exactly, should contest the Estates-General and give itself a new constitution.  
Sieyès does not have in mind just any individuals anywhere, or every individual everywhere; he 
never hints that the revolutionary agent is any kind of universal subject.  However, the 
composition of the revolutionary agent cannot simply be inherited from the existing political 
order.  It cannot be merely an effect or artifact of the constituted order it would overturn.458  As 
Marx makes clear in his own theoretical and political writings, in order to identify (or manifest) a 
collective agent of revolution—even of bourgeois political revolution—some criterion of 
commonality is needed, and it cannot simply recapitulate the political differentiations that are 
essential to the existing order.  
Sieyès recognizes this need and attempts to satisfy it in a way that, as I will argue later, is 
a prevalent modern strategy for negotiating the paradox of sovereignty.  He writes, “Where is the 
Nation?  Where it is.  In the forty thousand parishes covering the whole territory, in all the 
inhabitants and all the contributors to the public establishment—that is where the Nation is to be 
found.”459  For Sieyès, territory provides the natural principle of unity and differentiation that 
defines the nation.  The nation is a determinate collection of individuals that are united, prior to 
                                                
458 For this reason, the nation cannot be simply identical to an existing political class.  In a sense, the nation is the 
Third Estate, but not in its present state of “political nonentity,” which the existing legal-political order ensures 
(Ibid., 104).  Rather, the Third Estate is “always identical to an idea of a nation” (Ibid., 101, emphasis added).  The 
nation is the Third Estate once the latter has “become something,” i.e., once the Third Estate has gained political 
representation (Ibid).  Transforming the Third Estate into the national constituent power is the political task that 
Sieyès sets forth. 
459 Ibid., 140, italics added. 
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any act of constitution, by their shared location within a common geographic area.  It is these 
individuals who can and must give themselves a new constitution.  The nation is what it is and 
who it is because of “where it is”—inscribed within the boundaries of a historically given 
territory.460 
The territorial determination of the nation is a remarkable strategy for resolving the 
paradox of sovereignty, not because it is unique to Sieyès, but because it requires an obvious 
naturalization of the concept of territory.  Territory is a political artifact through and through; it 
is created, altered, and invested with meaning through political contest and conquest.  The 
boundaries of territory are the stakes of negotiations between sovereign states, rather than a 
given framework in which sovereignty is to be achieved.461  In particular, there is no naturally 
existing territory that defines the French nation.  There is only territory claimed by France for the 
French nation.  This is not to deny that territorial boundaries have a determining effect on 
nationality.  It is, however, to deny that territory is a pre-political framework within which a 
nation incubates prior to its constitution as a collective political subject of sovereign authority. 
However, this is exactly how Sieyès treats territory.  By locating the nation that never 
leaves the state of nature within a particular territory, Sieyès essentially naturalizes territory and 
the territorial composition of the nation.  The unconstituted nation is defined by territorial 
boundaries that cannot be altered by any act of constituent or constituted power.  Consequently, 
the “nation cannot decide not to be the nation it is or choose to be itself in only one particular 
way.”462  Nor can the nation deny its “natural, common will,” which turns out to be the majority 
                                                
460 Ibid. 
461 See Chapter 2, page 60-1.  Nonetheless, territory is frequently treated as a given framework in which 
sovereignty or political self-determination can be achieved.  This does not confirm Sieyès’s use of territory.  Rather, 
it affirms that this particular use of territory is by no means unique to Sieyès.  I explore the territoriality of modern 
sovereignty in Chapter 4.   
462 Sieyès, “Third Estate?,” 141. 
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opinion of the twenty-five or twenty-six million persons who, despite their different political 
statuses, all inhabit the same geographic area.463  For Sieyès, then, territory is the natural 
precondition of politics, rather than a political artifact; territory is a feature of the state of nature.  
Because of this, territory can serve as a pre-political framework for political representation: 
It ought to have been possible to make a territorial division able to produce an 
initial level of representation by means of the formation of circumscriptions, or 
arrondissements, made up [of] twenty to thirty parishes.  These circumscriptions 
could, following the same plan, have been grouped together to form provinces, 
and these latter could then have send a number of genuinely extraordinary 
representatives to the capital with special powers to determine the constitution of 
the Estates-General.464 
 
The boundaries of territory provide the pre-political frame in which politics can happen. 
 In the specific context of Sieyès’s political theory, the naturalization of the nation’s 
territorial composition ensures that constituent power—and the source of political legitimacy 
more generally—lies in neither a blind multitude nor a politically constituted people.  Rather, 
constituent power is to be exercised by a coherent and determinant association, namely the 
collection of individuals occupying the particular territory over which the constituted order will 
exercise political authority.  Without reference to the particular political statuses that may 
differentiate these individuals from one another, the boundaries of territory enable Sieyès to 
speak of these individuals as a collective agent of revolution whose unity is independent of the 
legal-political regime that it will revolutionize.  In other words, territorial belonging provides a 
means of composing the collective but pre-constitutional constituent agent that, for Sieyès, 
serves as a pre-political source of political legitimacy.   
 More generally, territory provides a distinctly modern way of negotiating the paradox of 
sovereignty.  The modern ideal of sovereignty is paradoxical insofar as the sovereign is 
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understood to owe its authority to its constituted collective subject, and the collective subject is 
understood to owe its constitution to the authorized sovereign.  In order for the paradox to be 
dissolved, one of these elements—the sovereign’s authority or the people’s constitution—must 
somehow be achieved without depending upon the achievement of the other.  If external 
reservoirs of political authority, such as divine investiture and venerable tradition, are no longer 
effective except as means of garnering popular authorization, and if natural law insists upon the 
voluntary nature of political subjection, then what is needed is some way of identifying the 
people as a collective political agent prior to its constitution by sovereign authority.  Dissolving 
the paradox requires some as-yet unconstituted association that can, through a Hobbesian, 
Lockean, or Rousseauian act of authorization, or some other founding act, institute the sovereign 
that will become the source of its own political constitution.  Because territorial boundaries 
provide an apparently given and natural—or naturalizable—framework for the composition of 
this association, territory itself appears to provide an effective foundation or container for the 
cycle of authorization and constitution that is essential to modern sovereignty.  In short, for 
modern thinkers who would trace sovereign authority back to ‘the people’, the people itself can 
be identified and located, prior to its political constitution, within the natural boundaries of a 
particular territory.465  This would appear to dissolve, or avoid, the paradox of sovereignty. 
                                                
465 This strategy is also important to thinkers, such as Hobbes and Locke, who understand sovereignty to rest on 
an act of alienation or consent by individuals, rather than by a people as a whole.  Territory can be made to specify, 
or assumed to specify, which individuals are the basis of sovereignty.  As Bert Van Roermund writes, “Who are to 
be parties to the social contract cannot be decided in terms of the social contract.”  Van Roermund, “Sovereignty: 
Popular and Unpopular” in Sovereignty in Transition, Neil Walker, ed. (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2006), 40.  
For both Hobbes and Locke, individuals do not act alone when they alienate their natural rights, or give their 
consent, to the sovereign.  Rather, they are part of a group, and it is interactions with the other members of the group 
that motivate each member to authorize the sovereign (in particular, it is the fear that the others inspire, although this 
is understood differently by Hobbes and Locke).  In Hobbes, the relevant group is a “multitude” or “crowd,” which 
is a singular unity of diverse individuals: “Because crowd [multitudo] is a collective word, it is understood to signify 
more than one object, so that a crowd of men is the same as many men.  Because the word is grammatically singular, 
it also signifies one thing, namely a crowd.  Neither way of taking it implies that a crowd has one will given by 
nature, but that each man has his own will.”  Hobbes, On the Citizen, R. Tuck and M. Silverthorne, eds. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 76.  For Locke, the relevant group is a family and property based natural 
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While Sieyès is not unique in turning to territory to locate the pre-political source of 
political authority, his thought is particularly illuminating because it explicitly affirms the 
paradox of sovereignty before invoking territory as a means of dissolving it.  Like Machiavelli 
and Rousseau, Sieyès is aware that there is a “petition of principle or a vicious circle” in any 
theory of sovereignty in which the collective agent of authorization is itself constituted.466  To 
avoid the regresses and circles of the paradox, Sieyès grounds the unity of the collective agent of 
authorization in a given territorial framework, rather than in a political act of constitution.  By 
naturalizing the territorial determination of the nation, Sieyès does explicitly what some other 
thinkers do implicitly: he nominates a particular, pre-constitutional version of ‘the people’ as an 
arbitrary starting point for politics and political theory.467  Nevertheless, his writing is unique 
insofar as it directly affirms that this kind of starting point is necessary to escape the paradox of 
sovereignty.  This attempt to define the nation as a pre-political source of constitutive authority 
fails spectacularly, when Napoleon Bonaparte displaces the nation as the agent of constituent 
power.  This failure, too, is illuminating.   
If, as Sieyès insists, constituent power does not exist in the political sphere (if the “nation 
does not leave the state of nature”), then it must be given political presence and voice without 
sacrificing the independence and normative priority it enjoys by virtue of its supposed exteriority 
                                                
society.  In either case, unless the group consists of all the individuals within the state of nature, some criterion is 
needed for distinguishing which individuals, in relation to one another and to the exclusion of others, authorize the 
same sovereign.  There are presumably different multitudes, crowds, and societies because there are multiple 
sovereigns.  For both thinkers, territorial boundaries demarcate spheres of sovereignty and subjection once the 
sovereign is authorized, so it can be inferred that, within the state of nature, multitudes and natural societies are also 
contained within, and separated from their outsiders by, territorial boundaries.  Making good on this inference, with 
thorough textual scholarship, is work that I must leave for another occasion. 
466 Sieyès, “Third Estate?,” 139. 
467 On the tendency of modern and contemporary political theorists to take a particular, determinate notion of the 
people for granted, see Margaret Canovan, Margaret Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (Brookfield, 
Vermont: Edward Elgar, 1996), especially Chapter 3, and Sofia Näsström, “Legitimacy of the People,” Political 
Theory 35:5 (2007): 624-658.  
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to the political.468  This is precisely the problem that Sieyès attempts to solve in his 1789 
pamphlets with the innovation of extraordinary national representatives and again, in his 1799 
draft of the Constitution of the Year VIII, with the proposal of the Great Elector.  Both the 
extraordinary representatives and the Great Elector are intended to be the political vehicles of an 
already existing, pre-political constituent power that remains beyond the political realm.469 
In his 1799 debates with Sieyès regarding the draft constitution, Napoleon Bonaparte 
vehemently rejected the idea of the Great Elector as a representative of the nation.470  The final 
version of the constitution eliminated the Elector and directly installed Bonaparte as First 
Consul, the highest executive position in the new government.471  Less than three years later, 
through the Constitution of the Year X, Napoleon was made First Consul for life.  This 
constitution, and the popular referendum proceeding it, effectively established Bonaparte as the 
acme of constituted power, even as it brought a close to the revolutionary career of French 
constituent power. 
The referendum that installed Bonaparte as First Consul for life is explicit that his office 
depended upon the will of the people, which remained, at least rhetorically, the supreme agent of 
constituent power.  The referendum reads:   
The Consuls of the Republic… considering that the resolution of the First Consul 
is a striking homage paid to the sovereignty of the people; that the people, 
consulted on its most dear interests, should know no other limit than these 
interests themselves, adopt as follows: Article 1.  The French people will be 
                                                
468 Sieyès, “What is the Third Estate?,” 138.   
469 Michael Sonenscher, “Introduction” to Sieyès, Political Writings, xxvii, xxxi-iii.  
470 Alphonse Bigeon, Sieyès, l'homme--le constituant (Paris: Henri Becus, 1893), 193-4.  
471 Title IV, section 41 of The Constitution of the Year VIII describes the duties of First Consul: “The First 
Consul promulgates the laws; he appoints and dismisses at will the members of the Council of State, the ministers, 
the ambassadors and other foreign agents of high rank, the officers of the army and navy, the members of the local 
administrations, and the commissioners of the government before the tribunals.  He appoints all criminal and civil 
judges other than the justices of the peace and the judges of cassation, without power to remove them.”  Online at 
http://www.napoleon-series.org/research/government/legislation/c_constitution8.html. 
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consulted on this question: ‘Will Napoleon Bonaparte become Consul for life?’472 
 
Bonaparte himself paid homage to the unilateral dependence of constituted power on constituent 
power: “The first consideration of the Government shall be the interests of the People from 
whom they derive all their powers."473  As in Sieyès’s political writings, the constituted power of 
the government depends, for its constitution and its authority, on the constituent power of the 
nation.  
Nevertheless, a few months after being made First Consul for life, Bonaparte could 
intelligibly declare, from a position of supreme constituted power, “I am the constituent 
power.”474  This declaration is not mere rhetorical flourish.  Nor does it contradict Bonaparte’s 
acknowledgement that his constituted power is dependent upon the nation’s constituent power.  
Rather, it signals Bonaparte’s role as the political constitutor of the French nation, which prior to 
Bonaparte’s ascension to power was politically “Nothing,” as Sieyès famously puts it.475  In 
assuming this role, Bonaparte displaces the nation as the constituent power.  He owes his 
authority to the nation—and in particular, to the majority of the French population, which lives 
within the borders of France but has never been represented in the Estates General—but from 
Bonaparte’s perspective, the nation’s constituent career is over.  It has done its job by installing 
him as First Consul.  Now he will take on the role of constituent power, not in order to constitute 
another, higher form of government, but in order to give the nation itself the political form that it 
                                                
472 My translation: “Les Consuls de la République…  Considérant que la résolution du Premier Consule est un 
hommage éclatant rendu à la souveraineté du peuple; que le peuple, consulté sur ses plus chers intérêts, ne doit 
connaître d'autre limite que ses intérêts mêmes; Arrètent ce qui suit: Art. 1er.  Le peuple français sera consulté sur 
cette question: « Napoléon Bonaparte sera-t-il Consul à vie? »”  France Assemblée Nationale, Archives 
parlementaires de 1787 à 1860: recueil complet des débats législatifs et politiques des chambres françaises, vol. III 
(Paris: Librairie Administrative de Paul Dupont, 1864), 668. 
473 “La marche du Gouvernement sera constamment dirigée dans l'intérêt du peuple, d'où dérivent tous les 
pouvoirs et pour qui travaillent tous les gens de bien.” Antoine Clarie Thibaudeau, Mémoires Sur Le Consulat, 1799 
à 1804 (Paris: Ponthieu et cie, 1827), 261, emphasis added. 
474 Thibaudeau, Mémoires, 315, emphasis added. 
475 Sieyès, “Third Estate?,” 94. 
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purportedly lacks: “My system is very simple.  I believed that, in the circumstances, it was 
necessary to centralize power, and increase the authority of the government, in order to 
constitute the nation.  I am the constituent power.”476  In substituting himself for the nation as the 
constituent power, Bonaparte reveals that the purportedly original and ultimate source of 
political authority is itself an artifact of political authority.   
In his assumption of constituent power, Bonaparte takes advantage of the opportunity 
presented by Sieyès’s removal of the nation from civil society to the state of nature.  It is 
precisely because the nation has been depoliticized—in the sense of its practical exclusion from 
political representation and its theoretical removal from the realm of politics altogether—that it 
is up for grabs and susceptible to any number of political forms that can be imposed upon it.  If 
the nation had an existing political form—if, for example, it were a self-constituted demos, or 
even a heteronomously constituted collective subject of a sovereign—it would not escape the 
Rousseauian versions of the paradox of sovereignty.  In that case, the nation would always carry 
with it an element of arbitrariness, insofar as its constitution would ultimately rest on a regress or 
circle of authorization and constitution.477  In an attempt to avoid this trace of political 
arbitrariness, however, Sieyès naturalizes the nation (and its territorial boundaries) and thereby 
renders the purportedly pre-political origin of political authority thoroughly arbitrary from the 
perspective of political contest.  The pre-political nation that is “the origin of everything… the 
source and supreme master of all positive law” might as well be God, tradition, or heritage.478  Or 
Bonaparte.  Bonaparte’s displacement of the nation from the position of constituent power—i.e. 
                                                
476 “Mon système est fort simple.  J'ai cru que, dans les circonstances, il fallait centraliser le pouvoir, et 
accroître l'autorité du Gouvernement, afin de constituer la nation.  C'est moi qui suis le pouvoir constituant.” 
Thibaudeau, Mémoires, 315, emphasis added. 
477 Alan Keenan argues that Rousseau’s paradoxes show that the identity of any democratic demos is always 
arbitrary in the last instance.  See Keenan, Democracy in Question (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 41-
54. I am arguing that this holds true for non-democratic sources of political authority as well, and I develop this 
argument more fully in Chapter 4.   
478 Sieyès, “Third Estate?,” 136-8. 
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the source of authoritative political transformation—is enabled by Sieyès’s prior displacement of 
the nation from the political sphere. 
In other words, Bonaparte’s particularly modern brand of autocracy, which claims the 
“natural, common will” of the nation as the source of its absolute authority, is made possible by a 
radical depoliticization of the source of popular authority.479  Bonaparte’s assumption of 
constituent power, and his literal (re)constitution of the French nation and its territory, reveal that 
the purportedly natural and pre-political nation was never an effective resolution of the paradox 
of sovereignty.  Rather, the nation is one more effect in a series or cycle of effects that would 
have to become causes, to borrow Rousseau’s phrase.480  Sieyès’s political theory of constituent 
power does not dissolve the paradox of sovereignty after all, but displaces it to the ‘natural’ 
territorial boundaries of the nation.  
The nation is not a naturally composed, pre-constitutional association that remains 
exterior to the political realm.  Rather, the nation and the territory that contains it are political 
artifacts.  They are politically constituted, and this draws the theory of constituent power back 
into the paradox of sovereignty.  Pace Sieyès, there is no outside of politics, because the very act 
of naturalizing or rendering incontestable an ultimate source of political authority—god, nation, 
tradition, ethnos, etc—is itself a political act.  There is no origin of authority (or constitution) 
that does not itself require authorization (or constitution).  The paradox of sovereignty is 
inescapable because politics itself is inescapable: there is no unauthorized (or unconstituted) 
origin of authority (or constitution).  This is a democratic thought, insofar as democracy 
                                                
479 Ibid., 138. 
480 “Instead of initiating, the collectivity is initiated by a constituent power.  If the exercise of constituent power 
signals the self-constitution of political community, then first and foremost it is the objective form of the genitive: 
the constitution of a collective self [“rather than by a self”]…  The exercise of constituent power cannot be directly 
attributed to a collective because constituent power effectively creates this collective.”  Hans Lindahl, “The Paradox 
of Constituent Power. The Ambiguous Self-Constitution of the European Union,” Ratio Juris 20 no. 4 (2007), 495-
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institutionalizes the political constitution of the ultimate source of political authority, the 
demos.481  However, as I will show in the next chapter, the inescapability of politics is not unique 
to democracy.  It is, rather, a condition of political authority itself, and it is writ large in the 
paradox of sovereignty that I have described in this and the previous chapters.  For now, the 
inescapability of politics can be seen in Sieyès’s failed attempt to locate constituent power in the 
state of nature, and thereby render it the pre-political and incontestably authoritative origin of 
political constitution.  Moreover, as the fate of constituent power during the last phases of the 
French Revolution illustrates, democracy is not the only form of politics that acknowledges the 
paradox of sovereignty by affirming the absence of any natural, pre-political, and completely 
incontestable source of supreme and independent political authority. 
Like Sieyès’s theory of constitute power, Bonaparte’s political practice also fails to 
effectively resolve the paradox of sovereignty.  This is not because Bonaparte’s is an autocratic 
political practice, but because the paradox cannot be fully resolved through any kind of political 
practice.  Practical negotiations of the paradox will assume more or less autocratic and 
democratic forms, but autocracy and democracy both invoke, rather than resolve, the paradox of 
sovereignty.  In the next chapter, I examine democratic practices that engage, but do not 
dissolve, the paradox.  For now, it is important to note that even though Bonaparte displaces the 
nation as the constituent power (and thereby reveals the purportedly ultimate source of political 
authority to be a political and contingent, rather than natural and necessary, agent of 
authorization), he himself is no beginning or end of politics.  Instead, his executive office is 
                                                
481 Democratic theorists in general acknowledge the political constitution and contestability of the demos that is 
the source of democratic authority and legitimacy.  Genuinely radical democrats insist that the constitution of the 
demos is political and contestable ‘all the way down’.  Less radical and non-radical democrats implicitly or 
explicitly identify either an incontestable core version of the demos, or a value to be realized, or procedure to be 
respected, that constrains the demos no matter how it is constituted.  See David Miller’s helpful distinction between 
“R-democrats” and “L-democrats” in “Democracy’s Domain,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 no. 3 (2009): 201-
228.  I discuss these topics in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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thoroughly political—perhaps even extra-political, in a way that resembles the sovereigns of 
Bodin, Hobbes, Schmitt, and Agamben—and it is ultimately indebted, for its authority, to the 
nation that Bonaparte constitutes anew.  Even the autocratic sovereign is authorized by the 
collective subject that it constitutes.  In Bonaparte’s assumption of constituent power, the 
Rousseauian paradoxes of popular sovereignty, which Sieyès hoped to dissolve in the name of 
democratic transformation, return in an absolutist but no less paradoxical form. 
This confirms what I have already shown by bringing together Machiavelli’s aporias of 
founding and Rousseau’s paradoxes of self-constitution.  The paradox of sovereignty is not 
exclusive to either absolutist or popular sovereignty.  Rather, it manifests tendencies of both 
types and, moreover, suggests a continuity between them.  In Machiavelli’s thought, this 
continuity is suggested by the form-giving prince’s indebtedness to the people he would 
constitute; in Rousseau’s thought, it is suggested by the Lawgiver’s imperiousness over the 
multitude.  Their different philosophical engagements with the paradoxical interrelation of 
constitution and authorization suggest, respectively, a popular tendency latent in absolutist 
republicanism and an absolutist tendency in popular republicanism.  These tendencies are 
ambivalently paired in the paradoxical ideal of sovereignty as supreme, independent, and (self-) 
bounded political authority that constitutes, as its subject, the collective agent of its own 
authorization. 
Sieyès’s failure to remove the source of political authority and constitution from political 
contest demonstrates that there is no outside of political contest.  The very act of naturalizing or 
rendering incontestable an ‘ultimate’ source of political authority—god, nation, tradition, ethnos, 
etc—is itself a contestable political act.  This is what Bonaparte’s reconstitution of the French 
nation illustrates: there is no unauthorized and unconstituted origin of authority and constitution, 
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so there is no way out of sovereignty’s circle of constitution and authorization.  Although in this 
context, the interminability sovereignty’s paradox is revealed by the institution of popular 
dictatorship, the idea that there is no ultimately pre-political source of political authority is in 
fact a basic tenet of democratic theory.  Democracy institutionalizes, rather than denies, the 
political constitution of the ultimate source of political authority, the demos.  In doing so, 
democracy institutionalizes the circular interdependence of constitution and authorization that is 
a fundamental characteristic of modern sovereignty.  In the next chapter, I will examine the 
paradoxes that arise from the way that democracies institutionalize contest over the source of 
democratic authority, and argue that these paradoxes are, in fact, a species of the more general 
paradox of sovereignty.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
DEMOCRATIC PARADOXES AND THE PARADOX OF SOVEREIGNTY 
 
 In the previous chapter, I examined the political thought of Machiavelli, Rousseau, and 
Sieyès in order to show that the paradox of sovereignty is specific to neither absolutist nor 
popular forms of sovereignty, and that in fact the paradox suggests a continuity between these 
forms.  On one hand, even absolutist forms of sovereignty manifest a popular tendency and 
democratic potential in the way that the sovereign depends, for its authority, upon the collective 
subject that it constitutes.  On the other hand, even popular forms of sovereignty manifest an 
absolutist tendency and autocratic potential in the way that the sovereign constitutes, as its 
collective subject, the agent of its own authorization.  These opposed tendencies and political 
potentials are ambivalently brought together, in a conflictual continuity, within the modern ideal 
of sovereignty as a kind of imperious and indebted authority that paradoxically engenders its 
own source of authorization.  This continuity is equally evident in Marx’s democratic answer to 
Hegel’s ideal of absolute sovereignty and in Bonaparte’s autocratic answer to Sieyès’s ideal of 
popular sovereignty.  
In instances of popular sovereignty, the absolutist moment is not mitigated by the fact 
that the sovereign and subject are (ideally) the same collective agent.  Rather, the heteronomy 
illustrated by Rousseau’s lawgiver will haunt even the most democratic forms of popular self-
constitution, because the exercise of popular constituent authority always exceeds or calls into 
question its popular authorization.  Whereas Machiavelli’s form-giving founders are faced with 
the task of constituting a people via the “power and virtue” that only comes from a constituted 
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people itself, the ‘founding fathers’ of a democracy are faced with the task of overcoming a 
democratic deficit that necessarily characterizes the original constitution of a demos.  As Arendt 
puts it, “Those who get together to constitute a new government are themselves 
unconstitutional.”482  Democracy continually and self-consciously renegotiates this deficit 
because it explicitly institutionalizes what Machiavelli implies about republicanism in general, 
namely that the aporias of foundation are present, not only at the beginning of a polity, but in its 
everyday maintenance.  “Self-governance implies self-constitution,” as Seyla Benhabib writes, 
and ongoing acts of self-constitution reiterate the paradox of sovereignty for as long as self-
government continues.483 
In recent democratic theory, the paradox I have traced through the work of Machiavelli 
and Rousseau, Sieyes and Bonaparte, and Hegel and Marx, appears as a paradox of democratic 
constitution.  This paradox expresses the surprising fact that no demos can constitute itself 
democratically, or with full democratic legitimacy, because any act of democratic self-
constitution (or reconstitution) results in a democratic deficit.  In this chapter, I turn to political-
philosophical responses to this particularly democratic paradox in order to illuminate the political 
stakes of the paradox of sovereignty.     
In part I, I examine Frederick Whelan’s, Seyla Benhabib’s, and Carol Gould’s different 
but related articulations of the paradox of democratic constitution.  I then argue that this paradox 
is a species of the more fundamental paradox of sovereignty.  This enables me to show, in part II, 
that the paradox of sovereignty cannot be resolved by any act of political closure, or by any 
appeal to purportedly pre-political sources of authority and constitution.  Like the paradox of 
democracy, the paradox of sovereignty is insoluble, and it reveals, not an inevitable deficit of 
                                                
482 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), 175. 
483 Seyla Benhabib, Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 19.   
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democratic legitimacy, but an ever present deficit of constitutive authority.  Because sovereign 
authority paradoxically constitutes its own source of authorization, the acts of inclusion, 
exclusion, and differentiation by which a sovereign constitutes its collective subject always 
remain incompletely authorized and perpetually contestable.  
 
Part I: The Paradox of Democratic Constitution 
 
The circular logic that characterizes the modern ideal of sovereignty is especially 
apparent in a democracy, where ideally the people continually constitutes itself as both collective 
sovereign and collective subject.484  The people-as-sovereign constitutes the people-as-subject, 
not only in an original moment of founding, but through the myriad and mundane acts of 
inclusion, exclusion, differentiation, subjection, and self-legislation by which the boundaries of 
the sovereign’s jurisdiction are established, policed, and maintained by its agents.  For these 
constitutive acts to be democratically legitimate, the people-as-subject must continually 
                                                
484 In actual democracies, the people-as-sovereign is not identical with the people-as-subject, insofar as many 
members of the collective subject do not participate in the exercise of sovereign authority.  On one hand, this is 
because the collective subject will contain non-citizen members, such as resident aliens or non-status refugees.  
These members are not enfranchised to participate in democratic decision making practices or the operations of 
government, even though they are subject to those decisions and operations.  On the other hand, even many 
enfranchised citizens also do not participate in democratic decision making or government.  Consequently, in even a 
robust democracy, the collective sovereign and the collective subject will not be substantively identical.  This should 
not give the impression, however, that the individuals excluded from a demos’s self-government (but who are 
nonetheless subject to the acts of differentiation by which the demos constitutes itself) are without political agency.  
For an important study of the political agency of non-status refugees and other non-citizen members, see Peter 
Nyers, “Taking Rights, Mediating Wrongs: Disagreements over the Political Agency of Non-status Refugees” in 
The Politics of Protection, ed. Jef Huysmans et. al. (London: Routledge, 2006), 48-67.  Importantly for the purposes 
of this dissertation, while Nyers emphasizes the ways that sovereign authority may be challenged by non-citizen 
members of a polity, non-citizen members may also recognize as authoritative—that is, authorize—the sovereign.  
See, for instance, Bonnie Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 75, 
93-4.  The authorization of the sovereign by its collective subject is not limited to the institutions of citizenship.  
Rather, the sovereign’s internally supreme authority rests on recognition by a collective subject that includes non-
citizens, and even the non-enfranchised members of that collective subject may participate, in very different ways, in 
the authorization (or deauthorization) of the sovereign.  In a democracy, this means that even though the people-as-
subject is never truly identical with the people-as-sovereign, the authority of the latter rests on authorization by the 
former, and the means of authorization extend beyond the institutions of democratic participation restricted to 
enfranchised citizens. 
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authorize the people-as-sovereign, which it does through myriad and mundane acts of 
recognition, as well as institutionalized acts of authorization, such as voting.  Democratic 
sovereignty, then, is a matter of the people’s continual self-constitution and self-authorization.  
Both of these self-reflexive acts are mediated by the institutions of democratic government.485  
 In a democracy, the tension between sovereign imperiousness and indebtedness is marked 
by an apparent deficiency of democratic legitimacy when it comes to the constitution of the 
democratic people.  The democratic people, the demos, cannot constitute itself democratically, or 
according to democratically legitimated means, because a democratic (or democratically 
legitimated) procedure for constitution presupposes the very demos that it would engender.  As 
democratic theorists have famously pointed out, there is a vicious circle or infinite regress 
here.486  This circle or regress, which I will call ‘the paradox of democratic constitution’ in order 
to maintain consistency across its various articulations, goes to the heart of democratic 
legitimacy.  It affects not only the original founding, but also the normal, everyday functioning 
of democratic self-government.  Bonnie Honig puts the point well:   
Every day, after all, new citizens are born, others immigrate into established 
regimes, still others mature into adulthood…  Every day the traces of the traumas 
of the founding generation are discernable in the actions of their heirs.  Every day, 
democracies resocialize, recapture, or reinterpellate citizens into their political 
institutions and culture in ways those citizens do not freely will, nor could they.  
Every day, in sum, new citizens are received by established regimes, and every 
                                                
485 Through the institutions of government, the people not only legitimates, but actively participates in the 
authoring of laws, policies, and procedures that determine the extent of its sovereign authority and, correlatively, 
constitute (itself as) its own collective subject.   
486 See, for instance, Arendt, On Revolution, 175-6; Robert Dahl, After the Revolution? Authority in a Good 
Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 46; Frederick Whelan, “Prologue: Democratic Theory and the 
Boundary Problem,” in Nomos 25: Liberal Democracy, J. Pennock and J. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York 
University Press, 1983), 13-47; William Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1995), 139; Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso 2000); Benhabib, Rights of 
Others, 455, 206, and Another Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 33-5, 167; Carol Gould, 
Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 39-41, 174-5; Martin 
Loughlin and Neil Walker, eds. The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Sofia Näsström, “The Legitimacy of the People,” Political Theory 35, no. 
5 (2007): 624-658; Arash Abizadeh, “Democratic Theory and Border Coercion,” Political Theory 36, no. 1 (2008): 
37-65, Bonnie Honig, Emergency Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 12-39.  
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day established citizens are reinterpellated into the laws, norms, and expectations 
of their regimes such that the paradox of politics is replayed rather than overcome 
in time.487 
 
The paradox of democratic constitution continually troubles, not only the democratic people’s 
ability to constitute itself democratically, but also the very identity of the people that would 
constitute itself.  The work of Frederick Whelan, Seyla Benhabib, and Carol Gould makes this 
clear. 
Frederick Whelan’s “boundary problem” is a classic statement of the paradox of 
democratic constitution.488  According to Whelan, democratic theory presupposes a constituted 
people or demos, the constitution of which cannot be evaluated according to democratic theory’s 
own criteria of political legitimacy.  All types of democratic theory, in Whelan’s estimation, 
evaluate the legitimacy of political decisions on the basis of whether or not the people can be 
said to participate (in a variety of possible ways) in collective decision-making.  But this general 
criterion for democratic legitimacy presupposes the existence of an already constituted people.489  
Consequently, the criterion cannot be brought to bear on questions concerning the constitution of 
the people in the first place—at least not without introducing “a regression from which no 
procedural escape is possible.”490  The demos cannot be constituted democratically.491 
For Whelan, this is a boundary problem because “the establishment of political 
boundaries,” is essential to “the formation of a group of people sharing a common political 
                                                
487 Honig, Emergency Politics, 15. 
488 Whelan, “Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem,” 13-47. 
489 Ibid., 13-15. 
490 Ibid., 19.  Later, Whelan writes, “We would need to make a prior decision regarding who are entitled to 
participate in arriving at a solution—and this prior question is frequently just as controversial as the substantive 
question, and procedurally insoluble” (Ibid., 22). 
491 Whelan’s argument “is not intended to discredit democratic theory, but only to establish some of its 
limitations” in the hope of “moderating some of the sometimes excessive claims that are made in its name” (16, 40).  
Robert Dahl reaches a similar conclusion: “We cannot solve the problem of the proper scope and domain of 
democratic units from within democratic theory.”  Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1989), 207.  This does not mean that the problem is insoluble beyond democratic theory and democratic 
procedures. 
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identity upon which democracy can be erected.”492  As in Chapter 2 above, the relevant 
boundaries need not be territorial, and the “common political identity” that they inscribe need not 
be a shared sense of self in any ‘thick’ sense.  What is crucial is that boundaries constitute a 
political group—the people or demos of democracy—by differentiating between its members and 
non-members.  Whelan writes:  
The problem is one of defining or bounding not geographical units but the 
membership of the democratic body, or citizenry…  The question of boundaries is 
essentially the question of defining eligibility for membership in the community: 
democracy refers to self-government by a people, and so a people or political 
“self” must be bounded or set apart from other peoples.493 
 
Boundaries constitute the individuals they inscribe as the collective people that, in a democracy, 
governs itself.  The determination of these boundaries presents an “insoluble” problem for 
democratic theory because “democracy, which is a method for group decision-making or self-
governance, cannot be brought to bear on the logically prior matter of the constitution of the 
group itself.”494  Consequently, democratic theory and practice cannot legitimate the highly 
political acts of inclusion and exclusion upon which they rest.   
 These unlegitimated acts are not limited to the initial formation of a polity.  Because the 
people is not constituted through a single, initial instance of boundary-setting, its boundaries are 
not only momentarily problematic.  Rather, the bounded constitution of the people is a source of 
“continuing controversy and conflict,” because that constitution is continually presupposed and 
invoked by everyday acts of democratic decision-making.  Whelan writes:  
Whatever form a democracy takes, collectively binding decisions are made, laws 
and policies are enacted, and these things are done for and in one way or another 
by a particular group or people that is set apart—and bound together—for the 
                                                
492 Ibid., 16.  
493 Ibid., 13, 14, 21. 
494 Ibid., 16, 40. 
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purposes of self-government from other people or peoples, who are 
correspondingly excluded.495 
 
Although Whelan admits that “a historically given solution” may be necessary to make 
democracy “practicable,” the problem traverses history insofar as the historical solution will 
continue to be “determinative of the substantive questions that follow.”496  In other words, the 
moral arbitrariness of any undemocratic act of boundary-setting—which, according to Whelan, is 
the only kind of boundary-setting there is—will continue to haunt the bounded people’s 
democratic decisions.497  
In her recent work, Seyla Benhabib articulates a similar version of the paradox of 
democratic constitution.  Like Whelan, she identifies a deficit of democratic legitimation in the 
ways that democracies continually reconstitute the self-governing demos.498  She writes: “Every 
act of self-legislation is also an act of self-constitution.  ‘We, the people’ who agree to bind 
ourselves by these laws, are also defining ourselves as a “we” in the very act of self-
legislation.”499  This ongoing process of collective self-constitution depends upon operations of 
differentiation, inclusion, and exclusion that are legitimated by democratic decision-making 
processes.  These processes necessarily involve only those persons who are already inscribed 
within the demos.  According to Benhabib, “There is a circularity here: the franchised citizens 
decide on who the ‘people’ are who are entitled to rule themselves, but the definition of being a 
                                                
495 Ibid., 15. 
496 Ibid., 16, 22. 
497 That is, its moral arbitrariness from the point of view of democratic theory, in which, according to Whelan, 
“democracy is usually offered as the exclusively legitimate method of making binding decisions for a collectivity” 
(Ibid., 22).  Whelan suggests that a “historically given solution” to the boundary problem may be “justifiable or not, 
by some theory other than democratic theory” (16).  It is the “justifiable or not” character of historically contingent 
‘solutions’ to the paradox of democratic constitution that I mean to signal with the phrase “moral arbitrariness,” 
which was helpfully suggested by Alison Jagger in an early discussion of these ideas at the Pacific APA. 
498 Despite their similarities, Benhabib makes no reference to Whelan, and does not seem to draw upon his work. 
499 Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism, 33.  “Defining the identity of the democratic people is an ongoing 
process of constitutional self-creation.” Benhabib, Rights of Others, 21. 
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franchised citizen is being part of the people.”500  Because the franchised members of the people 
exercise an exclusive right to differentiate between members and non-members of the people, 
their acts of differentiation significantly affect others who are not consulted by democratic 
decision making processes; “Those whose rights to inclusion or exclusion from the demos are 
being decided upon will not themselves be the ones to decide upon these rules.”501  Consequently, 
there is a deficit of democratic legitimacy regarding the acts that differentiate between members 
and non-members of the people and, by extension, the self-constitution of the democratic people 
itself. 
This deficit is problematic from the standpoint of any theory of democratic political 
legitimation (such as Benhabib’s own combination of discourse ethics and deliberative 
democratic theory) that holds that democratic deliberation should involve all persons affected by 
the issues or questions being deliberated.502  Benhabib writes: 
Because the discourse theory of ethics articulates a universalist moral standpoint, 
it cannot limit the scope of the moral conversation only to those who reside 
within nationally recognized boundaries…  The principle of discourse ethics… 
demands that all those whose interests are affected by a policy, a norm, and their 
consequences have a say in their articulation as equals in a practical discourse.503  
 
Because the boundary-setting required by democratic self-constitution necessarily affects 
outsiders—including foreigners, aliens, potential citizens, and the disenfranchised—who do not 
have an equal say in deliberations concerning boundaries, democratic self-constitution runs afoul 
of the universalist principles of discourse ethics.504  “Democracies cannot choose the boundaries 
                                                
500 Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism, 167. 
501 Benhabib, Rights of Others, 206. 
502 See Benhabib, Rights of Others, 12-15, 112, and Another Cosmopolitanism, 17-20, 32-6. 
503 Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism, 18, and Rights of Others, 112. 
504 The potential universality of this version of the all-affected principle shows that discourse ethics is not by 
itself a politics, but a frame for the contest of particularities essential to political deliberation.   
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of their own membership democratically,” because the demos that can decide on matters of 
constitution will always be too exclusive for genuinely democratic decision-making.505  
According to Benhabib, this paradox is insoluble within the institutional structures of 
particular democracies.  However, once democratic self-constitution is understood as an ongoing 
process that affects non-members as well as members, the acts of boundary-setting and 
differentiation necessary for democratic self-constitution can be opened to continual negotiation, 
revision, and contest through what Benhabib calls “democratic iteration.”506  The practice of 
democratic iteration, which I examine in more detail below, helps to reduce the democratic 
deficit inherent in the self-constitution of the demos by continually contesting the acts of closure 
that make democracy possible.507  However, so long as the legal determination of democracy’s 
borders ultimately rests with the members of the bounded people itself, the deficit cannot be fully 
eliminated.  The paradox of democratic constitution “can never be fully resolved for 
democracies,” not even by dynamic and inclusive democratic practices.508 
Carol Gould also recognizes the paradox of democratic constitution, which she views as a 
potential obstacle to the development of democratic communities between and beyond the 
boundaries of existing nation-states.  In an era characterized by increasing economic, political, 
social, and environmental interdependence, individuals and communities everywhere are 
increasingly affected by social issues and political decisions that originate beyond their own 
states.  In order to preserve and extend the freedom of all persons—but especially those whose 
                                                
505 Ibid., 35.  
506 “While the paradox that those who are not members of the demos will remain affected by its decisions of 
inclusion and exclusion can never be completely eliminated, its effects can be mitigated through reflexive acts of 
democratic iteration by the people who critically examines and alters its own practices of exclusion.  We can render 
the distinctions between ‘citizens’ and ‘aliens’, ‘us’ and ‘them’, fluid and negotiable through democratic iterations.”  
Benhabib, Rights of Others, 21. 
507 Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism, 68. 
508 Benhabib, Rights of Others, 47.  See also Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism, 35. 
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human and civil rights are most threatened—Gould articulates a model of democracy in which 
even distant persons might realize their “equal positive freedom” in relation to one another.509  
 Like the borders of nation-states, the scope of potentially transnational democratic 
deliberation cannot be determined democratically.  Gould writes: 
Democracy normatively understood entails a conception of the demos, or the 
collectivity that has the right to participate in democratic decision making, and 
this is a difficult issue for global democratic theory.  Indeed, it gives rise to one of 
the many paradoxes of democracy, inasmuch as the issue of who gets to make 
democratic decisions—the scope of the demos—cannot itself be settled 
democratically without an infinite regress.510 
 
Like Whelan and Benhabib, Gould understands the paradox of democratic constitution as a 
decisive obstacle to any straightforwardly democratic procedure for determining the boundaries 
of democracy: “It would thus seem that issues of membership in a demos (or citizenship)… 
require an appeal to concepts beyond those of self-determination or self-rule per se.”511  In 
response to this obstacle, Gould articulates two principles for determining the scope of 
democracy according to democratic norms, if not democratic procedure.512  These are the 
common activities criterion and a restricted version of the “all-affected” principle that tracks 
impact on human rights.513  I will examine these two principles below.  For now, it is important 
to note that although Gould proposes them as means to realize the more fundamental norm that 
democracy itself serves, namely equal positive freedom, the principles are intended to mitigate 
                                                
509 Gould, Globalizing Democracy, 34-7, and “Structuring Global Democracy: Political Communities, Universal 
Human Rights, and Transnational Representation,” Metaphilosophy 40, no. 1 (2009): 28. 
510 Gould, Globalizing Democracy, 174.  Earlier in Globalizing Democracy, Gould refers to a “constitutional 
circle” that loosely resembles the vicious circle described by Arendt in her remarks on constituent power (Arendt, 
On Revolution, 175-6).  The constitutional circle is a different expression of the same circular logic that underlies 
the paradox of democratic constitution: whatever acts are necessary to make democracy possible, they cannot 
themselves be democratic without invoking a regress or vicious circle.  Gould briefly examines this circular logic in 
Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), which contains the kernel of her later articulation of the constitutional circle 
(127, 224-5). 
511 Gould, Globalizing Democracy, 175. 
512 Omar Dahbour takes up a similar strategy in “Borders, Consent, and Democracy,” Journal of Social 
Philosophy 36, no. 2 (2005): 255-272. 
513 Gould, Globalizing Democracy, 174-8, 210-2, and “Structuring Global Democracy,” 28-31. 
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the undemocratic effects of the paradox of democratic constitution without actually dissolving 
the paradox itself.514  For Gould as for Whelan and Benhabib, democratic constitution can never 
be fully legitimated according to strictly democratic procedure.  
The paradox of democratic constitution might be read as a regress problem.  On this 
interpretation, the legitimate constitution of a demos requires and presupposes some already 
existing and legitimately constituted demos, which can use a democratic decision-procedure to 
decide upon the boundaries of the new demos.  This regress is potentially infinite.515  Every 
legitimately constituted demos presupposes a prior, legitimately constituted demos, and if any 
demos is not legitimately constituted (the very first one, for example), then the legitimacy of all 
subsequent demoi is jeopardized.   
However, this reading of the paradox does not illuminate the deeper problem, which 
takes the form of a vicious circle rather than a regress.  Democracy requires and presupposes, not 
merely the legitimate constitution of the demos by just any other demos, but the legitimate 
constitution of the demos by itself.  As Gould puts it, “Democracy itself has to be self-determined 
rather than other-determined or imposed.”516  An act of democratic constitution can never be 
democratic ‘all the way down’, not because this requires an existing demos and democratic 
procedure, but because it requires the very demos that is to be constituted.  This is the meaning of 
the democratic deficit that attends democratic constitution: genuinely democratic constitution is 
                                                
514 Gould, Globalizing Democracy, 34-7, 174-5. 
515 Abizadeh implicitly interprets Whelan’s boundary problem as a regress when he proposes to solve it by 
appealing to a global meta-demos consisting of all persons. Abizadeh, “Democratic Theory,” 37-65.  Issues of 
impracticality aside, Abizadeh’s solution fails because the problem is a vicious circle, not a regress, so it cannot be 
solved by appealing to a prior or wider demos.  Even though Abizadeh does not solve the problem according to its 
own terms, his proposed solution is an important complement to Benhabib’s and Gould’s responses to the paradoxes 
of democratic constitution.  Like them, he appeals to normatively democratic criteria for democratic inclusion, rather 
than strictly defined democratic decision procedures (because the demos deciding is not the demos being decided 
for).  
516 Gould, “Self-Determination Beyond Sovereignty: Relating Transnational Democracy to Local Autonomy,” 
Journal of Social Philosophy 37, no. 1 (2006): 52.   In its original context, this remark does not invoke a vicious 
circle because it refers to an already determined collective self defined by the common activity of its members.  See 
below, page 213-4.  
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self-constitution, which requires authorization, not from some other collective self, but from the 
constituted collective self.  Democratic constitution is never democratic enough, because the 
source of democratic legitimacy lags behind the constitutive act that requires it.  This does not 
mean, of course, that democracies are impossible to constitute, or that actually constituted and 
self-constituting democracies are not genuine democracies.  Rather, it simply confirms what 
Whelan, Benhabib, and Gould all claim: democracy is not self-legitimating.  
This deeper interpretation of the paradox illuminates the connection between the paradox 
of democratic constitution and the paradox of sovereignty.  The circle that prevents genuinely 
democratic self-constitution is a specific version of the circle that characterizes any sovereign’s 
constitution of its collective subject.  Every sovereign depends, for its constitutive authority, not 
upon just any collective subject, but upon the collective subject that it constitutes via its 
authority.  In instances of democratic constitution or reconstitution, the people-as-sovereign 
constitutes the people-as-subject, but the legitimacy of the constitutive act depends upon, not 
some prior version of the people, or some other democratic people, or even some more expansive 
notion of the people, but upon the people-as-subject itself.517  The democratic deficit that 
inevitably results is one particular expression of the indebtedness that characterizes every 
sovereign’s constitution of its own collective subject.  The paradox of democratic constitution, 
then, is a species of the paradox of sovereignty.   
                                                
517 This is why, in Democracy and the Foreigner (Princeton: Princeton University Press,  2001), Honig notes that 
it is newly arriving and naturalizing immigrants that legitimate the democratic state by enacting the fantasy of freely 
chosen, consensual membership (75, 93-4).  Legitimacy comes from the new demos as it is being formed, in and 
after the acts of differentiation, inclusion, and exclusion that form it, rather than from the demos prior to such acts.  
This means that the acts themselves are imperfectly legitimated at the moment of their performance; the act of 
democratic constitution exceeds the legitimacy that comes from the constitution itself.  This may be interpreted in 
terms of an act of founding violence that is repeated throughout the life of a democratic regime, or an exceptional 
situation that escapes the rule of law.  However, it may also be interpreted as a falling-short of legitimation (or 
authorization) that presents an opportunity for political innovation, renewal, and contest.  This is the interpretation 
that I, following Honig and others, take below.      
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Democracy makes sovereign indebtedness especially visible, because it upholds an 
explicitly institutionalized norm that goes unsatisfied in the act of constitution: democratically 
legitimate self-government, which implies legitimate self-constitution.  In undemocratic 
instances of sovereignty, there is a similar norm, although one that is not usually so explicitly 
institutionalized: authority.518  As I argued in Chapter 1, authority cannot be exercised without 
the authorization of the subjects over which it is exercised.  As I argued in the brief interlude 
between Chapters 2 and 3, sovereign authority, in order to be internally supreme and externally 
independent, must be authorized by the collective subject over which it is exercised, and which it 
constitutes.  In the same way that a demos cannot be constituted in a way that is fully democratic, 
because doing so would presuppose the constituted demos, an undemocratic sovereign’s 
collective subject cannot be constituted in a way that is fully authoritative—that is, in the way 
characteristic of sovereignty—because doing so would presuppose the constituted collective 
subject.  In both cases, the circular logic is the same: the act of constitution’s “effect would have 
to become the cause.”519  The circular logic that characterizes democracy is thus not exclusive to 
democracy.  Rather, it lies at the heart of the modern ideal of sovereignty itself, insofar as 
internally supreme, externally independent, and (self-)bounded political authority must, in order 
to be supreme, independent, self-bounding, and authoritative, constitute, as its collective subject, 
its own source of authorization.  
In fact, democracy can be described as the institutionalization of the interminability of the 
paradox of sovereignty.  In an ideally democratic polity, the ultimate source of authority—the 
demos—is always open to contestation, (re)constitution, and (re)authorization.  Contest over the 
                                                
518 See above, page 2.  In fact, it may be that in some cases, the effective exercise of sovereignty depends upon 
not explicitly institutionalizing (or even actively obscuring) the authority relation that binds the sovereign and its 
collective subject, insofar as that relation entails the sovereign’s indebtedness to its subject.  
519 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 71. 
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constitution of the demos is part of the normal functioning, rather than the exceptional 
breakdown, of democratic activity: “Self-governance implies self-constitution.”520  Some 
democratic theories and practices deny that there is an ultimate source of authority or 
constitution beyond contestation.  From the perspective of a thoroughly democratic politics, there 
is no natural and indisputable font of political legitimacy and no essential and immutable version 
of the people.   
The absence of any original or final source of incontestable authority may be a truism of 
democracy, but it is an unexpected truth of sovereignty.  Sovereignty does not present itself as 
fundamentally contestable; it appears as an end or resolution, rather than a site, of political 
contest.  One interpretation of sovereignty’s paradoxical structure would seem to vindicate this 
appearance.  Sovereign authority can be read as so imperious that, in constituting its own 
collective subject, the sovereign essentially authorizes itself by literally bringing into existence 
the basis of its own authority.  In this closed circle, the sovereign would seem to be always-
already authorized, or at least always able to secure its own authorization, because it alone is 
uniquely capable of manufacturing the collective agent that, in a modern world characterized by 
an absence of external reservoirs of authority, is the only viable source of sovereign authority.  
On this interpretation of the paradox, sovereignty is the end or conclusion of politics. 
 Critical attention to the paradox of democratic constitution suggests against this reading 
of sovereignty’s paradox.  In a way analogous to the deficit that characterizes democratic self-
constitution, the sovereign cannot authoritatively constitute its source of authorization, the 
people, because doing so presupposes the authorization of the people that is yet to be constituted.  
On this alternative reading, sovereign authority is so indebted that the sovereign constantly has to 
continually constitute the collective subject that it needs for its authority—and this need presents 
                                                
520 Benhabib, Rights of Others, 19.   
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an opportunity for challenging sovereign authority.  In this closed circle, the sovereign is always 
under-authorized, at least with regard to its constitutive acts, because the source of its 
constitutive authority always appears too late.521  The sovereign’s constitution of its own 
collective subject is not an end to politics, but a site of, and occasion for, political contest.  
To Whelan, Benhabib, and Gould, the practical and logical inability of a demos to 
determine its boundaries and constitute itself through democratic means suggests a limit to 
democracy’s self-legitimation.  There is something in democracy’s conditions of possibility that 
necessarily escapes democratic procedures of legitimation, such that the constitution and 
legitimation of any particular demos is always indeterminately or incompletely achieved by 
democratic procedure.  Alan Keenan puts the point well: “The closures necessary to the people’s 
identity and rule, then, in a paradox typical of democratic self-rule, mean that the people never in 
fact completely closes in on itself, never reaches completion or achievement.”522  Insofar as 
democratic legitimacy requires a constituted demos, legitimacy lags behind constitution.  This 
means that the act of constitution, as well as its outcome—the constituted demos—is never fully 
legitimated or finally accomplished.   
The same holds true for sovereignty itself, even in its undemocratic forms, because of the 
paradoxical interrelation of constitution and authorization that is characteristic of sovereignty.  In 
the same way that the circular logic of democratic (self-)legitimation and (self-)constitution 
entails that democracy is never fully self-legitimated, the circular logic of sovereign 
                                                
521 William Connolly expresses this well, in a formulation that has significantly influenced my thinking: 
“Sovereignty always occurs after the moment it claims to occupy.  The paradox of politics/sovereignty resides in 
this temporal gap between act and the consent that enables it.  And this temporal gap contains an element of 
arbitrariness that cannot be eliminated from political life.”  Connolly, Ethos of Pluralization, 139.  For Connolly, the 
paradox of sovereignty is primarily this temporal gap, which can be overcome in time.  On my interpretation of 
sovereignty’s paradox, which follows Honig’s criticisms of Connolly (but pace Honig, locates the paradox in 
sovereignty rather than only in democracy), the circular structure of authorization and constitution is practically and 
theoretically insoluble.  See Honig, Emergency Politics, Chapter 1.  I also do not conflate the authorization of 
sovereignty with consent, as Connolly appears to in the passage above. 
522 Keenan, Democracy in Question (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 11.   
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authorization and constitution entails that sovereignty is never fully self-authorized.  This is the 
surprising lesson that the paradox of democratic constitution suggests for the paradox of 
sovereignty: It is because a sovereign constitutes the basis of its own authority—its collective 
subject—that the constitutive authority of the sovereign, and the constitution of its subject, 
always remain politically contestable, indeterminate, and incomplete.  Sovereignty is a particular 
kind of political authority that constitutes ‘the people’ over which it rules, but ‘the people’ is 
never fully and finally constituted by sovereign authority. 
 
Part II: Closure and Contest 
 
The necessary incompleteness of the sovereign’s authority and the subject’s constitution 
presents an ambiguous opportunity for politically negotiating the paradox of sovereignty.  On 
one hand, the circular interrelation of authority and constitution may invite, or even require, an 
unauthorized, unlegitimated, and potentially violent act of constitution to initially define the 
collective subject that can be the source of sovereign authority.  In other words, the chicken-or-
egg structure of sovereignty may require that the constitution of the people be, at least initially, 
posited, decided, or otherwise determined by historically contingent and potentially arbitrary 
means, rather than rather through an exercise of authority.523  On the other hand, the paradoxical 
interdependence of authorization and constitution may invite, or even require, perpetual contest 
over any act of constitution that defines the sovereign’s collective subject.  If no sovereign act of 
constitution can be fully authorized, then the outcome of every such act—the constitution of the 
any sovereign’s collective subject—is open to political contest.  
                                                
523 See above, page 180, note 497. 
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In other words, the paradox of sovereignty may be negotiated through accepting 
historically contingent acts of political closure or through ongoing political contest.  Both of 
these strategies have been explored as potential responses to the paradox of democratic 
constitution.  In the remainder of this chapter, I will examine each approach to the democratic 
form of the paradox in order to clarify the political stakes of the paradox of sovereignty more 
generally.  I will argue that the first strategy—the strategy of political closure—has been 
essential to modern and contemporary practices of sovereignty.  Put more boldly, the paradox of 
sovereignty has historically been suppressed, in actual political practice, by unauthorized 
determinations of ‘the people’ that, when taken for granted, constrain possibilities for any deeply 
democratic form of popular self-determination.  Turning to the second strategy—the strategy of 
continual contest—I will loosely follow the work of Benhabib and Gould to suggest how the 
paradox of sovereignty might be acknowledged, rather than suppressed, in ways that may enable, 
rather than disable, democratic self-determination.   
 
Closure 
Like the paradox of democratic constitution, the paradox of sovereignty expresses a 
circular interdependence of authorization and constitution that cannot be interrupted, initiated, or 
ended through any final or complete act of constitution or authorization.  This does not mean, 
however, that sovereign authorization and constitution are impossible.  It means, rather, that 
sovereign constitutive authority is not authoritative ‘all the way down’ and, consequently, the 
constitution of the sovereign’s collective subject is never authoritatively accomplished.  The 
constitution of the people must ultimately rest on something other than an act of sovereign 
constitutive authority.   
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 With regard to democratic versions of the paradox of sovereignty, the implication is that 
democracy rests on undemocratic foundations.  If democratic self-constitution can never be fully 
democratically legitimated, then democratic procedure taken by itself lacks the normative 
resources for ruling out any historically contingent acts of closure that differentiate members 
from non-members.  Furthermore, democracy seems to initially require an unlegitimated act of 
closure in order to originally establish the demos necessary for future democratic legitimation.  
This appears to be the lesson that Whelan draws from his exploration of democracy’s boundary 
problem.  He writes: 
It may be that democracy is practicable only when a historically given solution of 
this issue (justifiable or not, by some theory other than democratic theory) is 
acceptable…  It appears that our only choices are to abide by the arbitrary verdicts 
of history or war, or to appeal on an ad hoc basis to other principles, none of 
which commands general respect.524 
 
Whelan concludes by noting the boundary problem reveals “one of the limits of the applicability 
of democracy,” which suggests that “historically given” and “ad hoc” solutions do most, if not 
all, of the work of determining the boundaries of actual democracies.525  This will come as no 
surprise to political historians, and of course Whelan is not alone in noting the undemocratic and 
morally arbitrary foundations of democracies.526   
                                                
524 Whelan, “Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem,” 16, 40.  Whelan notes that a given solution to the 
problem, no matter how arbitrary, should be “acceptable,” if not “justifiable.”  The problem becomes all the more 
difficult when we ask: Who must accept a particular solution to the paradox? 
525 Ibid., 42.  Gould mentions the idea of using this kind of “historical view” as an undemocratic criterion for 
democratic inclusion: “Yet another citizenship-based approach could stress instead that it is simply a matter of being 
situated together with others within boundaries, where these may be historically given or even arbitrary, that gives 
rise to rights to participate.”  Gould, Globalizing Democracy, 175.  She rejects this strategy by proposing her own 
two principles for democratic inclusion. 
526 Habermas, for instance, writes: “In the real world, who gains the power to define the boundaries of a political 
community is settled by historical chance and the actual course of events—normally, by the arbitrary outcomes of 
wars or civil wars.  It is a theoretical mistake with grave practical consequences, one dating back to the nineteenth 
century, to assume that this question can also be answered in normative terms with reference to a right to national 
self-determination.”  Jürgen Habermas, “The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and 
Citizenship” in Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, C. Ciaron and P. de Greiff, eds. (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 2000), 115. 
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What is surprising, however, is that the historical contingency at the core of democratic 
politics is frequently built into the foundations of normative democratic theory.  In her own 
exploration of the paradox of democratic constitution, Sophia Näsström argues that John Rawls, 
Michael Walzer, Rogers M. Smith, Jürgen Habermas, Benhabib, and others problematically 
accept historical acts of political closure as the starting points, rather than sites or occasions, of 
normative inquiry.527  In some cases, contrary to Näsström’s claims, this decision is merely a 
matter of these theorists ensuring that their normative work makes contact with the ‘real world’ 
of political practice.528  In other cases, however, Näsström convincingly argues that normative 
theorizing concedes too much to the morally arbitrary vicissitudes of history by accepting 
historical determinations of the people as frameworks for, rather than occasions for, theoretical 
inquiry.  The most general point, however, is that in normative democratic theory as well as in 
actual democratic practice, the paradox of democratic constitution is frequently ‘dissolved’ or 
ignored by accepting or presupposing historically contingent and democratically unlegitimated 
acts of political closure.   
When this point is appropriated for an analysis of the paradox of sovereignty, we can see 
that, in both theory and practice, the boundaries of territory provide the historically contingent 
means of political closure that determines—without authoritatively constituting—the collective 
subject over which sovereignty is exercised.  The paradox of sovereignty can be ‘dissolved’ by 
inscribing the limits of sovereign authority, and correlatively the constitutive boundaries of the 
people, within the apparently given boundaries of a particular territory.  However, when the 
                                                
527 Näsström, “Legitimacy of the People,” 624-658.  For similar arguments, see Margaret Canovan, Nationhood 
and Political Theory (Brookfield, Vermont: Edward Elgar, 1996) and Keenan, Democracy in Question. 
528 Näsström’s specific criticisms of Habermas and Benhabib, for example, are overstated.  Given a world of 
historical injustices, theorizing “a retroactive process of legitimacy” is not the same as removing questions of 
constitutional legitimacy from normative inquiry (or political engagement).  Näsström, “Legitimacy of the People, 
632.  Nor is it the same as denying “the gap in the constitution of the people,” which, as I have shown, Benhabib 
takes seriously (Ibid., 631).  Nonetheless, Näsström’s overall argument is generally instructive, and some of her 
criticisms inform my examination of Benhabib’s work below. 
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people itself appears as a consequence of geography, rather than as both a cause and an effect of 
a particular political relation, the circular logic of constitution and authorization is grounded, not 
in some external reservoir of sovereign authority, but in an apparently pre-political frame, or 
container, for the constitution of the collective subject.  When this kind of “historically given” or 
“ad hoc” solution to the paradox of sovereignty is most effective, it suppresses the paradox 
altogether, although without finally dissolving it, as I argue below.529  The modern ideal of 
sovereignty does not generally appear paradoxical, because its territorial framework is generally 
taken for granted.  
In Chapter 2, I argued that sovereignty must necessarily be bounded, but that its 
boundaries need not be territorial.  There is no logically or conceptually necessary connection 
between the boundaries of sovereign authority and the boundaries of territory, although there is a 
strong historical connection between them.  This historical connection is based on a functional 
relation in which territory—or, more accurately, territoriality, as “a powerful geographic strategy 
to control people and things by controlling area”—facilitates the realization of the modern ideal 
of sovereignty.530  Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide a detailed 
analysis of the historical and functional relations between sovereignty and territory, I will sketch 
the outlines of such an analysis in order to show how territoriality facilitates the unauthorized 
                                                
529 Whelan, “Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem,” 42. 
530 Robert Sack, Human Territoriality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 5.  Recently, Avery 
Kolers has drawn upon Sack’s widely influential work to define territoriality as “a strategy of bounding and 
controlling, and thereby making, geographic places” by regulating “the flows of people across the border and within 
the place itself.”  Kolers, Land, Conflict, and Justice: A Political Theory of Territory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 4.  See also John Agnew, Globalization and Sovereignty (New York: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2009), 29: “Territoriality is the strategic use of territory to attain organizational goals.”  The emphasis of 
geographers on territorial “strategies” can be misleading.  Territoriality involves conscious orientations to territory, 
but, as Sack notes, the particular effects and tendencies of territorial strategies need not be intended by territorial 
actors.  Sack, Human Territoriality, 31.  More generally, territoriality functions like a generalized ‘social logic’ or 
‘rules of the game’ that governs the practical and perceptual organization of power, persons, and space.   
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acts of political closure that perform—but do not actually achieve—the resolution of 
sovereignty’s paradox. 
The modern link between sovereignty and territory is frequently associated with the 1648 
Treaties of Westphalia, although, of course, geographically organized authority predates the 
treaties.  Nonetheless, the treaties formalize a distinct “sovereign territorial ideal” that emerged 
out of the decline of medieval systems of authority, and was later embodied in the development 
of modern European states.531  Whereas medieval systems of authority were characterized by 
translocal rule over persons—in particular, networks of personal loyalty or unbounded 
communities of followers—the Westphalian ideal of sovereignty can be characterized as 
localized rule over geographic space, and, in particular, over exclusive, “self-enclosed territorial 
domains.”532  Although there have always been competitors and exceptions to the territorial ideal 
of sovereignty, today the hegemony of territorial sovereignty has been so thoroughly achieved—
partly through political aspiration, and partly through imperial, colonial, and capitalist 
imposition—that proponents and critics of sovereignty alike tend to associate the political ideal 
of sovereignty with its territorial mode of realization.533  
The transition from unbounded medieval authority to bounded modern sovereignty was, 
with regard to subjects, a transition from a life of multiple, overlapping, and competing political 
obligations and allegiances to a life in which one source of political obligation and allegiance 
                                                
531 Alexander Murphy, “The Sovereign State System as a Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary 
Considerations” in State Sovereignty as a Social Construct, T. Biersterker and C . Weber, eds. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 82.  See also Joseph Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Hendrick Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996); James Caporaso, “Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority 
and Sovereignty,” International Studies Review 2, no. 2 (2000): 1-28; Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), especially Chapters 3, 5, 6; Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, 
Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), especially Chapter 2. 
532 Neil Brenner, “Beyond State-centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in Globalization 
Studies,” Theory and Society 28, no. 1 (1999): 45.  
533 John Agnew convincingly argues that debates concerning globalization versus sovereignty have strengthened 
the assumption that sovereignty is necessarily territorial.  See Agnew, Globalization and Sovereignty, especially 
Chapters 1 and 2. 
 195 
could make an intelligible claim to trump all others.534  Territoriality, as a strategy of controlling 
people by controlling bounded geographic space, was instrumental to this transition.  Three 
functions of territoriality in particular have been crucial to suppressing the paradox of 
sovereignty.  
First, territoriality mediates authority and subjection by providing a visible, imaginable, 
and easily determinable framework for secular, impersonal, and abstract forms of political 
authority.535  Saskia Sassen details the importance of these effects to the development of modern 
sovereignty.  She writes: 
The national territorial state became the final locus of authority rather than a 
monarch’s divinity, a lord’s nobility, or the claims of religious bodies.  It 
repositioned the meaning of membership toward a territorial collectivity derived 
from a complex abstract authority that could not be reduced to a divine king or 
“superior caste” of the nobility.536  
 
Once political authority and subjection are localized to a particular territory, the territory itself—
rather than personal allegiance, fidelity to a set of beliefs, or identification with the interests of 
particular rulers—can become the relevant framework for command and obedience.537  This, in 
turn, facilitates the removal of the basis of sovereign authority from contest, insofar as the 
sovereign’s exercise of constitutive authority, and its indebtedness to the constituted subject, are 
presented as separate relations between the sovereign and the territory, and the territory and the 
subjects.  On one hand, the territory appears as the entity over which the sovereign rightfully 
rules: “Territory is so important to political governance in part because it provides a locus for the 
exercise of political authority over a range of interests and initiatives...  It allows political claims 
                                                
534 See Chapter 2, pages 64-6, above. 
535 Sack, Human Territoriality, 32-3, 38; Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights, 72, 80-1. 
536 Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights, 80. 
537 John Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,” International 
Organization 47, no. 1 (1993): 151. 
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to be operationalized—they become claims over the regulation of space.”538  On the other hand, 
the territory also becomes the entity in which subjects locate their common allegiance and 
obligation: “Effective territories were units where decision space, the writ of effective 
legislation, shared the same boundaries with identity space, the extended turf that claimed 
citizens’ loyalties… [and] to which ordinary men and women tended to ascribe their most 
meaningful public loyalties.”539  In this way, territoriality mediates the authority’s prerogative to 
command and the subject’s obligation to obey by introducing a material body—the territory—as 
the site of authority and subjection.540  This material body provides a particular, concrete 
localization within which supreme and independent authority can be exercised universally and 
abstractly, through legal-political apparatuses rather than through direct rule over particular 
persons, groups, and communities.541  
Second, territoriality objectifies the jurisdiction of authority.542  Geographer Jean Gottman 
writes, “As the concept of a corporate national sovereignty gradually replaced the personal 
prerogatives of the individual sovereign, territorial delimitation acquired much more 
significance: it fixed limits to the spatial extent of sovereignty and outlined the size and location 
                                                
538 Murphy, “The Sovereign State System,” 110; Charles Maier, “Transformations of Territoriality: 1600-2000” 
in Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien.  Edited by G. Budde, et al. (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 36.   
539 Maier, “Transformations of Territoriality,” 35, 48.    
540 As Claude Lefort writes, “The image of the immortal body of the king is grafted onto that of the territorial 
state… A whole segment of the history of beliefs remains hidden if we ignore how transcendence was transferred 
into the frontiers of worldly space.” Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory. D. Macey, trans. (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1988.), 269.  See also Ernst Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1997). 
541 The territorial body of modern sovereignty is concrete enough to provide the visibility and tangibility that 
Walzer indicates when he writes, “The state is invisible; it must be personified before it can be seen, symbolized 
before it can be loved, imagined before it can be conceived.”  Michael Walzer, “On the Role of Symbolism in 
Political Thought,” Political Science Quarterly, 82, no. 2 (1967): 193.  At the same time, the territorial body is 
abstract enough to preserve some of the impersonal and universal character of ecclesiastical and imperial systems of 
authority.  Thus, the territorial localization of sovereignty splits the difference between the personal networks of 
feudal authority and the universal systems of ecclesiastical and imperial rule that were declining in the late medieval 
period. 
542 “Territoriality provides a means of reifying power.” Sack, Human Territoriality, 32. 
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of it.”543  This does not mean that territories themselves limit the exercise of sovereignty, although 
there may indeed be practical geographic constraints to the exercise of sovereign authority.  
Rather, sovereigns can, in relation to their subjects and to one another, map the jurisdiction of 
their own authority onto specific territories.  This geographic delimitation of sovereignty 
objectifies the limits of sovereign authority such that they appear, not as the variable outcomes of 
(internal) interactions of authorization and subjection and (external) negotiations, through which 
sovereigns continually bound themselves, but as political resources which must be brought under 
sovereign authority. 
Territoriality delimits sovereign authority, but sovereign authority is not undermined or 
eroded by territoriality.  Rather, territorial bounding facilitates sovereignty, insofar as the borders 
of a territory provide a means of marking, knowing, and enforcing the limits, and so also the 
extent, of supreme and independent authority.  The coherence of sovereignty’s boundedness 
allows for coherent regulation of the flow of people and things into and out of the scope of 
political authority, and enables authorities to coherently organize the relations between actors 
within that scope.  Thus, the territorial organization of sovereignty enables a rationalization of 
authorization and subjection generally, and legality in particular, that were impossible under 
medieval systems of authority.  For this reason, Max Weber identifies territoriality as “an 
essentially defining feature” of the modern state.544  Moreover, territorial boundaries provide 
physical sites where potentially competing spheres of sovereignty can be differentiated and 
negotiated.  Territory gives states something to fight over in negotiations of independence, and it 
                                                
543 Jean Gottman, The Significance of Territory, 49.  Caporaso writes, “Territoriality is also used to denote a 
principle of political organization that delimits the spatial scope of public authority.  In this usage, the reach of 
public political authority is coterminous with the physical boundaries of the state, that is, with its geographic 
borders… Territoriality links politics as authoritative rule with the geographical reach of this rule.” Caporaso, 
“Changes in the Westphalian Order,” 7. 
544 Weber, “Politics as a Vocation” in The Vocation Lectures, D. Owen and T. Strong, eds (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 2004), 33.    
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provides clear markers for violations of non-interference norms.  This, in turn, enables the 
rationalization of the modern interstate system and the development of a coherent body of 
international law.545  Taken together, these effects suggest that the territorial delimitation of 
sovereign authority, far from undermining that authority, in fact makes it more effective with 
respect to the internal and external aspects that territoriality helps to differentiate.  
Third, and most importantly for this dissertation, territoriality provides a coherent means 
of grouping the subjects of sovereign authority and differentiating this group from political 
actors who are not subject to the sovereign.  This is a corollary of the previous function.  The 
boundaries of sovereign authority are, correlatively, the limits of subjection to that authority, and 
when the boundaries of sovereignty are effectively mapped onto territory, subjection to 
sovereignty is determined, with some determinate exceptions, by location within a geographic 
area, rather than through an immediate negotiation of sovereign command and obedience.546  An 
individual is a subject of the king, or a member of “We the people,” by virtue of a fact 
concerning birth, residency, or location in a particular geographic area.  In his study of the 
origins of the modern state, Hendrik Spruyt expresses this well: 
The modern state defines the human collectivity in a completely novel way.  It 
defines individuals by spatial markers, regardless of kin, tribal affiliation, or 
                                                
545 This is not to say that the territorial limits of sovereign authority are always, or even frequently, respected 
within that system.  See Steven Krasner’s Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1999) for a catalogue of instances in which state authority reaches beyond territorial boundaries.  For a note of 
caution about Krasner’s analyses, see page 97, above. 
546 In his historical analysis of international relations, Ruggie emphasizes that the territorial organization of 
subjection is essential to modern sovereignty: “The distinctive feature of the modern system of rule is that it has 
differentiated its subject collectively into territorially defined, fixed and mutually exclusive enclaves of legitimate 
dominion.” Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond,” 151.  Territorial criteria for subjection are also essential to Weber’s 
definition of the modern state, and political community more broadly.  In Economy and Society, he writes: “The 
term political community’ shall apply to a community whose social action is aimed at subordinating to orderly 
domination by the participants a ‘territory’ and the conduct of the persons within it, through readiness to resort to 
physical force, including normally force of arms.  The territory must at any time be in some way determinable, but it 
need not be constant or definitely limited.  The persons are those who are in the territory either permanently or 
temporarily.”  Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, G. Roth and C. Wittich, eds. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), II:901, italics added.  
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religious beliefs.  Individuals are in a sense amorphous and undifferentiated 
entities who are given an identity simply by their location in a particular area.547 
 
Of course, territories themselves do not subject subjects.  Rather, territoriality provides coherent 
criteria for subjection, and these criteria play a double role.  First, the control and bounding of 
territorial space designates which actors are subject to a particular sovereign (i.e., the one whose 
authority is coextensive with the territory).548  Second, and less directly, the control and bounding 
of territorial space designates whether a particular actor is subject to a particular sovereign.549  In 
this regard, territoriality does not justify subjection to sovereign authority, but it clarifies when 
an actor is subject to that authority.  According to the modern territorial ideal of sovereignty, an 
actor is generally subject to a particular sovereign when he or she is within the territorial domain 
of the sovereign’s authority.550  
The territorial boundaries of sovereignty do not merely differentiate between individual 
subjects and non-subjects.  They also provide criteria for defining the collective subject of 
sovereignty.  As discussed in Chapter 2, to be included within a sphere of sovereign authority is 
to be constituted, along with all other subjects, as the collective subject of sovereignty.  This is 
not the constitution of a collective identity in any ‘thick’ sense, but it is the constitution of a 
determinate collective subject, in which individual members are united by their common 
subjection and differentiated, individually and as a group, from political actors that are not 
                                                
547 Spruyt, The Sovereign State, 35, italics added. 
548 “Territoriality is… a principle that defines the set of people over whom the holder of sovereignty rules.  They 
are to be identified, territoriality says, by virtue of their location within borders.” Philpot, Revolutions in 
Sovereignty, 17. 
549 Philpot implies that territoriality is not a criteria of moral justification, but a criteria of jurisdiction: “The 
question to which territoriality provides the answer is, By virtue of what quality are citizens subject to their 
governing authority?...  It is by virtue of their residence in a state, one demarcated by boundaries, by lines drawn in 
the sand, or through the woods, or along a river, or at the extent of a general’s conquest” (Ibid.) 
550 For example, one must follow local laws, and can be arrested for violating them, when travelling in a foreign 
country.  There are, of course, exceptions and complications to this, as there are for all aspects of the modern ideal 
of sovereignty.  Importantly, however, the most obvious complicating examples (exceptional cases of extradition or 
diplomatic immunity) do not motivate against the prevalence of territorial sovereignty per se, unless the legal 
systems involved are truly transnational. 
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subject to the same sovereign.551  In a territorialized system of sovereignty, geographic borders 
designate which actors make up the sovereign’s collective subject.  The collective subject is 
composed of all actors—again, with determinate exceptions—within the territorial boundaries of 
sovereign authority.  As a corollary to the second function, it can be said that territoriality 
objectifies the composition of the collective subject of sovereignty such that it appears, not as an 
outcome of a dynamic political relation of authorization and subjection, but as a political 
resource that makes sovereign authority possible. 
In short, territoriality facilitates the achievement of modern sovereignty by providing a 
mediating framework for the exercise of sovereign authority, objectifying its jurisdiction, and 
objectifying the collective subject of that authority.  Territory itself does not perform these 
functions; rather, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, not territory but political agents 
perform them.  In particular, sovereigns perform these functions, by bounding their own 
authority and constituting their own collective subjects.  Nonetheless, territoriality—as a strategy 
for controlling people by defining and controlling space—enables sovereign acts of self-
bounding and constitution to appear as facts of geography, rather than as the effects, and causes, 
of particular relations between sovereigns and their subjects.  When sovereignty is understood as 
a form of political authority that is necessarily exercised within, and circumscribed by, territorial 
boundaries, then the constitution of the collective subject by the sovereign is masked as a pre-
political consequence of geography.  In this way, territoriality facilitates the unauthorized acts of 
political closure that seem to provide a way out of the circular interrelation of authorization and 
constitution that comprises the paradox of sovereignty.  Territoriality displaces the political 
                                                
551 There is evidence, however, that territorial criteria for subjection do, in fact, structure thicker political 
identities such as nationality, as well as particular ideologies, habits and ways of life.  As Charles Maier puts it, 
“Territorial organization in its own right—including the nature of frontiers—helps to shape what we term political 
identity.” Maier, “Being There: Place, Identity, and Territory” in Identities, Affiliations and Allegiances, S. 
Benhabib, et al., eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 80. 
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relationship of authority and subjection onto geographic features of the social world, and this 
makes the differentiation between members and non-members of the collective subject appear as 
simply one aspect of the way the world is, rather than as an instance of sovereign decision 
overstepping or outpacing its authorization.552   
Sack identifies this kind of displacement as an essential function of territorial strategies 
of authority and power in general: “Territoriality can be used to displace attention from the 
relationship between the controller and the controlled to the territory.”553  Much earlier, Rousseau 
hints at this displacement when he links “public territory” to sovereignty in the first book of On 
The Social Contract.  He writes, “Present-day monarchs… shrewdly call themselves Kings of 
France, of Spain, of England, etc.  By thus holding the land, they are quite sure of holding its 
inhabitants.”554  Foucault makes a similar claim concerning early modern forms of sovereignty: 
“Sovereignty is not exercised on things, but first of all on a territory and consequently on the 
subjects who inhabit it.”555  By transferring the composition of the sovereign’s collective subject 
onto what appears as the pre-political givenness or facticity of territory, the territorial ideal of 
modern sovereignty presents the people as given by social facts, geographical features, or 
historical outcomes, rather than constituted by political acts that, necessarily lacking 
authorization by the collective subject itself, would be continually open to contest.  Because the 
people appears to exist as a collective subject separate from the exercise of sovereign authority, 
the circles of the paradox of sovereignty appear to end, innocuously, in the determination of the 
people by virtue of its location within territorial boundaries. 
                                                
552 This displacement need not be an intentional strategy of particular sovereigns.  See page 193, note 530 above.   
553 Sack, Human Territoriality, 33.  Similarly, “Territoriality provides a means of reifying power” (Ibid 32). 
554 Rousseau, On the Social Contract, 56. 
555 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977—1978, M. 
Senellart, ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 96, italics added. 
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One historical example is particularly fitting for illuminating the way that territory has 
been treated as a pre-political or given frame for nominating the collective subject of 
sovereignty, prior to its constitution by sovereign authority, so as to dissolve or suppress the 
paradox of sovereignty.  During twentieth century struggles for decolonization, collective 
political self-determination became increasingly recognized as a basic human right and an 
expedient means for political liberation.  The articulation of this right in international law, 
however, immediately raised questions concerning which selves could be self-determining.  Ivor 
Jennings expresses the main difficulty succinctly and stingingly, raising the spectre of 
indeterminacy that haunts all instances of sovereign constitution: “The doctrine of self-
determination… seemed reasonable: let the people decide.  It was in fact ridiculous because the 
people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people.”556  In point of fact, this prior 
decision was made in international law, primarily by the colonial powers themselves, and 
codified in the United Nations Charter.  As James Crawford summarizes, without a trace of 
irony: “International law recognizes the principle of self-determination.  It is, however, not a 
right applicable to just any group of people desiring political independence or self-government…  
It applies as a matter of right only after the unit of self-determination has been determined.”557  
He then summarizes the accepted criteria for determining, as Jennings puts it, ‘who are the 
people’ that are eligible for collective self determination: 
The units to which the principle applies are those territories established and 
recognized as separate political units; in particular…  
(a) trust and mandated territories, and territories treated as non-self-
governing under Chapter XI of the Charter;  
(b) States…;  
                                                
556 Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government, cited in Dahbour, “Borders, Consent, Democracy,” 255.   
557 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 127, 
emphasis added. 
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(c) other territories forming distinct political-geographical areas whose 
inhabitants are arbitrarily excluded from any share in government… with 
the result that the territory becomes in effect… non-self-governing; and  
(d) any other territories or situations to which self-determination is applied 
by the parties as an appropriate solution.558 
 
In short, the post-colonial peoples eligible for self-determination were territorially defined, and 
the members of a particular people were identified by their location within the geographic 
borders that circumscribed the people.559  Although political self determination was frequently 
understood to be national self-determination, the nations in question were themselves understood 
to be circumscribed within, and defined by, territorial boundaries.  Jennings’s riddle concerning 
the determination of the self-determining people was thus apparently solved, and with it the 
paradox of sovereignty, by the kind of “historically given solution” that Whelan expects in his 
discussion of the paradox of democratic constitution.560   
 However, this example reveals the limitations of such a solution in much the same way 
that Sieyès’s thought revealed the limitations of positing a natural and pre-political end to the 
paradox of sovereignty.  Although the two cases are not identical, insofar as the territorial 
determination of the people is not purported to place the people’s constitution beyond the realm 
of politics altogether, the cases are similar, insofar as what is taken to be the foundation of the 
sovereign interrelation of authority and constitution is, in fact, a product of this interrelation.  In 
the post-colonial case, the initial territorial determination of the self-determining people was 
decided upon, facilitated, and enforced largely by the colonial powers themselves.  Moreover, 
the relevant territorial boundaries were for the most part artifacts of colonial administration, and 
                                                
558 Ibid., emphasis added. 
559 “‘People’ in this context did not imply the existence of a collective consciousness or solidarity; in the eyes of 
those who adopted the declaration, a ‘people’ was simply the population who happened to find themselves within a 
given set of boundaries, and ‘nation-building’ was supposed to follow independence, not precede it.”  Margaret 
Canovan, The People (Malden, MA: Polity, 2005), 42. 
560 Whelan, “Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem,” 16. 
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therefore legacies of precisely the political opposite of self-determination.  Although these 
boundaries were presented as morally arbitrary but historically given starting points for the acts 
of authorization and constitution that are essential to sovereignty, they were, in fact, products of 
previous (and in many cases, ongoing) exercises of constituent authority by foreign sovereigns.   
Practically, this has contributed to the difficulty of many post-colonial states in achieving 
or successfully challenging the standards of democracy, sovereignty, and state effectiveness 
advocated and imposed by former colonial powers.561  On a more theoretical but not unrelated 
level, the exercise of foreign sovereign authority over and through the intended foundations of 
domestic sovereignty means that the paradox of sovereignty, far from being resolved by the 
territorial definition of the self-determining people, has instead been more deeply entrenched.  
As in the case of Sieyès’s nation, the territorial starting points of post-colonial sovereignty, 
which are supposed to answer Jennings’s riddle by interrupting the circles of sovereignty’s 
paradox, are not apolitical deposits of history, but are in fact political through and through.  The 
territorial definition of the post-colonial people is not a transcendent framework that needs no 
authorization; rather, it has merely gone unauthorized. 
Territory is a political artifact, as well as a medium, of the interactions of authorization 
and constitution that are essential to sovereignty; in Rousseau’s terms, territory is both 
sovereignty’s cause and its effect.562  The boundaries of territory are no more historically fixed, 
incontestable, or apolitical than the constitution of the people itself.  Rather than existing as a 
framework for politics, these boundaries are constructed through politics, through the same kind 
                                                
561 Siba N’Zatioula Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996), Chapters 1, 2 and 6; Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  2004), Chapters 4 and 5; Agnew, Sovereignty and 
Globalization, 109-110. 
562 Drawing on the work of Jens Bartelson, I defend a similar claim in Chapter 2.  See page 70, above. 
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of political acts, relations, and negotiations that constitute the people itself.563  There is no prima 
facie reason why the marking of territorial boundaries should be treated as more foundational 
than any other sovereign act of constitution. 
Because the territorial determination of the people does not remove the people’s 
constitution from the circular interaction of authorization and constitution marked by the paradox 
of sovereignty, it does not make possible either the full authorization of the sovereign, or the 
settled constitution of the collective subject.  Consequently, it does not resolve the paradox.  
Rather, the territorial determination of the people merely displaces the political interactions that 
are essential to sovereignty onto the territorial limits of authority and subjection themselves, 
which inherit, rather than resolve, the indeterminacy, incompleteness, and contestability of 
sovereign authority and popular constitution.  More generally, the invocation of any purportedly 
pre-political source of authority or constitution is itself a political act that cannot guarantee its 
own authorization.  Hence, the appeal to historically contingent closure reiterates, rather than 
resolves, the paradox of sovereignty. 
 
Contest 
The discussion of Sieyès’s nation in Chapter 3, together with the above discussion of 
territory, suggest that positing any contingent origin, end, or interruption of sovereignty’s circle 
of authorization and constitution is itself a political act in need of authorization.  This is true even 
and especially when proposed ‘solutions’ to the paradox of sovereignty masquerade as precepts 
                                                
563 On the political nature of territory in general, see Gottman, The Significance of Territory; Sack, Human 
Territory; Agnew, Sovereignty and Globalization; Kolers, Land, Conflict, and Justice.  As Carol Pateman has 
recently shown regarding the doctrine of terra nullius, a denial or forgetting of territory’s political origins facilitated 
the development modern sovereign states and European colonialism, as well as theories of sovereignty from Vittoria 
to Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke.  See Pateman, “The Settler Contract,” in Pateman and Mills, Contract and 
Domination (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2007), 35-78.  See also Mary Butterfield, “Terra Nullius and Epistemic 
Injustice” (unpublished paper on file with the author). 
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of natural law (as in the case of Sieyès’s nation) or pre-political facts about the world (as when 
territory is treated as a given frame for, rather than also an effect of, sovereignty).  Any 
theoretical or practical attempt to dissolve the paradox with an act of political closure simply 
reiterates the paradox insofar as it demands, rather than ends, further political contest over the 
bases of authority and constitution that it invokes.  In light of this, we need to consider the 
possibility that negotiating the paradox of sovereignty requires more political contest, rather than 
less.   
If sovereign authority is never fully authorized because its collective subject is never 
finally constituted, and vice versa, and if no assumed, posited, or purported source of authority or 
constitution is sufficient to remedy this, then we may be justified in reinterpreting the paradox of 
sovereignty in a new way.  Rather than viewing the paradox as something that obstructs the 
actualization of an ideal of fully achieved, unambiguous, and unarbitrary authority and 
constitution, we can view that ideal itself—the ideal of sovereignty as the achieved end or 
resolution of political contest—as something that obstructs or obscures the possibilities for 
authorization and constitution otherwise that are continually called forth by the paradox.  From 
this perspective, the problem is not that the paradox of sovereignty prevents us from ever 
realizing the modern ideal of self-bounded, self-constituted, and self-authorized sovereignty.  
Rather, the problem is that the pursuit of this impossible ideal prevents us from acknowledging 
that what the paradox reveals—namely the interminability of sovereign bounding, constituting, 
and authorizing—is itself a site of political possibility.  
 Something like this perspective is adopted by Benhabib, Gould, Keenan, Näsström, and 
others in response to the paradox of democratic constitution.  For these theorists, the proper 
response to the paradox is not to seek its resolution or dissolution, but to make it an opportunity 
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for democratically contesting, from beyond the scope and procedures of particular constituted 
democracies, the acts of unification and differentiation through which democratic constitution 
occurs.  Näsström’s remarks are generally illustrative:  
Contrary to what is assumed by many liberal and deliberative theorists of 
legitimacy, the gap in the constitution of the people is therefore not a problem.  It 
is productive, a generative device that helps to foster ever new claims for 
legitimacy…  A fully legitimate people is indeed impossible to achieve, but 
therein resides its power.  The criteria of legitimacy make the people into a site of 
perpetual contestation.  They guarantee that the claims of a legitimate people do 
not come to a standstill.564 
 
On this view, the indeterminacy or incompleteness of the democratic people’s self-legitimation 
and self-constitution is not a failure of democracy, but a condition of its ongoing possibility.  The 
task is not to eliminate the paradox of democratic constitution, but to find normatively 
democratic means by which to continually address the democratic deficit entailed by the 
paradox.   
 Of the thinkers who take up this task, the work of Benhabib and Gould offers the clearest 
lessons for engaging, not only the paradox of democratic constitution, but also the more 
foundational paradox of sovereignty.  For both of these thinkers, the paradoxical nature of 
democratic self-constitution signals an occasion to rethink, resituate, and repoliticize the borders 
of democracy in ways that would begin to close the democratic deficit entailed by the paradox.  
After reviewing their proposals for democratizing the constitution of political communities 
beyond what is possible according to strictly defined democratic procedures, I will clarify the 
extent to which these proposals repoliticize the historically contingent and apparently apolitical 
act of closure performed by the modern state’s functional linkage of territory and sovereignty.    
On a purely theoretical level, Benhabib’s project of democratic iteration can be read as a 
way to negotiate the paradox entailed by any act of democratic self-constitution.  However, she 
                                                
564 Näsström, “Legitimacy of the People,” 626, 644. 
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clearly situates her project as a response to contemporary transformations in the relations 
between sovereignty, subjection, and community that have traditionally characterized the modern 
state.  In particular, Benhabib identifies a “crisis of territoriality,” in which the territorial borders 
of the state no longer adequately mark boundaries of political agency, obligation, identity, or 
membership.565  She writes, “The unitary model, which combined continuous residency upon a 
given territory with a shared national identity, the enjoyment of political rights, and subjection to 
a common administrative jurisdiction, is coming apart.”566  Benhabib does not explicitly theorize 
the role that territory has played in apparently resolving—or rendering invisible—the paradoxes 
of democratic constitution and sovereignty.  However, she clearly views the contemporary 
disaggregation of territoriality from important state functions, and from political community 
more generally, as necessitating a reconsideration of the limits of democratic self-constitution. 
 For Benhabib, neither the paradox itself, nor the contemporary crisis of territoriality, 
requires completely opening or fully resituating the boundaries of existing democracies.567  Nor 
does Benhabib advocate abandoning territoriality as a medium of democracy’s boundedness.  On 
her view, “The demos, as the popular sovereign, must assert control over a specific territorial 
domain…  It is incoherent to envisage the constitutional government of a people without some 
form of territorial sovereignty.”568  Rather than redrawing existing boundaries or constituting 
altogether new forms of democratic community, Benhabib argues that the boundaries of existing 
democracies should be rendered increasingly “porous.”569  This can be accomplished, she argues, 
through “reflexive acts of self-constitution, whereby the boundaries of the demos can be 
readjusted” in light of continual democratic deliberation and contest both within and beyond the 
                                                
565 Benhabib, Rights of Others, 4. 
566 Ibid., 146. 
567 Ibid., 221. 
568 Ibid., 48, 78. 
569 Ibid., 221. 
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boundaries of particular democracies.570  This is the political practice that Benhabib calls 
democratic iteration. 
 Democratic iterations are jurisgenerative processes “of public argument, deliberation, and 
exchange through which universalist rights claims and principles are contested and 
contextualized, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned, throughout legal and political 
institutions, as well as in the associations of civil society.”571  Through these processes, 
democratic peoples reappropriate and reinterpret the universal norms or guiding principles upon 
which democracy is founded (i.e. equality, freedom, protection of human rights, etc.) and 
“reiterate these principles and incorporate them into democratic will-formation processes 
through argument, contestation, revision, and rejection.”572  Through democratic iterations, in 
other words, democracy’s “context-transcending” or universal norms are continually mediated 
with the particular wills of actual democratic communities.573   
Processes of democratic iteration are not limited to the deliberative institutions of 
particular democracies.574  Rather, they also take place in the “‘weak’ publics of civil society 
associations and the media,” and may involve participants and voices that are normally excluded 
by the formal boundaries of particular polities.575  Although processes of iteration do not 
themselves have the legally-binding force of institutionalized democratic deliberation, particular 
democracies can be pressured to respond to, if not directly institutionalize, any context-
transcending consensus generated by these dynamic and inclusive democratic exchanges.576  
                                                
570 Ibid., 48. 
571 Ibid., 179. 
572 Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism, 49. 
573 Benhabib, Rights of Others, 19. 
574 Ibid., 179-181, and Another Cosmopolitanism, 71-2. 
575 Benhabib, Rights of Others, 179.; cf. 180-1, 197, 211-2, 216-221; Another Cosmopolitanism, 71-2. 
576 Although Benhabib is clear that the universal norms articulated by transnational discourses should often 
trump the “ultimate and arbitrary authority” of local sovereignty, she construes most of the pressure to adopt 
democratic norms as coming, most immediately, from within particular democracies, where activists and 
 210 
Consequently, processes of democratic iteration provide normatively, if not procedurally, 
democratic means of continually contesting and influencing the acts of differentiation by which 
particular democratic peoples bound and constitute themselves. 
The practice of democratic iteration is not meant to resolve or eliminate the paradox of 
democratic constitution.  Although the forms of closure required by democracy can be 
renegotiated by citizens and foreigners alike, it is ultimately up to the citizens themselves (i.e. the 
popular sovereign) to designate where and how their democracy bounds itself.  The paradox 
persists because the renegotiation of boundaries and the reconstitution of the democratic people 
necessarily fall short of the universality embedded in democratic norms.577  The acts of 
differentiation and closure that, for Benhabib, make democracy possible will always retain a 
trace of historical contingency or moral arbitrariness.578  However, the undemocratic impacts of 
this arbitrariness can be progressively (but never finally) minimized through the continual 
mediation of democratic particularity with the universal and context-transcending norms that 
underlie democracy itself.  Although no democratic practice can eliminate democracy’s essential 
“disjunction between the universalist content of its constitutional commitments and the 
paradoxes of democratic closure,” democratic iteration can continually repair this disjunction in 
favor of democracy’s universalist aspects.579 
                                                
policymakers have been influenced by, or participated in, wider democratic iterations.  Another Cosmopolitanism, 
24.  Cf. 51-62; Rights of Others, 176-201, 219-220.   
577 “‘We, the people,’ is an inherently fraught formula, containing in its very articulation the constitutive 
dilemmas of respect for universal human rights and nationally circumscribed sovereignty claims…  Precisely 
because democracies enact laws that are supposed to bind those who legitimately authorize them, the scope of 
democratic legitimacy cannot extend beyond the demos which has circumscribed itself as a people…  While the 
scope of the authority of the laws can be reflexively altered, it is inconceivable that democratic legitimacy can be 
sustained without some clear demarcation of those in the name of whom the laws have been enacted from those 
upon whom the laws are not binding.”  Rights of Others, 178, 218, 220.   
578 Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism, 20, 35. 
579 Benhabib, Rights of Others, 20. 
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Whereas Benhabib seeks to preserve the territorial boundaries of existing national 
democracies but open them up through transnational democratic negotiation, Gould seeks to 
articulate democratic means for determining the scope of new, transnational and trans-regional 
democratic spheres.  “The activity of globalizing,” she writes, “calls for new intersociative 
democratic relationships to develop along with the growth of transborder interdependence, not 
limited to those close to us or to political societies as such.”580  Theorizing the general contours 
of globalized democracy is, as Gould unhestitantly admits, a forward-looking and deeply 
normative project that goes “beyond a current or short-term perspective, in which nation-states 
are clearly the predominant players.”581  Like Benhabib, Gould attempts to find a normatively 
democratic response to the paradox of democratic constitution.  Unlike Benhabib, however, she 
ultimately affirms the politically contestable contingency at the heart of democratic self-
constitution and, in so doing, affirms the insolubility of the paradox of sovereignty.582 
Although Gould’s project is more radically democratic than Benhabib’s, it is not more 
utopian.583  Gould’s proposals are based in, and seek to respond to, the deepening and widening 
interdependence that characterizes contemporary social, political, environmental, and 
technological relations, and they do not look far beyond already existing political capacities. 
While the prospect of transnational and trans-regional democracy may appear farfetched to a 
                                                
580 Gould, Globalizing Democracy, 3.  Gould does not ignore the importance of territoriality and local place-
making, and she does not suggest that her principles enable democracy to transcend territory.  She writes, “The 
conception proposed here of democratic self-determination cannot completely replace the range of issues concerning 
the connection of self-determination to territory.”  Gould, “Self-Determination Beyond Sovereignty: Relating 
Transnational Democracy to Local Autonomy,” Journal of Social Philosophy, vol. 37, no. 2 (2006): 51.  Her work 
on transnational democracy differs significantly from the cosmopolitanism of Benhabib insofar as it denies any 
essential or politically fundamental link between territoriality and political participation or membership.  See 
Benhabib, Rights of Others, 218-221. 
581 Gould, “Structuring Global Democracy,” 27. 
582 Generally speaking, whereas Benhabib advocates a movement toward ever more inclusive democracy in the 
name of transcendent and universal ideals, Gould advocates the democratization of contingent solidarity and 
cooperation in the name of situated and particularized forms of freedom and self-determination. 
583 See Ibid., 29, where Gould characterizes her common activities criterion as a proposal “for radical 
democracy, endorsing a requirement for it in a range of associations and communities beyond those currently 
recognized (where this is admittedly a highly normative and distant possibility).” 
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political imagination dominated by “territorially defined, fixed and mutually exclusive enclaves 
of legitimate dominion,” the territorial nation-state has never been an uncontested mode of 
political organization.584  Rather, alternative configurations of political community, authority, and 
subjection have persisted throughout the development of the state, from the Hanseatic League 
and Iroquois Confederacy to late-modern empires and contemporary federations of political and 
economic power.585  Competitors to the territorially-based state, however, have generally not 
been conducive to democratic self-determination.  Seen from this perspective, Gould’s project is 
a matter of democratizing transnational and trans-regional political capacities that have long 
existed and are currently evolving, rather than inventing new modes of political organization 
from scratch.586   
Gould’s two principles—the common activities criterion and the modified all-affected 
principle—are intended to specify the scope of participation and representation in a plurality of 
overlapping and potentially transnational demoi.  On Gould’s view, democracy and justice are 
both grounded in a basic norm of “equal positive freedom,” understood as “prima facie equal 
rights to the conditions of freedom as self-transformative activity, whether individual or 
collective.”587  The realization of equal positive freedom requires individual self-determination 
and, by extension, equal opportunities for codetermination in all collective activities.  
Codetermination, in turn,  
requires democracy as the equal right to participate in decision making 
concerning the common activities in which individuals are engaged.  For 
                                                
584 Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond,” 151. 
585 Agnew, Sovereignty and Globalization,  27, 88-91.  See also Spruyt, Sovereign State, passim; Benno 
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587 Gould, “Structuring Global Democracy,” 28.  Gould’s notion of equal positive freedom contains, rather than 
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 213 
engaging in such common activities is itself one of the main conditions for 
individuals’ self-development, the opportunity for which requires that they be 
self-determining in this activity.588 
 
The realization of equal positive freedom through democratic codetermination of collective 
activities would entail “a radical increase in opportunities for democratic participation” 
extending far beyond typical liberal-democratic institutions.589  Because individuals participate in 
a variety of collectively transformative activities at once, opportunities for democratic 
participation are likely to overlap, compete with one another, and potentially enrich one 
another.590   
 The common activities criterion, which is the core of Gould’s proposal for defining the 
scope of democratic participation, simply formalizes these considerations.  She writes, “The 
democratic principle requires equal rights of participation in decisions concerning the common 
activities in which people engage, where such common or joint activities are understood to be 
defined by shared goals and practices.”591  Because joint activity is not limited by state borders, 
ethnic commonality, territorial integrity, or the scope of public institutions, the common 
activities criterion will specify democratic spheres that neither look nor function like the demoi 
of existing nation-states.  
 Although the common activities criterion presents collective self-determination as a 
feature of democracy itself, it does not rely upon the paradoxical notion of a democratically self-
determining demos.592  Gould writes: 
It is unlikely that we can see the initial formation of this collectivity itself as 
subject to democratic choice without entering an infinite regress…  My view of 
                                                
588 Gould, Globalizing Democracy, 35. 
589 Ibid.,  47. 
590 Gould, “Structuring Global Democracy,” 29. 
591 Ibid., 28.  More simply: “Wherever people are engaged in common activities defined by shared aims, there is 
a requirement for rights of democratic participation”. Gould, Globalizing Democracy, 208.  
592 Gould, “Self-Determination,” 48-50, and Globalizing Democracy, 174-5. 
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common activities does not see them as for the most part formed through 
democratic constitution but rather as contexts relevant for democratic decision 
that are given through the range of activities in which people cooperate to realize 
shared goals.  While, in my view, it is desirable that these be voluntarily 
constituted to the extent possible, this does not entail the circularity that would be 
involved in regarding these contexts as themselves democratically constituted.593   
 
The common activities criterion is a normatively, but not procedurally, democratic criterion.  It 
formalizes the basic democratic norms of self-determination and self-government (in the sense of 
equal participation in collective transformative activity), but it does not specify that a collective 
‘self’ must be constituted through democratic procedures like majority-rule voting.  Indeed, 
Gould importantly acknowledges that individuals do not always voluntarily participate in 
common activities: “Some of these shared contexts, particularly those associated with cultures, 
involve appropriation of traditions and histories that are initially given to us rather than created 
de novo.”594  Although we may be born or thrust into some common activities and, therefore, to 
some potential spheres of democratic decision-making, we make these activities and spheres our 
own through equally participating in their performance and transformation. 
 Gould’s second principle, a modification of the general “all-affected” principle of 
democracy, extends the sphere of democratic decision-making beyond those directly involved in 
common activities defined by shared practices and goals.  Although she recognizes the need to 
“open the institutions of global governance (or indeed even the decisions of traditional political 
communities) to input from people increasingly affected by their decisions,” Gould rejects the 
unqualified all-affected principle as “hopelessly vague” when it comes to global networks of 
interdependence.595  In its place, she proposes the following: “When people at a distance are 
impacted in regard to their possibilities for fulfilling their basic human rights because of the 
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decisions of those institutions of global governance, they have rights of input into those 
decisions.”596  Following Gould’s own simplification, this can be called the “importantly 
affected” principle, where it is understood that the principle primarily tracks impact on human 
rights, the enjoyment of which is necessary for the realization of equal positive freedom.597 
 Although Gould’s two principles are meant to facilitate political organization that would 
challenge the monopoly of nation-states over democratic decision-making and self-
determination, they do not appear, at first glance, to inspire the kind of ongoing contest 
advocated by Näsström and others.  In fact, they may appear to perform the same kind of 
historically contingent act of closure that territoriality has provided throughout the development 
of the modern, sovereign nation-state.  Some initial pre-political determination of ‘the people’ 
seems necessary to begin the interactions of authorization and constitution that are essential to 
sovereignty; if not a historically given determination based on territorial location, why not a non-
geographic determination based on common activities and impacted human rights? 
 The reason why Gould’s two principles cannot be made to function like territorial criteria 
for subjection and membership is that the two principles cannot be even apparently depoliticized.  
The common activity criterion and the importantly affected principle are self-evidently political 
through and through.  First, common activity involves “shared goals and practices,” and can be 
generally defined as “activity in which a number of individuals join together to effect a given 
end…  It essentially involves the cooperation and coordination of many individuals in the 
realization of their joint projects or purposes.”598  The core criterion for constituting a democratic 
community, then, is itself a matter of collective organization.  Gould insists that this organization 
                                                
596 Ibid., 31.  See also Globalizing Democracy, 210-216. 
597 Gould, Globalizing Democracy, 212.  See “Self-Determination,” 54, and “Structuring Global Democracy,” 
31. 
598 Gould, “Structuring Global Democracy,” 28, and Globalizing Democracy, 175. 
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need not occur through a democratic procedure (and should not, if the paradox of democratic 
constitution is to be minimized), but even still, the collective action problems involved in 
cooperating and coordinating—and even in identifying and defining a common activity in the 
first place—build contest and negotiation directly into the basic criterion for democratic 
inclusion.599  Even when shared contexts, such as traditions and histories, “are initially given to 
us” such that we find ourselves in a shared activity, this is not the same as finding ourselves in a 
particular territory, because the activity in which we engage is more immediately ours to 
appropriate, if not transform.600  The common activity criterion, in short, immediately reflects the 
organized agency of the political actors that it designates, and thereby incorporates the activity of 
collective self-organization into the basic criteria for democratic inclusion.601   
The importantly affected principle, on the other hand, does not so strongly emphasize 
active political self-organization.  Whereas the common activity criterion focuses on the agency 
of the individuals it designates, the importantly affected principle designates persons who are 
affected by that agency.602  Nonetheless, the principle does not simply reduce these individuals to 
the passive objects of others’ political action.  Gould writes, “Some participation is required in 
the sense that people need to be consulted in regard to their understanding of their basic needs 
and interests and key projects; they are the ones to give expression and shape to understanding 
                                                
599 Gould, Globalizing Democracy, 176, an “Self-Determination,” 49-50. 
600 This is not to say that traditions and histories present themselves as self-evidently transformable, or to say that 
territory is independent of human agency.  Rather, territory simply poses more convincingly as a fact about the 
world than any shared activity that is genuinely ours, in the sense of expressive of our goals, practices, and 
purposes. 
601 Gould explains that “the motivation for this emphasis on spheres of common activity is to place weight, in a 
somewhat Aristotelian fashion, on the active rather than passive side of social life, and also to provide a very general 
and preexisting criterion not deriving from democratic decision itself.”  Gould, Globalizing Democracy, 176.  The 
emphasis on the active side of social life is what keeps the common activity criterion from threatening to become a 
“very general and pre-existing criterion” that, like territorial belonging, nationality, functions by picking out the 
members of a political community.  
602 This is one of the virtues of Gould’s two principles: they bring together, within the same decision-making 
body, the individuals engaging in shared projects and the individuals affected by those projects.   
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these.”603  Negative impact on human rights does not simply announce itself, especially in 
translocal and global contexts, and the articulation of human rights violations is itself a highly 
political, contentious, and possibly dangerous expression of political agency.  Although Gould 
notes that a system of representation will be necessary to successfully articulate needs, interests, 
projects, and human rights impact at the transnational level, she intends such a system to be a 
medium, rather than a replacement, for the agency of represented individuals.604  Ultimately, 
then, the importantly affected principle also tracks the agency of the individuals it designates.  It 
too, builds political activity into the basic criteria for democratic inclusion. 
Together, Gould’s two principles designate the scope of potentially transnational 
democratic spheres, not by picking out a feature of the social world (such as territory or 
affectedness) and nominating it as the dividing line between members and non-members, but by 
highlighting the connections among the political activities (in particular, the self-organization 
and self-representation) of persons who may not share regional proximity, national identity, 
cultural heritage, or any other traditional criteria of collective political belonging.  This not only 
makes the boundaries of democratic spheres politically contestable, but also construes them as 
the self-evident institutionalization of political contest.  For Benhabib, a democratic negotiation 
of the paradox of democratic constitution requires politicizing the borders of democracy through 
“public argument, deliberation, and exchange” in the name of universal ideals.605  For Gould, on 
the other hand, the borders of democracy simply are manifestations of argument, deliberation, 
and exchange in the name of particular lived experience, insofar as these political interactions are 
necessary for the collective cooperation and coordination tracked by the first principle and the 
articulations of rights, interests, and needs tracked by the second.   
                                                
603 Gould, “Structuring Global Democracy,” 35, emphasis added. 
604 Ibid. 
605 Benhabib, Rights of Others, 179. 
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Gould’s principles do not require democratic decision-making in the determination of a 
demos, but they do formalize a democratic norm of equal participation in common activity, and 
they are intended to realize the more foundational norm of equal positive freedom.  Because of 
all this, they provide a normatively, if not procedurally, democratic means for determining the 
boundaries of democracy.  This is not, strictly speaking, a resolution of the paradox of 
democratic constitution, but it introduces important democratic commitments to guide and 
constrain the constitution of particular democratic institutions.   
However, while Gould has provided a democratic and politically constestatory means by 
which to circumvent the paradox of democratic constitution, she has not provided a means by 
which to escape the more foundational paradox of sovereignty.  On the contrary, she ultimately 
affirms the paradoxical interrelation of constitution and authorization that is essential to 
sovereignty, insofar as she fully politicizes the constitution of the demos that is the source of 
political authority.  For Gould, the decision-making body that is the source of binding law is self-
evidently constituted through the political activity—cooperation, coordination, representation—
of its members.  There is nothing apolitical or pre-political about the identification of common 
activity and the articulation of adversely impacted human rights, and there is nothing apolitical 
or pre-political about a polity constituted on the bases of these political acts.  Democracy, for 
Gould, does not begin with a particular composition of ‘the people’ that is given by some 
historically contingent but apparently pre-political act of closure.  Rather, democracy is the 
process by which ‘the people’ gives itself a composition—continually constitutes itself by 
continually closing itself—through contestable and potentially conflictual political activity.  
Whereas Benhabib’s cosmopolitanism attempts to progressively minimize the contingency that 
underlies democratic self-constitution, Gould’s principles highlight that contingency and 
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politicize it further, democratizing it in the name of particular, rather than universal, forms of 
freedom.   
Democracy is a political means of coping with irreducible contingency, and the 
boundaries of democracy are determined by what can be and has been negotiated politically, 
rather than by whatever falls outside or resists political negotiation.  In this regard, Gould’s 
implicit response to the paradox of sovereignty is almost exactly the opposite of Sieyès’s 
disastrous attempt to dissolve it.  Whereas for Sieyès, political constitution and authority are 
ultimately grounded in the “natural, common will” of a group of individuals beyond the political 
realm, for Gould political constitution and authority are continually grounded (never ultimately) 
in the artificially common will—that is, the negotiated and coordinated “shared goals and 
projects”— of a group of individuals within the political realm.606  Rather than beginning 
democratic inclusion at a starting point that is apparently removed from political contest, Gould 
begins democracy at political contest itself. 
Gould’s response to the paradox of democratic constitution offers a lesson for responding 
to the paradox of sovereignty.  As discussed, that more foundational paradox cannot be dissolved 
by a historically contingent act of political closure—even and especially one that is presented as 
an apolitical criterion of inclusion.  Rather, the paradox of sovereignty can only be negotiated 
through more political contest, rather than less.  Sovereignty, because of its paradoxical nature, is 
an invitation to contest.  Even when it appears incontestable—especially when it appears 
incontestable—it is a site, rather than an end, of politics.  
                                                
606 Gould, “Structuring Global Democracy,” 28. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this dissertation, I have identified and elaborated a paradox inherent in the modern 
ideal of sovereignty as supreme, independent, and bounded political authority.  In doing so, I 
have not argued that sovereign states are impossible fictions; nor have I argued that sovereignty 
is an incoherent concept with no referent.  Rather, I have shown that the paradox marks a 
political tension within one of the most influential norms of modern politics.  In this brief 
conclusion, I will indicate how attention to the paradox of sovereignty might reorient 
contemporary debates concerning the purported eclipse of modern sovereignty or the retreat of 
the sovereign state.  Although my remarks here are intended to bring closure to the preceding 
discussion, a full elaboration and defense of these new claims will have to await another 
occasion. 
The paradox of sovereignty expresses a conjunction of conflicting political ideals rather 
than a conjunction of contradictory propositions.  On one hand, sovereignty is idealized as a 
form of political authority that, as both a condition and an expression of its internal supremacy 
and external independence, determines the limits of its own jurisdiction and constitutes its own 
collective subject.  The sovereign authoritatively constitutes the people.  This ideal of the 
imperious sovereign—which appears in the work of modern thinkers as diverse as Bodin, 
Hobbes, Rousseau, and Hegel—is evident in the everyday activities by which political 
communities police their own boundaries and differentiate between members and non-members, 
or citizens, subjects, and aliens.  On the other hand, sovereignty is idealized as a form of political 
authority that, like any other form of authority, can only be exercised with the authorization of its 
subject.  The sovereign depends upon the people for its authority.  This ideal of the indebted 
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sovereign—which appears in the work of not only Locke and Marx, but also Machiavelli and 
others who greatly emphasize the imperious aspect of sovereign authority—is evident in the 
procedures, rituals, and practices by which the agents of sovereignty are authorized in the name 
of the people.  These opposed idealizations do not cancel one another out.  Rather, modern 
sovereignty is idealized as simultaneously imperious and indebted.  Paradoxically, the sovereign 
authoritatively constitutes the people that is the collective agent of its own authorization.   
This circular interrelation of constitution and authorization prevents both the constitution 
of the people, and the authorization of the sovereign, from ever being fully or finally achieved.  It 
is because the sovereign authoritatively constitutes the basis of its own authority that both its 
authority and the people’s constitution remain indeterminate, incomplete, and politically up for 
grabs.  Because there is no incontestable source of sovereign authority, the sovereign may always 
be reauthorized, deauthorized, or differently authorized by its collective subject.  Because there 
is no incontestable source of popular constitution, the people may always be reconstituted, 
unconstituted, or differently constituted by the sovereign.  Sovereignty, like authority more 
generally, is a dynamic, negotiable, and contestable political relation.  This truth is not limited to 
democracies, which explicitly institutionalize political contest over sources of authority and 
constitution.  Rather, anywhere that sovereign authority constitutes the people over which it is 
exercised, both the authority of the sovereign, and the constitution of the people, are occasions 
for—rather than resolutions of—political contestation. 
Attention to the paradox of sovereignty reveals that sovereignty is not a characteristic, 
property, or quality of certain political communities, but a mode through which political 
communities are made and continually remade.  Sovereign authority requires boundaries 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and it creates these boundaries itself, by limiting its own jurisdiction, 
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bounding its subjects, and constituting the collective subject that authorizes it.  In this way, 
sovereign and subject come into being together, qua sovereign and subject, not prior to 
sovereignty but through it.  Balibar expresses this clearly, in a passage referred to earlier: “In 
reality it is precisely the correlation between inside and outside that makes sovereignty what it is 
(and, above all, that constitutes a ‘political community’ submitted to a sovereign authority and in 
some sense ‘created’ by it, or creating itself through the institution of sovereignty).”607  Balibar’s 
ambivalence gestures to the paradoxical circularity that is essential to sovereignty.  Sovereign 
authority does indeed constitute its own collective subject, but insofar as that authority emanates 
from the very subject that it constitutes, it is equally accurate to say, with Marx and against 
Hegel, that the collective subject of sovereignty—the people—constitutes itself through the 
institution of the sovereign.  Although the modern ideal of sovereignty supports both of these 
interpretations, actual political relations do not usually reflect both of them equally.  
The preceding chapter suggests a qualification to Balibar’s otherwise accurate portrayal 
of modern sovereignty.  The constitution of the political community, together with the 
correlation between inside and outside that is both the condition and effect of sovereign 
authority, must be continually established if they are to endure.  Sovereign authority is a mode by 
which collective subjects are constituted (or by which collective subjects constitute themselves), 
but sovereign authority never finally constitutes its collective subject.  Rather than settling or 
affirming the constitution of the people, sovereignty calls that constitution into question at the 
same time that it enacts it, insofar as the act of sovereign constitution always exceeds or outpaces 
its authorization.  Sovereignty is indeed a mode by which political communities are constituted 
(or constitute themselves) through acts of boundary drawing, inclusion, exclusion, and 
differentiation.  However, the continual constitution of the political community through 
                                                
607 Étienne Balibar, We, the People of Europe? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 158. 
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sovereign authority also continually undermines the possibility of any final or settled constitution 
of the community.  The achievement and exercise of sovereignty is an occasion for contest over 
the constitution of a political community, rather than an end or conclusion of such contest. 
This interpretation of modern sovereignty is in some ways contrary to appearances.  Very 
often, sovereignty is claimed or announced in order to end or to prevent contest, rather than to 
invite more.  This is the case, for example, when a seceding or decolonizing people declares 
itself sovereign, or an established state invokes its sovereign right to non-interference, or actors 
within civil society or a government reject foreign influences, goods, or persons in the name of 
local sovereignty.  In such cases, where the invocation of sovereignty is meant to trump 
negotiation and stop political contest, sovereignty is portrayed as a characteristic, property, 
prerogative, or achievement of an already existing, constituted, identified, recognized or 
assumed political community: We, the people, declare ourselves sovereign; you cannot make us 
do that because we are a sovereign state; we reject this (or you) in order to preserve our 
sovereignty.  There would appear to be a community prior to or behind the invocation of 
sovereignty, which achieves, enjoys, and protects its sovereignty.   
This appearance conceals what the paradox of sovereignty reveals: that sovereignty is an 
ideal of active and ongoing political constitution and authorization, a mode of people-making 
rather than a property of particular peoples.  This concealment has long been accomplished by 
the kind of contingent political closure that I discussed, in the previous chapter, as one possibility 
for politically negotiating sovereignty’s paradox.  When the members of the people are 
nominated by an apparently natural, empirically given, or pre-political criterion for unification 
and differentiation, the circular interrelation of constitution and authorization that is essential to 
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sovereignty disappears, and the people appears to be prior to, and separate from, the exercise of 
sovereign authority that in fact constitutes it.   
Throughout the history of modern sovereignty, the boundaries of territory have played 
this role.  Behind theoretical articulations of sovereignty from Machiavelli to Benhabib, and 
underlying practical articulations of sovereignty from the centralization of Capetian authority in 
thirteenth and fourteenth century France to the identification of self-determining nations during 
twentieth century decolonization, territory has served as a “substrate” of the people over which 
sovereignty is to be exercised.608  “Territoriality is… a principle that defines the set of people 
over whom the holder of sovereignty rules.  They are to be identified, territoriality says, by virtue 
of their location within borders.”609  When the members of the people are defined by reference to 
territory, and territory is assumed to be prior to sovereignty—as it is in the “sovereign territorial 
ideal” that construes sovereignty as exercised “first of all on a territory and consequently on the 
subjects who inhabit it”—then the people appears to preexist the sovereign authority to which it 
is subject.610  In other words, the territorially defined people appears as something that may be 
brought under sovereign authority, or exercise sovereignty over itself, rather than as something 
that is constituted by and through the exercise of sovereign authority.   
It is this traditional link between territory and sovereignty, rather than sovereignty itself, 
that is most threatened by the contemporary forms of globalization and transnationalization that 
purportedly herald the “anachronism” of state sovereignty, the “passing” of the “Westphalian 
                                                
608 Concerning the relation of nationality to the paradox of democratic constitution, Benhabib writes: “According 
to this view, analytically, even if not historically, the political community of fate, or the nation, precedes the 
democratic people and constitutes the substrate of the democratic state.” Another Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 167.  My claim is that territory—and the territorially defined nation—has performed a 
similar role vis-à-vis the sovereign state and the paradox of sovereignty more generally.  
609 Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 17. 
610 Alexander Murphy, “The Sovereign State System as a Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary 
Considerations” in State Sovereignty as a Social Construct, T. Biersterker and C . Weber, eds. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 82; Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de 
France 1977—1978, M. Senellart, ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 96. 
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moment,” or the “end of the nation-state.”611  Territory has long provided the frame in which the 
modern ideal of sovereignty might be realized, not by nominating a space over which authority 
can be exerted, but by nominating the persons among whom a particular kind of authority 
relation can be established.  Even if territory is increasingly unable to frame and facilitate 
sovereignty in this way, this does not by itself entail the eclipse of modern sovereignty or the 
retreat of the sovereign state.  Rather, sovereignty—as internally supreme, externally 
independent, self-bounding authority that constitutes its own subject—may persist beyond the 
“territorially defined, fixed, and mutually exclusive enclaves” in which it has usually been 
exercised.612  Indeed, some theorists have argued that we are currently witnessing precisely that: 
not a dissolution of modern sovereignty, but a deterritorialization (or reterritorialization) of 
sovereignty, through which supreme, independent, and self-bounding political authority is 
becoming increasingly disconnected from its traditional territorial boundaries.613   
The preceding discussion of the paradox of sovereignty can shed light on the stakes of 
this transformation.  Throughout the history of modern politics, ‘sovereignty’ has named an ideal 
of political authority that appears incontestable both within and beyond its jurisdiction.  This 
appearance relies upon a denial or suppression of sovereignty’s paradoxical nature, which has 
                                                
611 Ingeborg Maus, “From Nation-State to Global State, or the Decline of Democracy,” Constellations 13, no. 4 
(2006), 465; Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach, Remapping Global Politics: History’s Revenge and Future 
Shock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1; Jean-Marie Guehenno, The End of the Nation-State 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), passim.  The uniqueness, details, meanings, and consequences 
of contemporary globalization are widely debated.  For overviews of these debates, see David Held and Anthony 
McGrew, The Global Transformations Reader (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004) and Globalization/Anti-
Globalization (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2008); John Agnew, Sovereignty and Globalization (New York: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 2009). 
612 John Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,” International 
Organization 47, no. 1 (1993): 151. 
613 This type of argument is made in Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond;” Neil Brenner, “Beyond State-
centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies,” Theory and Society 28, no. 1 
(1999): 45; Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006); Agnew, Sovereignty and Globalization.  A conception of deterritorialized 
sovereignty—albeit not one I share exactly—is the core of Michael Hart and Antonio Negri’s Empire (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2000). 
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been in turn facilitated by the territorial borders that designate the collective subject of 
sovereignty prior to its constitution through sovereign authority.  If sovereignty is to continue to 
play the roles that it has throughout the history of modern politics, then new boundaries will have 
to replace territorial borders as the apparently natural, given, apolitical, or de-politicized frame 
within which sovereignty might be realized.  
Recent political theory and practice have suggested non-territorial criteria of political 
belonging that could do precisely this work.  For example, modified versions of democracy’s 
“all-affected” principle might treat affectedness as an empirically determinable variable, rather 
than a politically contestable claim, and thereby generate apparently pre-political boundaries 
within which sovereignty—and possibly democracy—might be achieved.614  Perhaps even more 
illustrative is the concept of “community of fate,” which has sometimes replaced territorial 
nationality as an apparently pre-political criterion for differentiating between the members and 
non-members of political communities.615  Although both of these potential frames of 
sovereignty are self-evidently non-territorial, they function like territory by placing the 
determination of the collective subject of sovereignty beyond political contest and, more 
precisely, beyond the interrelated acts of constitution and authorization that comprise the politics 
and paradox of sovereignty.  In this way, empirical variants of the all-affected principle and 
emerging notions of community of fate facilitate the kind of unauthorized closure discussed in 
Chapter 4.  In doing so, for better or worse, they enable the preservation of modern forms of 
sovereignty beyond modern sovereignty’s territorial frame. 
                                                
614 For a proposal of this kind, see David Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1995), Chapter 10, especially pages 233-8.  But see also 237, fn. 6, where Held notes that tests of affectedness 
(“extensiveness”) will be contentious. 
615 Communities of fate are critically discussed in Seyla Benhabib, Rights of Others (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 204-7, 211, and Another Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 63-9, 
167-9; Carol Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
170.
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The previous discussion, and attention to the paradox of sovereignty more generally, 
suggest an alternative orientation to the present or potential deterritorialization of sovereign 
authority.  Absent a convincingly de-politicized frame to nominate the collective subject of 
sovereign authority prior to its constitution, the paradox of sovereignty becomes apparent.  
“Sovereignty only reigns over what it is capable of interiorizing,” but unless there is already 
some given or pre-political version of the people, sovereign acts of interiorization are always 
under-authorized—i.e., are always in some sense less than sovereign—insofar as the collective 
agent of authorization must be produced through the very acts that stand in need of 
authorization.616  As Bonnie Honig, Sophia Näsström, Seyla Benhabib, and Carol Gould 
differently recognize, this kind of deficit can be politically productive, insofar as the imperfect 
authority of the sovereign and the incomplete constitution of the people afford opportunities for 
contesting and challenging the acts of interiorization, exteriorization, and boundary drawing that 
are both the cause and effect of sovereign authority and the constitution of the people.  
A politics that affirms the paradox of sovereignty, rather than suppressing it through an 
historically contingent act of political closure, might call attention to the discrepancy between, 
on one hand, the ideal of sovereignty as supreme and independent authority that constitutes its 
own collective subject and, on the other hand, the necessarily deficient authorization of every 
sovereign act of constitution.  At a general and abstract level, this kind of politics would not seek 
to find new natural, empirical, or apolitical frames in which sovereignty might be realized, but 
would call attention to the politically contestable nature of all such frames, including 
deterritorialized and de-politicized communities of empirically identified (rather than politically 
articulated) affected interests or common fates.  At a more concrete level, such a politics would 
call attention to the necessarily under-authorized quality of particular acts of sovereign 
                                                
616 Giles Deleuze and Felix Guatarri, A Thousand Plateaus (London: Continuum, 2004), 397.  
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constitution, such as those operations of inclusion and exclusion, or interiorization and 
exteriorization, which occur, not only at the territorial borders of sovereign states, but anywhere 
that the subjects of sovereignty are differentiated from non-subjects.  Finally, a politics that 
affirms the paradox of sovereignty would not merely look forward to globalization or 
transnationalization as the end, eclipse, or retreat of modern sovereignty.  Rather, such a politics 
would seek global or transnational resources for making good on the subversive potential that 
has always been latent in even the most conservative conceptions of modern sovereignty, namely 
that the sovereign state of exception—the moment when sovereign rule exceeds normal 
authorization in order to act ‘beyond the law’, as it necessarily does in every act of sovereign 
constitution—is not a moment of incontestable authority, but a moment when sovereign 
authority is at its most contestable. 
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